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Gentlemen:
This technical report culminates nearly three years of Mariner/Voyager
studies at Boeing. During this time, we have gained an appreciation of the
magnitude of the task, and feel confident that the experience, resources
and dedication of The Boeing Voyager Team can adequately meet the challenge.
The Voyager management task is accentuated by three prime requirements:
An inflexible schedule of launch opportunities; the need for an information-
retrieval system capable of reliable high-traffic transmission over inter-
planetary distances; and a spacecraft design flexible enough to accommodate
a number of different mission requirements. We believe the technical
approach presented here satisfies these design requirements, and that
management techniques developed by Boeing for space programs will assure
delivery of operable systems at each critical launch date.
Mr. E. G. Czarnecki has been assigned program management responsibility.
His group will be ably assisted by Electro-Optical Systems in the area of
spacecraft power, Philco Western Development Laboratories will be respon-
sible for telecommunications, and the Autonetics Division, North American
Aviation will provide the auto-pilot and attitude reference system. This
team has already demonstrated an excellent working relationship during the
execution of the Phase IA contract, and will have my full confidence and
support during subsequent phases.
This program will report directly to George H. Stoner, Vice President and
Assistant Division Manager for Launch and Space Systems. Mr. Stoner has
the authority to assign the resources necessary to meet the objectives as
specified by JPL.
The Voyager Spacecraft System represents to us more than a business oppor-
tunity or a new product objective. We view it as a chance to extend
scientific knowledge of the universe while simultaneously contributing
to national prestige and we naturally look forward to the opportunity of
sharing in this adventure.
_Lys_le A Wood
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INTRODUCTION
In fulfillment of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Contract 951111,
the Aero-Space Division of The Boeing Company submits the Voyager Space-
craft Final Technical Report. The complete report, responsive to the
documentation requirements specified in the Statement of Work, consists
of the five following documents:
VOLUME TITLE
A
B
C
D
E
Preferred Design Flight Spacecraft and
Hardware Subsystems
Part I
Section 1.0 Voyager 1971 Mission Objectives
and Design Criteria
Section 2.0
Section 3.0
Part II
Section 4.0
Part III
Section 5.0
Section 6.0
Section 7.0
Design Characteristics and
Restraints
System Level Functional Descriptions
of Flight Spacecraft
Functional Description for Space-
craft Hardware Subsystems
Schedule and Implementation Plan
System Reliability Summary
Integrated Test Plan Development
Alternate Designs Considered--Flight Spacecraft
and Hardware Subsystems
Design for Operational Support Equipment
Design for 1969 Test Spacecraft
Design for Operational Support Equipment
for 1969 Test Flight Spacecraft
BOEING
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
D2-82709-I
D2-82709-2
D2-82709-4
D2-82709-5
For convenience the highlights of the above documentation have been sum-
marized to give an overview of the scope and depth of the technical
effort and management implementation plans produced during Phase IA.
This summary is contained in Volume O, Program Highlights and Management
Philosophy, D2-82709-0. A number of supporting documents are provided
to furnish detailed information developed through the course of the
contract and to provide substantiating reference material which would
not otherwise be readily available to JPL personnel. Additionally, a
full scale mockup of the preferred design spacecraft has been assembled.
This mockup, shown in Figure I, has been delivered to JPL. The mockup
has been provided with the view that it would be of value to JPL in sub-
sequent Voyager Spacecraft System planning. Mr. William M. Allen,
President of The Boeing Company, Mr. Lysle A. Wood, Vice-President and
Aero-Space Division General Manager, Mr. George H. Stoner, Vice-President
and Assistant Division Manager responsible for Launch and Space Systems
activities, and Mr. Edwin G. Czarnecki, Voyager Program Manager, are
shown wlth the mockup.
During the 3-month period covered by Contract 951111, Boeing has:
i) Performed system analysis and trade studies necessary to achieve
an optimum or preferrod design of the Flight Spacecraft.
2) Determined the requirements and constraints which are imposed upon
the Flight Spacecraft by the 1971 mission and by the other systems
and elements of the project, including the science payload.
3) Developed functional descriptions for the Flight Spacecraft and for
each of its hardware subsystems, excluding the science payload.
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Figure 1: Preferred Design Mockup 
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Edwin G. Czarnecki 
Lysle A. Wood 
George H. Stoner 
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Determined the requirements for the Flight Spacecraft associated
Operational Support Equipment (OSE) necessary to accomplish the
Voyager 1971 mission.
Developed a preliminary design of the OSE.
Developed functlonal descriptions for the OSE.
Determined the objectives of a 1969 test flight and the design of
the 1969 Test Flight Spacecraft using the Atlas/Centaur Launch
Vehicle. An alternate test flight program is presented which
utilizes the Saturn iB/Centaur Launch Vehicle.
Deveoped functional descriptions for the Flight Spacecraft Bus, and
its hardware subsystems, and OSE for the 1969 test spacecraft.
Updated and supplemented the Voyager Implementation Plan originally
contained in the response to JPL Request for Proposal 3601.
The Voyager program management Team, shown in Figure 2 is under the
direction of Mr. Edwin G. Czarnecki. Mr. Czarnecki is the single
executive responsible to JPL and Boeing management for the accomplish-
ment of the Voyager Spacecraft Phase IA, and will direct subsequent
phases of the program. He reports directly to Mr. George H. Stoner
who has the authority to commit those corporate resources necessary to
fulfill JPL's Voyager Spacecraft System objectives.
Although Boeing has a technical management capability in all aspects
of the Voyager Program, it is planned to extend this capability in
depth through association with companies recognized as specialists in
certain fields. Use of team members to strengthen Boeing's capability
was considered early during pre-proposal activities. The basic concept
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was to add team members who would complement Boeing experience and
capability, and significantly improve the amount and quality of tech-
nical and management activities. Based upon competitive considerations
including experience and past performance and giving strongest emphasis
to technical qualifications and management willingness to support the
Voyager effort, Autonetics, Philco Western Deveopment Laboratories, and
Electro-Optics Systems were chosen as team members. This team arrange-
ment, subject to JPL approval, is shown in Figure 3. The flight space-
craft design and integration task to be accomplished by this team is
illustrated in Figure 4. Discussions leading to the formation of this
team were initiated late in 1964, formal work statement agreements have
been arrived at, and there has been a continuous and complete free
exchange of information and documentation; permitting the Boeing team to
satisfy JPL's requirements in depth and with confidence.
BOEING VOYAGER TEAM
VOYAGER SPACECRAFT AND SPACE SCIENCES PAYLOAD INTEGRATION CONTRACTOR
The Boeing Company
Seattle_ Washington
Mr. E. G. Czarnecki - Program Manager
SUBCONTRACTOR
Autonetics, North
American Aviation
Anaheim, California
Autopilot
and
Attitude Reference
Subsystem
Mr. R. R. Mueller
Program Manager
SUBCONTRACTOR
Philco, Western Development
Laboratories
Palo Alto, California
Telecommunications
Subsystem
Mr. G. C. Moore
Program Manager
SUBCONTRACTOR
Electro-Optical Systems
Incorporated
Pasadena, California
Electrical Power
Subsystem
Mr. C. I. Cummings
Program Manager
Figure 3
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SUMMARY--VOLUME A
The Boeing team's flight spacecraft represents a conservative design
based upon selection of space-proven components. The design meets the
objectives of the Voyager program for 1969 through 1977 opportunities.
The 250-pound science payload, as well as the 2300 or 4500 pound flight
capsule can be accommodated and all program and mission objectives
achieved.
The Voyager Spacecraft is shown in Figure 4 with equipment deployed in
the operational configuration. It is 30 feet wide from solar panel tip
to solar panel tip, and the body is 59-inches high. The 31-foot magnet-
ometer boom and 17- and 18-foot antenna booms are shown in position.
Estimated weight at this state of the preliminary design is 1565 pounds
for the spacecraft, and 3400 pounds for the propulsion module. A con-
tingency of 285 pounds of the specification weight of 5250 pounds is
available for selective use during the detail design phase. The 20
equipment modules are fastened to the central magnesium shell with
cooling provided by thermal radiation from the external faces of the
package. Thermal control is by space-facing louvers.
Outstanding design features of the Boeing team's Voyager Spacecraft are
its ability to perform reliably, transmit data to Earth at encounter at
the 50,000 bit-per-second rate generated in the science package, and
meet all mission energy requirements through 1977 with a single propul-
sion module design. Use of redundancy in critical components and
selection of proven designs requiring a minimum of additional development
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resulted in an overall mission success probability of 47 percent,
exceeding the specified 45 percent, including an allocation of 0.674
for the science payload.
The spacecraft can enter biologically safe orbits with periods as low
as 18 hours from Mars approach velocities as high as 3.5 km/sec., or with
periods less than 9 hours from approach velocities as high as 3.0 km/sec.
The 18-hour orbit provides coverage of four different swaths of Mars
surface in the first three days after encounter.
In 1971, orbits are available which have no occultation of Canopus or
the Sun for the first 60 days in orbit. The periapsis positions are at
southern latitudes and at illumination angles which favor the black and
white TV experiment. Some adjustment of periapsis position is available
with "off-periapsis" orbit insertion techniques. The "off-periapsis"
insertion technique allows the utilization of the fixed-total-impulse
solid motor for all approach velocities considered.
The telecommunications design includes completely redundant radio sub-
systems. It features an 8' x 12' paraboloidal high-gain antenna, two
50-watt traveling wave tubes and bi-orthogonal block coding to obtain
the high data rate. The 50-watt tube selection is supported by three
separate tube designs including test data. Detailed link calculations
substantiate a positive communication link margin under worst-case
conditions at Mars encounter, with a calculated 48,000 bits per second
data rate. (Upon definition of the precise science payload data rate,
the telecommunications link can be optimized to that value.) For
13
longer communication ranges, alternate lower data modes and two tape
recorders with storage capability for 2 x 108 bits of scientific data
are provided. Two 72,000 bit buffers provide temporary storage of
spacecraft engineering and capsule data.
The spacecraft propulsion subsystem consists of a solid motor with an
oblate spheroidal case for Mars orbit insertion and four 50-pound thrust,
jet vane controlled, hydrazine engines operating in pairs for midcourse
and orbit trim. The solid propellant motor with a specific impulse of
about 300 pounds force seconds per pound mass delivers 10,500 pounds
maximum thrust and burns regressively to provide not more than 2.2 g's
acceleration. Solid motor TVC is by a Freon secondary injection system.
With the available 2306 pounds of solid propellant, an orbit insertion
velocity increment of 5700 feet per second is attained. The 50-pound
thrust monopropellant engines With a specific impulse of 235 pound
force seconds per pound mass have multiple restarting capability. These
engines utilize the spontaneous decomposition catalyst. Hydrazine fuel
capacity is adequate for 929 total seconds of operation.
Reaction control is produced by expulsion of sterile nitrogen through
two redundant sets of eight .25 pound thrusters each, which are body-
mounted on the spacecraft. Four titanium tanks contain 60 pounds of
cold nitrogen for reaction control and propulsion requirement. The
45 pounds allocated to reaction control is adequate for the 6-month orbital
mission with a safety factor of 2. Under nominal conditions, the nitrogen
supply is adequate for four years. Both propulsion systems, plus the
reaction control subsystem, are assembled in a single sub-module mounted
14
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in the spacecraft. This modular arrangement permits complete assembly
and checkout, including sterilization, prior to installation on the
spacecraft. The propulsion and reaction control systems including all
fuel and gas supplies are sterilized to avoid planetary contamination
by propulsion ejecta.
The selected attitude reference and autopilot subsystems are comprised
of an attitude reference module, autopilot module, and coarse and fine
Sun sensors. The attitude reference module includes three redundant
Autonetics G-10 gas-bearing gyros, two redundant accelerometers, two
redundant Canopus sensors and two fine Sun sensors. The coats Sun
sensors are located on two solar panels. The autopilot is an analog
type and maintains spacecraft orientation to within !0.4 degree in
cruise, _0.2 degree in Mars orbit, and the limit cycle period is sever-
al hours. All selected components are existing designs with operation
and qualification experience.
The electrical power system is similar to Mariner IV, with three solar
panels, 8-1/2' x 13', consisting of two sections each. The total area
of 236 square feet provides 627 watts of power at the distance of Mars
from the Sun. A flat solar cell arrangement is used; three silver cad-
mium batteries are provided for use during off-Sun periods. The power
subsystem regulates and distributes the electrical power to subsystems
where additional power conditioning is performed. A 50=percent increase
in power is possible by addition of one section to each solar panel.
15
The Voyager central computer and sequencer (CC&S) provides timing func-
tions and command signals to all other spacecraft subsystems. A magnetic
core memory provides storage for 256 21-bit words and a capability to
execute 333 different commands. The CC&S minimizes the need for detail
ground commands by incorporating preplanned operational sequences. All
commands and stored instructions can be monitored and controlled from the
ground for complete analysis and control during the entire mission. A
modified NASA Lunar Orbiter programmer has been selected as the basic
element. This memory-oriented digital computer has been space-qualified
and addition of redundant data processing and switching circuits provide
a highly reliable unit.
The spacecraft structure includes a simple truss base, i0 feet wide at
the bottom and 5 feet wide at the top, fabricated of 6AL4V titanium
tubing. This base attaches to the Centaur adapter and supports the
antenna and solar panel appendages. The electronic packages are con-
nected to a five-foot diameter, cylindrical, magnesium shell installed
above the truss. The flight capsule is supported by an adapter ring with
loads carried by four columns through the cylindrical shell.
A number of major technical problems were encountered and studied in
developing the preliminary design. The most significant of these were
as follows:
l) The assessment of the most reliable and highest power transmitter
tube meeting the Voyager requirements;
16
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2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i0)
ll)
12)
The overall spacecraft magnetics problem with particular attention
to the magnetic focusing field for the traveling wave tube.
Availability and reliability of spacecraft recorders.
Selection of a reliable secondary battery with adequate recycle life.
Estimation of solar panel degradation from electromagnetic radiation
and meteoroids during the mission.
The trade-off between proven instruments versus new and inherently
simpler instruments.
Determination of the degree aid type of redundancy, for example,
using two identical instruments of two difference designs.
The effect of the solid engine exhaust on the structure and solar
panel temperature.
Accommodating the length of the orbit insertion engine.
Selection of installation technique for the equipment packages.
Selection of the thrust vector control technique.
Effect of heat soak sterilization on equipment.
These problems are the key technical considerations in developing the
preferred design.
The subsystems of the Boeing team's spacecraft provide a conservative and
highly reliable design. No state-of-the-art advances are required to meet
the design criteria for any subsystem.
@
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5.0 SCHEDULES AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The schedules and plans developed by Boeing for the Voyager Spacecraft
System complement and extend the technical approach discussed in the pre-
vious sections of this volume.
During Phase IA, Boeing Voyager Spacecraft System personnel have responded
to the Statement of Work by developing schedules and plans based on a
thorough understanding of the mission objectives, related JPL publica-
tions, and other program requirements. Techniques used to tailor the
schedules and implementation plan are founded on experience with develop-
ment type programs that require rapid reaction to change.
The schedules and plans reflect consideration of the preferred design,
results of schedule trade studies, various government publications, and
customer management practices. Although the schedules and implementa-
tion plans were developed to satisfy a specific Statement of Work, they
are flexible enough to be readily modified.
The selecZion of Autonetics as another major subcontractor has increased
the technical strength and capabilities of the Boeing Voyager team.
Total company commitment to the Voyager Spacecraft System demonstrated
during the Phase IA activity was publicly endorsed by Mr. William M.
Allen, President of The Boeing Company, when he said:
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"The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration's Voyager
Program for which the Aero-Space Division is now competing,
promises to be the major effort for unmannedexploration of
the planets for the next fifteen to twenty years.
Wewant to be a major contributor to the Voyager Program. It
is a key project in an expanding area of business and will
place the successful company in a commanding position in the
field of unmanned spacecraft."
Based on its understanding of the overall Voyager mission, Boeing is con-
fident that its scheduies and impiementation pIans wiii iead toward
success for a 1969 test fiight and primary fiights in i9?I and i973.
Boeing is prepared to support JPL in aII management and technicaI areas
of the Voyager Project as desired and requested. The combination of
JPL's demonstrated Ieadership in interpIanetary expIoration and Boeing's
experience in design, assembiy and test, and systems integration consti-
tutes a team most iikeiy to attain overaIi mission success--both for
Voyager and for future probes of outer space.
5.2 SCOPE
The schedules and implementation plans presented in this section relate
specificaIIy to the preferred design of the Spacecraft and Operationai
Support Equipment (OSH) and take advantage of the versatiiity inherent
in this design. Three master scheduIes are presented. They are:
I) The accompiishment of a i97i mission without a prior test fiight.
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2)
3)
The accomplishment of a 1971 mission preceded by a test flight in
1969 using Atlas/Centaur.
The accomplishment of a 1971 mission preceded by a test flight in
1969 using Saturn IB/Centaur.
Detailed analysis and schedule trade studies of the alternate spacecraft
designs discussed in Volume B indicate that the adoption of any one of
these alternates will have no significant effects or implications on the
schedules and implementation plans related to the preferred spacecraft
design. Moreover, the schedules presented herein are sufficiently flex-
ible to accommodate, without significant impact, any combination of the
features of the alternate spacecraft designs.
Summary implementation plans which are a preview of the detailed plans
to be submitted in the Phase IB proposed are presented separately in
this section. They include a Management Structure that encompasses the
Boeing Voyager Spacecraft System management structure and the separate
management structures of its three major subcontractors. A comprehensive
Project Control Plan, based on an Integrated Management System, is also
presented.
Product Assurance is discussed in summary form. The Quality Program
Plan summarizes the Quality Assurance System and Quality Control System
recommended for the Voyager Spacecraft while the Reliability Program
Plan describes how Boeing intends to meet the reliability requirements
imposed by IPL. A Configuration Management Plan is presented describing
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how disciplines used by Boeing on other programs will be applied on the
Voyager.
The Manufacturing Plan discussed the in-plant manufacture of structural
components, the assembly and installation of electrical/electronic com-
ponents and systems manufactured by Boeing and suppliers. The Procure-
ment Plan summarizes Boeing procurement policies that will be administered
on the Voyager, highlights some of the major procurement tasks and how
they will be accomplished. A Safety Plan is also presented which estab-
lishes system safety direction and control. The section concludes with a
project control system proposed by Boeing for JPL's use in managing the
Voyager Project.
With respect to the plans mentioned in this paragraph, Boeing is thor-
oughly familiar with the contents of NPC 200-2, NPC 250-1, NPC 500-1,
AFSCM 375-1, and other customer management practices.
5.3 APPLICABLE DOCUM£NYATION
The applicable documentation used in the preparation of Section 5.0 is
listed below. Copies of pertinent reference Boeing documents (*) are
being submitted with this report.
5.3.1
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Boeing Documentation
D2-14727-I, Change Processing Manual - Minuteman
D2-15000, Configuration Management Manual - Minuteman
D2-23814-I, Reliability Technology Resources - Aero-Space Division
D2-23850-3, Voyager Spacecraft System Proposal, Volume III, Manage-
ment, Organization and Scheduling
D2-80027, Safety Design Requirements, X-20 Program
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6)
V)
8)
9)
lO)
ll)
12)
D2-82709-I
D2-82707-I, General Requirements - Voyager Spacecraft System
*D2-82724-I, Voyager Spacecraft System Reliability Analysis
*D2-82724-2, Voyager Spacecraft System Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
*D2-82724-3, Voyager Program Reliability - Analysis and Prediction
Standards
D2-I00151, Reliability Program Plan - Lunar Orbiter
D2-I00174, Configuration Management Plan - Lunar Orbiter
D5-I1423, Proposed Saturn V Configuration Management Implementation
Study for Marshall Space Flight Center
5.3.2 Other Documentation
i) ANA Bulletin 445, Air Force Navy Aeronautical Bulletin-Engineering
Changes to Weapons, Systems, Equipment, and Facilities
2) JPL Volume 45, Voyager 1971 Mission Specification
3) JPL Volume 46, Voyager 1971 Mission Guidelines
4) MIL-D-70327 Drawing, Hngineering and Associate Lists
5) MIL-Q-9858A, Quality Program Requirements
6) MIL-Q-21549B, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Fleet
Ballistic Missile Weapon System Contractors
7) NPC 200-2, Quality Program Provisions for Space System Contractors
8) NPC 200-3, Inspection System Provisions for Suppliers of Space
Materials, Parts, Components, and Services
9) NPC 250-1, Reliability Program Provisions for Space System
Contractors
NPC 500-1, Apollo Program Configuration Management Manual
AFSCM 375-1, Configuration Management During Definition and Acquisition
lO)
ll)
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12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
AFSCM 375-2, System Program Management and Industrial Management
Assistance Survey
AFSCM 375-3, System Program Office
AFSCM 375-4, System Program Management
AFSCM 375-5, System Engineering Management
AFSCM 375-6, System Management Development Engineering
30265-General Specification, Spacecraft Flight Equipment, Pressure
System, Safety Requirements for
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05.4 SCHEDULES AND SCHEDULE ANALYSIS
The unalterable launch window for the 1971 mission is the primary con-
straint on the program master schedule for the Voyager Spacecraft System.
The special significance of this constraint must be carefully consi-
dered in every technical and programming decision. The master schedule
was developed to successfully achieve the 1971 mission objective, based
on a Phase IB go-ahead in January, 1966, a development freeze in July,
1966, and a continuous contractor effort with no break between Phase IB
and Phase II. Detailed schedule analyses confirm that test flights
can be made in 1969 that will contribute significantly to the success
of the 1971 mission.
Three different program implementation approaches to achieve 1971
mission success were considered.
i)
2)
3)
The accomplishment of a 1971 mission without a prior test flight.
The accomplishment of a 1971 mission preceded by a test flight
in 1969 using the Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle.
The accomplishment of a 1971 mission preceded by a test flight
in 1969 using the Saturn iB/Centaur launch vehicle.
All three approaches utilize the preferred 1971 spacecraft configura-
tion for the mission flights with minor modifications for the 1969
test flights on the Atlas/Centaur. The 1969 test flight is considered
as an integral part of the total test program to improve the probability
of 1971 mission success.
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Important ground rules applied to the master schedules are:
i) Phase II will follow Phase IB with no break between phases.
2) For the selected orbit the earliest 1971 launch window opens on
April 30, 1971.
3) Voyager Project and Spacecraft System interface tests will be
concluded well enough in advance of flight spacecraft and
related operational support equipment (OSE) completion to
allow for corrective action as necessary. For 1969 test flights
interface tests will use simulated hardware.
4) Three complete flight spacecraft and related OSE will be
delivered to the Air Force Eastern Test Range for each launch
opportunity.
5) One complete set of subsystems, "burned-in" on the standby
vehicle, will be delivered as flight spares.
6) There will be two flights launched during each launch
opportunity.
5.4.1 Phase IB Schedule
The Phase IB schedule is considered to be the same for all three
approaches. In order to accurately schedule all of the program events,
it is necessary to develop a clear definition and understanding of the
scope of work for Phase IB and obtain complete agreement on what will be
accomplished prior to Phase II initiation. A detail phase IB schedule
was prepared to provide this understanding and is summarized on each
master schedule. It reflects the objectives, tasks and outputs as
defined in the Phase IB Specimen Statement of Work, and the Preliminary
Voyager Mission Specification and is described below.
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Coincident with Phase IB contract award, JPL will provide an approved
formal 1971 Voyager Mission Specification, an approved Organization
Plan, and an approved Implementation Plan. These documents, together
with the firm Phase IB work statement, will control and guide the
Phase IB effort. By late February modifications to implementation
plans must be approved by JPL to allow early initiation of applicable
portions. A Parts, Materials and Processes Control Plan will be pre-
pared and submitted to JPL for approval early in Phase IB, so that
it can be used to discipline hardware design.
The most significant event during Phase IB is the "development freeze"
specified in the preliminary Voyager Mission Specification. Its
significance rests on the following definition:
I) By July i, 1966, all subsystems and component design develo_pment,
2)
3)
4)
including development tests, necessary for improving on the
state-of-the-art will be completed.
Development testing in support of component selection and
design verification need not be completed by July i, 1966.
The mission specification provided at Phase IB go-ahead will be
verified, with any revision recommendations ready for submittal
to JPL. Centerline, inboard profile, and equipment arrangement
drawings will be complete.
Functional specifications for 1969 and 1971 spacecraft and for
the operational support equipment will be complete. Also, pre-
liminary design specifications (Part 1CHI Specifications) will
be complete.
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5)
6)
Design reviews will have been held for each subsystem or major
component. These reviews, in the case of critical long lead
time items, will be similar to a Preliminary Design Review (PDR),
and will involve Boeing, its team contractors, and JPL.
In addition to the specifications and drawings listed above
Phase II costs, schedules, and program plans will be included.
These plans are Engineering, Manufacturing, Assembly and
Checkout, Integrated Test, and Launch Operations.
After development freeze, the final two months of Phase IB are devoted
to continued design effort, completion of the functional specifications,
refinement of implementation plans, initiation of procurement surveys,
and submittal on August 31 of final report documentation.
5.4.2 Master Schedule - 1971 Mission Only
The master schedule shown in Figure 5.4-1 depicts the significant events
and time phasing for the Voyager Spacecraft System to support the
Voyager mission flight in 1971, with no test flights in 1969. The
5-1/3 year time period from Phase IB go-ahead until the 1971 launch
opportunity, starting on April 309 19719 permits an end-to-end schedule
approach to achieve mission success. Time is available for an un-
hurried design phase, followed by extensive ground testing. Only
the minimum practical concurrency of timing between design and testing
is scheduled.
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5.4.3 Master Schedule - 1971 Mission and 1969 Atlas/Centaur Flyby Test
This master schedule Figure 5.4-2 depicts the significant events and
necessary time phasing for the Voyager Spacecraft System to support
the Voyager mission in 1971) preceded by a Mars fly-by test mission in
1969. The test mission omits the Flight Capsule, and is accomplished
using an Atlas Centaur launch vehicle.
The choice of a flyby trajectory affects the launch date for the 1969
test flight, and the use of Atlas Centaur with its lesser thrust and
smaller shroud than Saturn iB/Centaur requires minor alteration of
the 1971 spacecraft configuration used for the 1969 test flight. The
most significant of these configuration revisions is shown in Volume D.
5.4.3.1 Schedule Effects
The modifications to the 1971 Flight Spacecraft design required for the
1969 Atlas Centaur test flight do not affect the master schedule.
An integrated program that includes a flight test in 1969 prior to the
1971 mission is characterized by compression of design and test time
as opposed to one that does not include the test flight. To preclude
pre-implementation of design development testing during Phase IB a
philosophy of concurrency of design and test was used in the scheduling
that includes the 1969 test flight. Judicious selection of key design
and test milestones provides design maturity of the 1971 spacecraft
for use in 1969 tests and sufficient confidence testing to assure
objectives of the 1969 test flight. This approach recognizes that
the 1969 test flight is an integral part of the test program insofar
5-13
as extended life type tests are concerned. Continuation of various
model tests, time phased to the 1971 mission, provides an increase
in probability of mission success in 1971.
By this philosophy a high-degree of confidence is obtained for the
1969 flight, and engineering data resulting therefrom is incorporated
in the 1971 mission tests and designs in a timely manner.
Increased confidence in initial design development testing could be
gained by selectively initiating effort in Phase IB.
5.4.3.2 Conclusion
The implementation of the 1969 test flight is compatible with imple-
mentation for the 1971 mission. The schedule for accomplishment of
the 1969 test flight is reasonable and valid.
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5.4.4.2 Conclusions
The implementation of the 1969 Mars orbit test flight with a Saturn
IB/Centaur launch vehicle is compatible with the implementation for
the 1971 mission.
Although the total time from Phase IB contract award to test flight
is 2 ½ months less for the Mars orbit test flight than it is for the
flyby test flight the schedule for accomplishment is reasonable and
valid. The major effect is compressed design time, while the system test
cycle is the same.
O
5.4.5 Analysis
Results from analysis and comparison of the three master schedule
approaches are:
i) The 1971 mission with no prior test flight provides an optimum
time-phase program and involves the least schedule risk. Time
is available to provide an extra measure of safety in the per-
formance of all important tasks (design, verification testing,
interface testing, and flight acceptance testing) to allow for
major rework or retesting.
2) A program encompassing a 1969 test flight compresses the engineer-
ing and test flow time to support the 1969 launch opportunity.
This causes a slightly greater risk for the 1969 flight than for
a 1971 mission only. However, the actual experience from the
test flight, plus the substantial increase in system-level ground
test experience obtained from the 1969 test flight vehicles will
greatly enhance the confidence level for 1971 mission success.
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Master Schedule - 1971 Mission and 1969 Saturn IB/Centaur
Orbitinq Test
This master schedule, Figure 5.4-3, depicts the significant events and
necessary time-phasing for the Voyager Spacecraft System program to
support the 1971 Voyager mission_ preceded by a Mars orbiting test
flight in 1969. Both the 1971 mission and the 1969 test flight are
accomplished using a Saturn IB/Centaur launch vehicle. An enlarged ver-
sion of this schedule has been placed in the pocket on the back cover.
The choice of a Mars orbit trajectory_ made possible by the use of
Saturn IB/Centaur_ sets an earlier launch date for the 1969 test flight_
but the spacecraft will be identical in configuration to that planned for
the 1971 mission. An important factor will be the ability to accept
additional engineering test data instrumentation on the 1969 vehicle.
5.4.4.1 Schedule Effects
The launch opportunity for a Mars orbit test flight starts on December
30, 1968. This means that flight vehicles and OSE must be available for
launch nearly 2 _ months earlier than for a 1969 flyby test flight. The
reduction in total time from Phase IB go-ahead to test flight launch is
mostly absorbed in the allocation of {ime available for subsystem design
prior to the construction of test flight hardware.
A 1969 Mars orbit test flight requires considera_on of propellant
sterilization. Sterilizing of propellant can be accommodated without
any pacing effect. Valid estimates for further sterilization effects
will require further study to be accomplished early in Phase IB.
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Where the Saturn IB/Centaur is used for the 1969 Mars orbit test
flight, the schedule is compressed an additional 2 ½ months over
the Atlas/Centaur schedule with schedule risk slightly greater
than for the Atlas/Centaur. However this option provides a test
of all project systems elements, personnel, procedures and mission
flight in the true environment prior to the actual 1971 mission.
This provides for greater benefits to ultimate mission success when
weighed against the schedule risk. The schedule assures timely
testing early in the program for a successful 1969 test flight.
A high confidence level is inherent in all schedules considered
due to the detail level of analysis acsomplished to support their
preparation, and the use of actual flowtimes from similar system
details on programs such as Lunar Orbiter, Mariner and Minuteman
to provide further assurance of success.
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5.5 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
During the IA definition phase, The Boeing Company and its major sub-
contractors have selectively implemented changes designed to improve
the effectiveness End responsiveness of their management structures.
The principaI change to the overaii management structure described in
the IA proposai has been the incIusion of Autonetics as a major sub-
contractor. Autonetics brings additionai strength to the Boeing team
by contributing recognized capability and experience and a reputation
for high reIiabiiity in its area of responsibiiity- the autopiiot
subsystem, attitude reference subsystem and reIated operationaI sub-
port equipment.
To avoid duplicating material submitted in the IA proposal, only signif-
icant management, structure changes made since then will be described.
Biographical material is included for key Autonetics personnel assigned
to the program. Resumes for other new personnel are available upon re-
quest and will be included in the organization plan submitted as part of
the Phase IB proposal.
5.5.1 Management Structures for Phases IB and II
Boeing and each of its major subcontractors have developed and imple-
mented management structures which clearly define lines of authority,
delegation of responsibility and accountability for performance.
Each team member has established one basic structure applicable to
Phases IB and II. This approach is dictated by the need for starting
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many program activities during Phase IB in order to accomplish the neces-
sary design, development and testing work in time to meet the program ob-
jectives.
5.5.2 Boeinq Manaqement Structure
The Boeing management structure has been modified slightly. Figure 5.5-1
indicates changes from the structure submitted in the Phase IA proposal.
There are a few personnel changes including a new Engineering Manager,
W. C. Galloway, whose resume is included. Changes in functional respon-
sibilities and structuring, principally the realignment of reliability
and product assurance activities, are indicated.
5.5.3 Electro-Optical Systems t Inc. and Philco t WDC Manaqement Structures
The changes to these management structures are quite minor. The charts
are repeated for convenience on Figures 5.5-2 and 5.5-3 respectively.
5.5.4 Autonetics Management Structure
Autonetics, a major operating unit of North American Aviation, has been
actively engaged in Voyager program studies for over two years. Positive
evidence of continued commitment is manifested by full participation as
a member of the Boeing team. Basic responsibility for Voyager activities
within Autonetics has been assigned to the Astrionics Division. Figure
5.5-4 illustrates the Voyager management structure within Autonetics and
the significant responsibilities of each position. Resumes of the
principal Autonetics personnel assigned to Voyager appear at the end of
this section.
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• DIRECT SPACECRAFT LAUNCH OPS.
AFFILIATION
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
AERO-S PACE DIVISION
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
AERO-SPACE DIVISION
AERO-SPACE DIVISION
AERO-SPACE DIVISION
ELECTRO-OPTICAL SYSTEMS
PHILCO WDL
AERO-SPACE DIV:St.ON
SYSTEMS
TESTI NG
• PREPARE ASSEMBLY & CHECK
OUT PLAN
• PREPARE INTEGRATED DATA
MANAGEMENT PLAN
• ACTIVATE SYSTEM TESTING
FACILITIES
• CONDUCT SYSTEM TESTING OF
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
SYSTEMS TESTAND
LAUNCH OPERATIONS
MANAGER
K. K. MC DANIEL
• DEVEt
PLAN,
AND i
• DEVEI
MENT
• IDEN1
DEPEt
TESTBOARI)
• DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED
TEST PLAN
• MONITOR INTEGRATED TES'
PLAN
• CERTIFY TEST COMPLETION
• VALIDATE TEST DATA
AND MPLEMENT INTEGRATED TEST
ACECRAFT ASSEMBLY & TEST PLAN
NCH OPERATIONS PLAN
ENT REQUIREMENTS AND PLANS FOR IMPLE-
N OF THE MOS
_|CATION REQUIREMENTS FOR DSNI SFOF MISSION-
iDENT EQUIPMENT AND PROGRAMS
FACILITIES
R. K. MILLS
• IDENTIFY INDUSTRIAL AND OPERA-
TIONAL FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
• DEVELOP FACILITY PLANS INCLUDING
FUNDING AND SCHEDULES
• COORDINATE FACILITY PLANS WITH
JPL
• IMPLEMENT APPROVED PLANS AND
CONTROL FUNDS
• CONTROL AND MAINTAIN PROGRAM
FACILITY RESOURCES
k
LAUNCH
OPERATIONS
• PREPARE SPACECRAFT LAUNCH OPERATIONS
PLAN
• ACTIVATE LAUNCH OPERATIONS FACILITIES
• COORDINATE PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS WITH
JPL/AFETR
• CONDUCT SPACECRAFT LAUNCH OPERATIONS
I
MISSION
0PERATIONS
• SUPPORT SPAT AND FPAT AT JPL
• CONDUCT MISSION OPERATIONS TRAINING
• IMPLEMENT MISSION-DEPENDENT OSE
• SUPPORT MOS ACTIVITIES
FABRIC
ASSEMBI.
• FABRICATE MO,
AND TEST MOE
• DIRECT PLANN
FABRICATION,
HARDWARE
• DIRECT PLANN
FABRICATION
AND TEST FUN
• PROVIDE SUPP(
LAUNCH OPER
OPERATIONS
L. B. BARLOW
• DIRECT FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES
• DIRECT PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
• DIRECT QUALITY CONTROL ACTIVITIES
• ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE
QUALITY CONTROL DOCUMENTS
I
TION AND
MANAGER
i
I
"KUPS
IELS
ING, ORDERING
_ND ASSEMBLY OF
ING, ORDERING, AND
I F TEST EQUIPMENT
TIONS
T TO STET AND
IONS
MATERIEL
MANAGER
• MAINTAIN ETHICAL AND COMPETITIVE
PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
• BE SOLE COMMITMENT AUTHORITY
FOR PROCUREMENT
• MAINTAIN INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
• MAINTAIN SOURCE SELECTION SYSTEM
• ESTABLISH INCOMING TRAFFIC
ROUTING
• ACCOMPLISH RECEIVAL AND STORAGE
OF PARTS
• FURNISH MAKE-OR-BUY SUPPORT
QUALITYCONTROL
MANAGER
• ESTABLISH & DIRECT QUALITY
CONTROL REQUIREMENTS AND
PROCEDURES
• DEVELOP QUALITY CONTROL PLAN
TO COMPLY WiTH NPC 200-2
• DIRECT PRODUCT INSPECTION &
QUALITY ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES
• PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY RECORD
SYSTEM & DISCREPANCY CONTROL
SYSTEM
SYSTEMt
• ESTABLISH SPACE_
OBJECTIVES
• ESTABLISH SPACE1
MENTS AND COb
• DEVELOP SPACEC!
• ESTABLISH SPACE,
REQUIREMENTS
• MONITOR DESIG
• MONITOR INTEG
"QU IREMENTS
_AFT AND OSE DESIGN
_AFT AND OSE REQUIRE-
STRAINTS
AFT TEST REQUIREMENTS
RAFT SYSTEM INTERFACE
I COMPLIANCE
ATED TEST PLAN
I \
SYSTEM ANALYSIS
SYSTEM
ENGINEERING
S. R. RAGAR
• DEVELOP SPACECRAFT REQUIREMENTS AND
CONSTRAINTS
• CONDUCT SYSTEM-LEVEL TECHNICAL TRADE
STUDIES TO OPTIMIZE THE SPACECRAFT
SYSTEM
• DEVELOP SPACECRAFT AND ASSOCIATED OSE
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS
• DEVELOP TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
SPACECRAFT SYSTEM
I
SYSTEM INTEGRATION
• CONDUCT SYSTEM-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION
AND TRADE STUDIES
• ASSIST IN SELECTION OF PREFERRED SPACE-
CRAFT DESIGN
• CONDUCT SYSTEM-LEVEL FAILURE MODE
ANALYSIS
• ESTABLISH FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE OF
MISSION EVENTS
• DEVELOP SPACECRAFT AND OSE FUNCTIONAL
DESCRIPTIONS
• PREPARE SPACECRAFTAND OSE FUNCTIONAL
SPECIFICATIONS
• IDENTIFY AND DEFINE SPACECRAFT SYSTEM
INTERFACE
IDENTIFY AND DEFINE VOYAGER PROJECT
ELEMENT INTERFACES
TECHNICAL REVIEW
BOARD
G. L. HOLLINGSWORTH
BUS INESS MANAGEMENT
• DIRECT AI
• DEVELOP
• PROVIDE
AND COt
• PROVIDE
MISSION ANALYSIS
ONDUCT MISSION TRADE STUDIES
UPPORT JPL IN CONDUCTING MISSION
NGINEERING STUDIES
ARTICIPATE ON THE JPL PROJECT MISSION
NGINEERING PANEL
I
FINANCE
T. K. ARMITAGE
ESTIMATE PROGRAM COSTSDEVELOP FUNCTIONAL BUDGETS AND
ADMINISTER COST CONTROl SYSTEM
• PROVIDE FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND
COST ANALYSIS
• ASSIST IN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
PROGRAM PLANNING
AND REPORTS
P. H. SCARLATOS
• PREPARE AND MAINTAIN PROGRAM BR
STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT NETWORK
SCHEDULE, AND ACTIVITY/TIME NETV
• PREPARE AND MAINTAIN PROGRAM Pt
• ESTABLISH AND DIRECT PROGRAM COl
• PREPARE MAKE-OR-BUY PLAN
VOYAGERSPACECRA_
SYSTEM
PROGRAMMANAGER
E. G. CZARNECKI
i iii
V_INISTRATION OF CONTRACTS FUNCTION
ROGRAM PLANS AND DIRECTIVES
NANCIAL AND RESOURCE DIRECTION
rROL
ORRESPONDENCE CONTROL
ASSISTANT PROGRAMMANAGER
PASADENARESIDENT
PLANETARYQUARANTINE
J. A. STERN
• IDENTIFY AND ESTABLISH PLANETARY QUAR-
ANTINE REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
• DIRECT PLANETARY QUARANTINE ACTIVITIES
• CERTIFY END-PRODUCT COMPLIANCE WITH
PLANETARY QUARANTINE REQUIREMENTS
]
PRODUCT
C. S. B_
AKDOWN
MASTER
:)RKS
kN
ITROL ROOM
CONTRACT
ADMINISTRATION
H. R. SYVERSON
• DIRECT ADMINISTRATION &
NEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS
• SUBMIT & NEGOTIATE PRO-
POSALS TO CHANGE CONTRACT
STATEMENT OF WORK
• DEVELOP FUNCTIONAL
WORK STATEMENTS
• ACCOUNT AND REPORT CONTRACT
TASK COMPLETIONS
• CONTROL CONTRACTUAL
CORRESPONDENCE
RELIABILITY
&
SAFETY
• PREPARE AND MAINTAIN RELIABILITY AND •
SAFETY .REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAM PLANS,
PROCEDURES, AND CONTROLS
• ASSIGN RELIABILITY AND SAFETY TASKS, •
PERFORM INVESTIGATIONS, AND MONITOR
AND REPORT PERFORMANCE •
• PREPARE SUBCONTRACTOR RELIABILITY AND
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND MONITOR •
PERFORMANCE
• OPERATE A SAFETY OFFICE
• ESTABLISH RELIABILITY TEST REQUIREMENTS
AND INCLUDE TEST RESULTS IN PERIODIC
RELIABILITY STATUS REPORTING
CONFIGUF
MANAGI
ENSURE PROPER IDI
IS MAINTAINED OI
END ITEMS
ESTABLISH AND M,/
RELEASE AND RECC
ENSURE PROPER AC
IS MAINTAINED
MAINTAIN CONFI_
CENTER AND CHAI'
i
_SSURANCE
_THOLOMEW
• ESTABLISH AND DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF
POLICIES, PLANS, REQUIREMENTS, BUDGETS,
AND PROCEDURES FOR PROGRAM RELIABILITY,
SAFETY, QUALITY ASSURANCE, AND CONFI-
GURATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
• DIRECT ESTABLISHMENT AND MONITORING
OF SUBCONTRACTOR PRODUCT ASSURANCE
FUNCTIONS
• ESTABLISH AND DIRECT PRODUCT ASSURANCE
DATA CENTRAL FUNCTION
_,TION
_IENT
',ITIFICATION CONTROL
CONTRACT DELIVERABLE
NTAIN AN ENGINEERING
IDS CONTROL SYSTEM
ZOUNTABILITY CONTROL
,URATION CONTROL
GE BOARD
I
QUALITY ASSURANCE
• PREPARE AND MAINTAIN PROGRAM QUALITY
ASSURANCE PLAN AND REQUIREMENTS AND
AUDIT PERFORMANCE
• ASSIGN TASKS AND MONITOR PERFORMANCE
• DIRECT COGNIZANT ENGINEER ACTIVITIES
• CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS OF QUALITY
PROBLEMS
• ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A PRODUCT
ASSURANCE DATA SYSTEM
• CONDUCT PRELI_
STUDIES ON SPA_
• PREPARE SUBSYST
DOCUMENTS
• SELECT PREFERREI
TYPES, AND PERI
DESIGN CONFC
REQUIREMENTS
!
STRUCTURESAND
MATERIALSTECHNOLOGY
M, J. TURNER
CONDUCT ANALYSES, TESTS AND SYNTHESES:
• DESIGN CRITERIA
• STATIC AND DYNAMIC LOADS
• NOISE AND VIBRATION AND TEMPERATURES
• STRESS ANALYSIS
• MATERIALS AND PROCESSES AND PARTS
• WEIGHT PREDICTION AND CONTROL
F--
CONDUCT A
IN THE AREA
• COMI
• GUID
• ELEC _,
• MICRq
• RADI(
• ANTE
SUBCONTRACTORS
ELECTRO-OPTICALSYSTEMS
C. I. CI_INGS
ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM
PHI LCOWESTERNDEVELOPMENT
LABORATORIES
G. O. MOORE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM
AUTONETICSDIVISION--NORTH
AMERICANAVIATION
R. R. MUELLER
AUTOPILOT AND ATTITUDE REFERENCE
SYSTEM
ENGINEERINGMANAGER
W° C.
TECHNICAL
COORDINATION
GALLOWAY
• DIRECTS DES)GN AND DEVEL(
THE SPA( RAFT AND OSE
• PROVIDE SUBCONTRACTOR TECH
DIRECTION AND COORDINATIOI',
• DIRECT SCIENCE SUBSYSTEM INTE
• DIRECTS LAUNCH VEHtCLE INTEG
• DIRECTS FLIGHT CAPSULE INTEGR
'ACECRAFT
._INEERING
B. WILLIAMS
INARY DESIGN TRADE
ECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS AND OSE
M AND OSE SPECIFICATION
DESIGN, CONSTRUCT PROTO-
_)RM TASKS TO DEMONSTRATE
_Ju_ANCE WITH FUNCTIONAL
I
ELECTRONICS
TECHNOLOGY
B. W. BROCKWAY
IALYSES, TESTS, AND SYNTHESES
OF:
_UNICATION
_NCE
[ICAL POWER
IELECTRONICS
_-FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE
,iNAS AND WAVE GUIDES
TECHNOLOGY
T. G. DALBY
• CONDUCT SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEM SYN-
THESIS AND ANALYSIS FOR CONCEPTUAL
DESIGN
• PROVIDE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION FOR
SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS AND RELATED OSE
• CONSTRUCT SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEM
BREADBOARD MODELS & PERFORM DEVELOP-
MENTAL AND EVALUATION TESTS
I
FLIGHT
TECHNOLOGY
H. KENNET
CONDUCT ANALYSES, TESTS, AND SYNTHESES IN
THE AREAS OF:
• SPACE PROPULSION
• ORBITAL MECHANICS
• THERMAL CONTROL
• ATTITUDE CONTROL
SPACESCIENCE
I NTEGRATION
W. F. HILTNER
• OBTAIN SCIENCE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIP-
TIONS & SPACIFY REQUIREMENTS ON
SPACECRAFT DESIGN
• DEFINE THE ELECTRICAL INTERFACE BETWI
THE DATA AUTOMATION CONDITIONINC
SYSTEM AND THE CC&S
• DEVELOP TEST REQUIREMENTS
I
BIOASTRONAUTICS
A. J. PILGRIM
CONDUCT STERILIZATION ANALYSIS AND
TESTS OF:
• MICROBIOLOGICAL LOAD AND BIG-
CLEAN OPERATIONS
• RECOVERY TECHNIQUES
• ASSAY TECHNIQUES
DEVELOP STERILIZATION MONITORING
TECHNIQUES
D2-82 709- i
)PMENT O _
NICAL
._RATIOi_
!ATION
_TION
NAME
AVAILABLE SCIENTIFIC CONSULTANTS
SPECIALTY AFFILIATION
DR. Z. KOPAL
DR. G. DEVANCOULEURS
DR. A. DEPRIT
OR. C. L. GOUDAS
DR. J. F. KENNEY
OR. D. L. JOHNSON
DR. R. I. SCHOEN
J. M. SAARI
PLANETARY ASTRONOMY
ASTRONOMY AND
MARTIAN AUTHORITY
TRAJECTORIES AND
CELESTIAL MECHANICS
I_.ANETARY GRAVITA-
TIONAL PERTURBATIONS
SCIENTIFIC INVESTI-
GATIONS, INSTRUMEN-
TATION
LINEAR PROGRAMMING
UPPER ATMOSPHERE,
PLASMA PHYSICS, AND
SOLID STATE PHYSICS
MASS SPECTROMETERS
AND OTHER INSTRUMEN-
TATION
U. OF MANCHESTER, ENGLAND
U. OF TEXAS
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
BOEING SCIENTtF_C RESEARCH LAB.
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
BOEING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LAB.
LOGISTICS
• ESTABLISH LOGISTIC SUPPORT CRITERIA,
OBJECTIVES, AND GOALS
• ACCOMPLISH SUPPORT SYSTEM ANALYSIS
AND r)EVELOP LOGISTICS PLANS
• DETERMINE SUPPORT SYSTEM REQUIRE-
MENTS INCLUDING SPARES, PUBLICATIONS
TRAINING EQUIPEMENT, MAINTAINABILITY
AND TRANSPORTATION
Figure 5.5-1: Boeing Voyager Spacecraft
System Management Structure
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• Provides direction to reliability, quality control & safety
plans for Voyager program.
• Prepares Implementation Plans for reliabillty, quallty
control, safety programs
• Allocates manpower for specific tasks. Provides function
d_rectlon in Prod. & Safety Assur. orgn
• Monitors product assurance and safety activities and
approves reports
PRODUC
SAFETY
ASSURAt
W. Wahr
1
SCHEDULE CONTROL
D. Sullivan
• Prepare & coordinate
prelim. Master Phas-
ing & Actlvlty/Time
relationships of
major milestone
charts.
• Monitor schedule per-
formance and _n-
corporate changes.
• Advise cognizant
personnel & Program
Mgr. of anticipated
schedule problems.
• Prepare customer
sched, reports.
DEPUTY FOR
PROJECT
MANAGEME NT
R. Erls
CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT
R. Blohm
• Prepares & coordin-
ates work breakdown
matrix and job
orders.
• Organizes and serves
as secretary to
change board
• Receives, coord &
issues engrg changes
from change board
• Receives & coord.
engrg change propo-
sals to customer
PROCUREMENT
PLANNING
• Provides staff advise to prog. mgr. in mgmt.
techniques
• Evaluates effectiveness of prog. mgmt. & supl:
prog. mgr. to improve performance
• Provide service to tech. mgr. in cost & sched
control, editing & publish, reports, admln.
duties
• Supports Cont. Admin. in cost analysis & proj.
mgmt. for contract negotiation
DATA & REPORTS
Publishes tech. &
mgmt. data for
status reports
• Supervises prepara-
tion of contract
film reports.
• Maintains master
control room.
COST
ANALYSIS
M. Ho
r
TEST
ENGINEER
C. Champi
• Test plans
• OSE requlreme_
• Facility plans
• Test procedures
• Negotiates budgets with work r_
• Analyzes weekly costs against k
• Advises work reclp_ents and pro
• Prepares cost proposals for chan
• Plans make or buy action
• Serves as sect'y of make/buy committee
• Prepares sc'_ed, of procurement--identifies long-lead items
• Coord. preparation of supply reqn. & other proc. documents
• Provides liaison between Voyager prog. office & Philco centralized procur
!
SPACE VEHICLE OPERATIONS
E. Fthenakls, Director,
Philco, Western Development Laboratories
1
VOYAGER
PROGRAM MANAGER
G. O. Moore
• Overall program declslons--management & technical
• Plans & approves work allocations, budgets & schedules
• Controls budgets, schedules & work allocation
• Evaluates status & redirects effort as required
• Establlshes appropriate organization & responslbility
• Reports progress to top management & customer
• Provides functional direction & supervision to all program personnel
CONTRACTS
ADMINISTRATION
N. Relmers
• Provides contractual liaison between Boeing & Voyager prog. mgr.
• Negotiates contract
• Prepares & issues contract authoriz, to Voyager prog mgr.
• Monitors & reviews schedules against contractual requirements
• Receives & forwards to customer engr change proposals
• Advises prog. mgr. of unique contractual aspects of Voyager program
DEPUT' FOR
TECHNICAL
MANAGEMENT
J. Savldes
• Provides functional direct. & supervision for:
Syst. Anal., trade studies, telecomm, sys. devel-
opment including lab work, issuance of engrg.
dwgs., mfg. & test engrg.
• Prepare program engineering plan
• Approve tech. reports for issuance to customer
• Provide tech. support to Contracts Admin. for
DEPUTY FOR
MANUFACTURING &
TEST
R. Rogers
contract negotiation
SYSTEM
ANALYSIS
R. Jorasch
]
TELECOMMUNICATION 1
DESIGN I
INTEGRATION I
D. Willoughby I
H. Verse (Deputy) ]
I
ELECTRONIC l
FABRICATION J
***j
ASSEMBLY &
TEST
Trade studies to
determine optimum sy-
stem to ;nclude:
• Complete llnk per-
formance for the
range of system
parameters
• Power output
• Antenna gain
• DSIF configuration
• S/C radio subsystem • ProducHon control
• Power amplifier subcontract • S/C telecomm
• System specs fabrication
• Packaging design
• Antenna design
• Telemetry & data storage
subsystem
• Relay radio subsystem
FIELD OPERATIONS J
..l(-.j
• Subsystem assembly • Spacecraft inte-
• Envlronmental test gratlon
• OSE assembly & • Launch support
c heckout ope rat ions
• DSIF support
operations
:iplents to ensure coord, program budget
duet to determine reasons for under-runs or over-runs
• mgr. of potential cost problems
_s in scope as directed by Program Monage.r
*** Phase II only
Figure 5.5-3: Philco, Western Development Laboratories Voyager
System Management Structure
Spacecraft
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ELECTROSE NSOR
SYSTEMS
DIVISION
I
MINUTEMAN
SYSTEM
DIVISION
I
STRIKE AVIONICS
SYSTEM DIVISION
TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD
Chief Engineer, Astrlonics Div., J. J. Fischer
Chief Scientist, Astrionics Div., Dr. D. P. Chandl,!
Director, R&E Div., C. F. O'Donnell
• Responsible for Technical Integrity of Program JI• Technical Direction of Activity• Report on Technical Effort to Customer VOYAGERCHIEF SCIENTISTT. Mitsutomi
I
CONTRACTS &
PRICING
ADMINISTRATOR
R. Lindsay
L
MATERIAL
SUBCON TRACT IN G
PURCHASING AGENT
R. Moonier
PROGRAM OPERATIONS
MANAGER
W. P. Yetter
• Negotiates Contracts oCoordlnates Subcontracting Activity •Program Control
• Evaluates and Negotiates Contractual Changes oCoordlnates Make-or-Buy Action OConflguration Management
• Advises on Contractual Requirements •Prepares Procurement Schedule •Quality Control
• Coordinates Budget Allocations with e Provides Liaison between Voyager Program •Operations Center
Activity Estimates Office and Procurement Activities •Production Adminstratlon
oAssists in Identifying Long-Lead Items •Product Support
I
SYSTEM ANALYST
Dr. T. L. Gunckel
• Perform Guidance Analysis
• Perform Flight Control Analysis
• Perform System Studies
• Perform ReliQb_ITty Anc!ys s
AUTONETICSDIVISION
OF
NORTHAMERICANAVIATION
I
ASTRIONICS DIVISION
DIRECTOR
M. Boe
I
DATA
SYSTEMS
DIVISION
VOYAGER PROGRAM
MANAGER
R. R. Mueller
• Provldes Overall Program Direction
O Establlshes Appropriate Organization ant
Responsibilities
OPlans, Approves, and Controls Work All
Budgets, and Schedules
• Evaluates Status and Redirects Effort as
oReports Program Status to Upper Manag_
Customer
oAssists
CUSTOMER with CL
LIAISON gin Resic
BOEING
SENIOR PROJECT
ENGINEER
F. W. Hauf
I
Report Status of Engineering Effort to
Program Manager and Program Operations
l Manager
Preparation of Engineering Work
Authorizations and Control of
i Engineerlng Expenditures
IpDevelopment of Technical Schedules
I
DATA SYSTEMS
DIVISION
VOYAGER PROJECT
MANAGER
M Hoffman
• Develop Detailed Specifications
Subsystem and Components
• Develop, Fabricate, and Test A
oTechnlcal Assistance for Autopil
Support
• Subcontract Autopilot Componer
oMaintain Autopilot Production
DResponsible for Documentation of
i Englneering Effort
I
i
SYSTEM INTEGRATION
& TESTS
J. Sterrett
SYSTEM
ENGINEER
Dr. S. White
Prepare Systems Integration Plan
*Prepare Integration Test Procedures
,Determine Operational Support Equipment
Requirements
_Prepare Engineering Test and Qualification
Procedures
oDevelop System Mechanizat
oPerform Electronics Integrat
oDeterrnlne Inertial Instrumer
ODetermine Electro-optical C
OEnvironmental Factors
£
I
NAVIGATION J
SYSTEMS J
DIVISION J
I
RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
DIVISION
ocations,
Required
ment and
2oordlnation by Expediting Interchange
stomers
ence at Boeing
Jtopilot
_t Product
ts
ontrol
i
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
DIVISION
VOYAGER PROJECT
MANAGER
J. J. Mizera
for Autopilot oDevelop Detailed Specifications for Attitude
Reference Subsystem and Components
eDevelop, Fabricate, and Test Attitude Reference
Subsystem
oSubcontract or Develop and Fabricate Attitude
Reference Components
eMalntain Production Control for
Reference Subsystem
OSystem Integration and Test of Attitude Referenc_
and AutopiIot Subsystem
ion
on
t Requirements
omponen" l _ " 'r_equlremenrs
Figure 5.5-4:
Spacecraft
Structure
Autonetics Voyager
System Management
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10
5.5.4.1 Proqram Manager
The Astrionics Division Voyager Program Manager, R. R. Mueller, is
directly responsible for the management direction, control and reporting
for all Voyager activities within Autonetics. Reporting directly to the
Astrionics Division Director, he is charged with the conduct of the
program from the inception and proposal stage to completion.
5.5.4.2 Technical Review
A technical review board comprised of the Chief Engineer J. J. Fischer_
the Chief Scientist, Dr. D. P. Chandler_ and the Director of Research
and Engineering_ C. F. O'Donnell reviews technical decisions, renders
judgments on technical problems and furnishes technical support.
5.5.4.3 Autonetics Key Personnel
£ollowing are resumes of Autonetics key personnel.
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WILLIAM c. CNJLlWAY (Boeing--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
Mr. Galloway has been with Boeing for seventeen 
years. From December 1963 until his recent 
appointment as Voyager Engineering Manager, he 
served on the Saturn Program as Manager of 
Technical Staff. Responsibilities included 
administrative and technical direction of Huntsville electronic engineer- 
ing, management of electronic R&D activities supporting Launch Systems 
Branch new business, and providing technical support to the Saturn S-1C 
and V Programs. 
Manager, he directed the design and development of electronic equipment 
and the development of supporting electronic technologies for the major 
programs of the Aero-Space Division. In 1960-1961 he served as Assistant 
Gulf Test Base Manager, responsible for all test and design engineering 
at the Bomarc test base at Elgin AFB, Florida. Earlier, he progressed 
through increasingly responsible supervisory appointments in Bomarc 
Applied Physics, with assignments in flight control and computer develop- 
ment. He became Project Engineer on the aomarc B Program in 1958, respon- 
sible for directing the overall 13 Program engineering effort. Mr.Galloway 
has published technical papers dealing with microwave oscillators and 
pressure recorders. He is a member of IEEE and AIEE. 
From 1961 through 1963, as Electronic Design Engineering 
€ducat i on : 
B.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, 1944 
M.S., Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1948 
e 
e 
e 
e 
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JOSEPH A. STERN (Boeing Phase IA, IB 8 11) 
Dr. Stern brings to the position of Voyager 
Planetary Quarantine Manager experience in 
the fields of microbiology, chemistry and 
system engineering. This was gained during 
his eight years on the faculties of the Massa- 
chussets Institute of Technology and the Univer- 
sity of Nashington, and seven years at Boeing. 
He joined The Boeing Company in 1958 as Chief of the Biochemistry Unit 
and has advanced through positions of Research Program Coordinator of 
Bioastronautics to Life Sciences Section Chief of the Boeing Lunar Ex- 
cursion Module Team to Chief of Interplanetary Studies, Advanced Programs. 
Beginning in 1963, Dr. Stern has been responsible for a number of space- 
oriented advanced technological and conceptual studies. These include 
a study of  a satellite system for micrometeoroid measurement, and ad- 
vanced Lunar Orbiter (LOS) mission studies. 
Manager of the Study of Interplanetary Mission Support Requirements, 
He served as Program 
?!ASP. C o n t r a c t  MA.sg-34419 .May 1965 e 
He is author of more than 35 technical papers and encyclopedia articles 
and is a Fellow of the AAAS. 
Education: 
B.S., Food Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 1949 
M.S., Food Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 1950 
Ph.D, Food Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 1953 
e 
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RUDY R. MUELLER (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
M r .  Mueller has been with North American eight 
years. He has been continuously engaged in 
technical and management responsibilities in 
the space field throughout virtually this entire 
period. Prior to his assignment as Voyager Pro- 
gram Manager, he served as project engineer for these Autonetics programs: 
Voyager Design Studies, the Lunar Logistics System, and the Logistics 
Spacecraft. Prior to 1957, he taught at the University of Texas and held 
engineering positions with Convair and Chance-Vought. He has taken a 
number of post-MS courses in the mathematics and astronautics fields. 
Mr. Mueller is a member of Tau Beta Pi, Pi Tau Sigma, the Institute of 
Navigation Astrodynamics, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro- 
nautics, and has participated in Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquia. 
Mr. Mueller has presented twelve professional papers in the space field 
including "The Voyager Mission: Guidance and Control Considerations," 
"An Analysis of Guidance and Control Requirements for a Mars Mission," 
"An Analysis of Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Equipments for 
a Mars Mission;" and "Investigation of Possible Satellite Position - Sens- 
ing Methods." 
of Michigan Space Seminar. 
He has also presented a guest lecture at the University 
Education : 
d.S. , Mechanical Engineering, :'n;vSrsity c!f Texis 1955. 
M.S., Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, University of Texas, 1959. 
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BRUCE C. DUNN (Autonetics--Phase IA, I B ,  11) 
Mr. Dunn joined North American Aviation in 1962 
as Chief, Quality and Reliability Assurance, 
Electro Sensor Systems Division, responsible for 
quality and reliability assurance activities 
pertaining to airborne radar and electronic 
test equipment. Mr. Dunn's previous Quality Control experience is exten- 
sive, beginning in 1955 in the Quality Control Office, Air Force Air 
Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio. Holding successively more responsible 
positions in different locations, he became Director of Materiel, Chief- 
Quality Control Planning, and finally Director-Quality Control, Western 
Contract Management Region, Air Force Systems Command. In the latter posi- 
tion he was responsible for the conduct of all Air Force Quality Control 
activities in contractor's facilities in thirteen western states and at 
all dallistic Missile Sites. His responsibility extended over 1700 quality 
and reliability engineers and technicians and covered NASA, Air Force, 
and other DOD Programs. During this same tour of duty, he had an addi- 
tional responsibility as Assistant to the Commander for Site Activation. 
Mr. Dunn is a member of the American Society for Quality Control and the 
American Management Association. 
a 
0 
0 
Education: 
B.A., Economics, Sioux Falls College, 1941. 
M.d.A., dusiness Administration, Stanford University, 1949. 
0 
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T. L. GUNCKEL, I1 (Au 
Dr. Gunckel will be re 
studies on the Voyager 
Phases of the Space mi 
after joining Autoneti 
to the development of 
tonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
sponsible for system analytical 
' Spacecraft System for all 
ssion. His first assignment 
cs in 1961 was contributing 
a computer program f o r  the 
analysis of Minuteman free flight test data. 
Gunckel has been engaged in the analysis of guidance and navigation systems 
holding progressively more responsible supervisory positions in this field. 
He has participated in studies of orbit determination techniques, a Lunar 
Logistics System, the Apollo mission and provided much of the systems 
analysis effort on the Standardized Space Guidance System Phase I A  study 
contract. Dr. Gunckel's professional papers include "A General Solution 
for Linear Sampled Data Control," "Orbit Determination Using Kalman's 
Method," and "The Effect of Physical Constant Uncertainty upon Lunar Orbit 
Determination." Dr. Gunckel is a l s o  author o f  "Preliminary Guidance and 
Navigation Study for Apollo Lunar Orbit Rendezvous," an Autonetics Report. 
He is a member of Tau Betta Pi Honor Society, Pi Tau Sigma, Sigma Xi. 
Since December 1961, Dr. 
e 
Education : 
B.S., Mechanical Engineering, California Institute of  Technology, 1958. 
M.S., Electrical Engineering, Standford University, 1959. 
PhD., Electrical Engineering, Standford University, 1961. 
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F. W. HAUF (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
M r .  Hauf's most recent assignment was Project 
Engineer for Autonetics' next generation guidanc 
system involving advanced concepts of inertial 
instruments, microminiaturized electronics and 
system engineering. M r .  Hauf previously served 
;e 
as 
Space Guidance and Sensor Stabilization Project Engineer coordinating 
space guidance and sensor stabilization activities within the Navigation 
Systems Division. Earlier, M r .  Hauf was System and Staff Engineer on 
the N5B Technical Development program with assignments in systems and 
project engineering. 
Engineer on the N35S Autonavigation System and was largely responsible 
for the creation of the most recent Autonetics stellar-inertial space 
system. 
Government Bureau Ordnance and Research Engineer on Bureau of Ordnance 
contracts at the General Electric Company, at Shenectady, New York, for 
15 years. 
power, low drift gas-bearing gyros for space application. 
several patents pending. 
Previous to this assignment, M r .  Hauf was Project 
His previous experience includes that of Ordnance Engineer, U.S. 
Mr. Hauf has made patent applications in the field of low - 
He also has 
Education: 
B.S., Electrical Engineering, Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1931. 
M.S., Electrical Engineering, Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1934. 
Graduate Work, University of California at Los Angeles. 
e 
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MURRAY HOFFMAN (AutonetAcs--Phase ) 
Mr. Hoffman has been with Autonetics for five 
years. Since 1962, his assignment has been 
project engineer responsible for the Minuteman 
Wing VI airborne guidance and control system 
computer. Previously, he was assistant project 
engineer for Minuteman I aerospace ground equipment. From 1957-60, he 
was employed by Nortronics as supervisor of System Integration respon- 
sible f o r  advanced design concepts and proposals for automatic test 
equipment. From 1952-57, he held systems engineering assignments on 
Navaho instrumentation systems at North American. Mr. Hoffman's sixteen 
years of professional experience in computers includes pioneering the 
first production microminiature computer, automatic test equipment, b 
instrumentation, telemetry, radar, and radio command. He was instrumental 
in establishing the basic design criteria f o r  fully automatic checkout 
and launch o f  the Navaho weapon system. 
for the Army's Universal Automatic Test Equipment and Polaris Automatic 
Test Equipment developed by Nortronics. Earlier, he contributed to the 
development ~f advar?cod instrumentation and measurement systems, telemetry, 
and radio control. 
He established the design concepts 
Education: 
B.S., American Television Institute of Technology, 19490 
e 
R. E. LINDSAY (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
Mr. Lindsay joined North American Aviation in 
1960. His first assignment involved engineering- 
manufacturing liaison on Minuteman flight control 
and accelerometer hardware. He became Manufac- 
turing Project Administrator responsible for 
various deliverable systems hardware, including the REINS Bomb-Navigation 
System for the A5C Vigilante. In 1963, Mr. Lindsay was named Project 
Engineer for the engineering unit responsible for design, development, 
and fabrication of special test units used to checkout the Apollo Space- 
craft subsystems. Shortly thereafter he was assigned as Project 
Administrator, Contracts, and has been in this position since. Before 
joining North American Aviation, Mr. Lindsay was Chief Industrial 
Engineer, and General Supervisor of Production Control at Solar Aircraft 
Company. 
e 
a 
e 
Education: 
B.S., Industrial Engineering, Iowa State University, 1951. 
e 
e 
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T. MITSUTOMI (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
Mr. Mitsutomi is presently a member of Autonetics 
Senior Technical Staff-Electronics Research and 
is responsible for applying advanced technologi- 
cal concepts in generating new devices, products 
and systems. He has held the position of Group 
Leader of the Electromechanical Systems Research Group, and Supervisor in 
the Controls Group of Inertial Navigation Engineering. 
pated in or supervised inertial instrument and platform servo development 
on all Autonetics autonavigators since 1953. 
Techniques Department of Autonetics Navigation Division, he was responsi- 
ble f o r  research on microelectronics, advanced devices and electro-optics. 
Mr. Mitsutomi is an instructor at the University of California at 
Los Angeles and is a member of Sigma Xi, Eta Kappa Nu, Tau Beta Pi, IEEE, 
AIE:E, and AIAA. He has completed two years of course work at USC leading 
to his PhD. 
platform dynamics, error analysis of inertial instruments, and application 
of microelectronics to electromechanical control system. 
He has partici- 
As Manager of the Advanced 
Mr. Mitsutomi has authored six technical papers on inertial 
Education: 
B.S., Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953 
M.S., Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953 
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uation and Project Engineer for Low-Level Navigation Systems. 
extensive experience in mechanization and performance analysis of both 
ballistics and cruise inertial systems. 
and evaluation of the N7C and N7D inertial and stellar inertial marine 
guidance systems, respectively. Prior to this, Mr. Mizera performed 
early system error studies for the GAM-77 and the early launch ballistic 
missile feasibility studies. He is a member of the A I M ,  Institute of 
Navigation, and served as a member of the AI€€ Subcommittee inertial 
navigation. He was a contributing author to the book, "Inertial Naviga- 
tion Analysis and Design," edited by C. F. O'Donnell and published by 
McGraw Hill. 
He has had 
He was responsible for analysis 
Education: 
A . B . ,  Physics, Washington University, 1955 
e 
a 
e 
a 
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R. V. MOONIER (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
Mr. Moonier joined North American Aviation in 
1951 and has served in varied procurement, 
subcontracting and material positions. He has 
held responsible supervisory positions includ- 
ing Buyer, General Supervisor and Purchasing 
Agent. In 1961 he was appointed General Purchasing Agent in the Com- 
puters and Data Systems Division, responsible for all procurement, sub- 
contracting and warehousing activities of the Division. During 1963 and 
1964, Mr. Moonier was assigned to the Standardized Space Guidance System 
Division where he was responsible f o r  conducting an industry survey and 
providing the Divisional interface with all subcontract agencies. In 
his current assignment, he is Executive Advisor to the Manager of 
Material and Subcontracting, SAS Division. 
Education : 
Business Administration, University of California at Los Angeles 
a 
a 
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J. P. STERRETT (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
Mr. Sterrett has been employed at North American 
for ten years. 
prior to Voyager was responsibility for the 
definition of AGE requirements for a Standard- 
ized Space Guidance System. 
His most recent assignment 
Prior to joining 
the Astrionics Division in 1963, he supervised Minuteman Aerospace Ground 
Equipment system engineering for three years. Earlier, he spent two 
years, 1957-1959, in system development of automatic checkout equipment, 
AN/GJO-9, and component development for the NAVAHO arming and fuzing 
system, 1955-1957. 
by Librascope in fire control development and Sandia Corporation in arm- 
ing and fuzing development. 
Before joining North American in 1955, he was employed 
a 
Education: 
B.S., Electrical Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1950 
a 
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DR. STANLEY A. WHITE (Autonetics--Phase IA, IB, 11) 
Dr. White has been associated with the Inertial 
Navigation Division of Autonetics as a Senior 
Research Engineer for six years. His most recent 
assignments include the performance of research 
on the quartz-reed accelerometer, non-linear 
platform-controller servos, and a simplified digital star-tracking servo; 
he also recently participated in the design, development, and testing of  
the MABLE. Previous assignments included an analysis of the Mobile 
Minuteman platform alignment, as well as gyro-compass and platform 
error analysis. 
Section, he was responsible for analysis and design of velocity-meter 
servos, and performed a Minuteman warhead-arming study. Dr. White's exper- 
ience in the Aerospace field dates back to 1951 when he was engaged in 
SHORAN mapping of the Atlantic Missile Range. He was Lecturer in Engineer- 
ing at the University of California at Los Angeles from 1959 until 1961, 
and Instructor at Purdue from 1961 until 1963. From 1963 to 1965, he held 
a NAA Science-Engineering Fellowship. His technical papers include, 
"Pendulous Velocity-Meter Controller Synthesis," "Linear St.ate Estimation 
by Network Syntheses," and "Theory and Design of Analog Linear Estimates 
for Automatic Control Systems." 
speaker at a number of universities. 
Earlier, with the Servo Unit of the Component Engineering 
Dr. White has been an invited Seminar 
5.ducatfon: 
B.S., Electrical Engineering, Purdue University, 1957 
M.S., Electrical Engineering, Purdue University, 1957 
Phd., Electrical Engineering, Purdue University, 1965 
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W. P. YETTER (Autonetics--Phase 
Mr. Yetter joined North American 
195 . For three years preceding 
men to the Voyager Spacecraft S 
Mr. Yetter has performed project 
for Astrionautics in the Systems 
IA, IB, 11) 
Aviation in 
1 his assign- 
ystem program, 
engineer work 
Division. Fr 
a 
om 
late 1959 through 1962 he was the Reliability Project Engineer responsible 
for the formulation, direction and monitoring of all foilial reliability 
programs within the Armament and Flight Control Division. 
sibilities included supervision of the Airplane Systems Unit with system 
responsibilities on F-108, B-70, and A3J flight control systems; super- 
vision of a Systems Engineering Unit responsible for air data computer and 
automatic landing system development; technical supervision of the Air- 
borne Instruments Group, directing inertial and barometric flight control 
instrument selection, evaluation, and design; and project staff engineer 
in the Autonetics NAVAHO Project office with cognizance over autopilots 
and autonavigators. Mr. Yetter's initial assignment was with the Autopilot 
Group, where he worked in the field of magnetic amplifier development and 
stability analysis on autopilot systems. He is a member of the Institute 
of €lectrical and Electronic Engineers, Tau Beta Pi, and Eta Kappa Num. 
Earlier Respon- 
Education: 
B.S., Electrical Engineering, Cornel1 University, 1950 
M.S., Electrical Engineering, Yale University, 1951 
a 
a 
a 
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5.6 PROJECT CONTROL PIAN
The Voyager Project Control Plan is based on the existing Boeing Inte-
grated Management System. This concept, illustrated in Figure 5.6-1,
encompasses a management control and reporting system that ties together
the entire spectrum of work package definition, task assignment,
schedules, and financial, manpower and subcontract controls. This
system, tempered on other important DOD and NASA programs, has been
tailored to meet specific Voyager requirements.
5.6.1 Inteqrated Manaqement System
The Integrated Management System includes the primary program control
techniques to be used on the Voyager Spacecraft System as well as the
mechanism for developing, reporting and presenting data needed for
program evaluation and direction. The following discussion summarizes
the most significant features of the Integrated Management System to
be used for Phases IB and II.
The Statement of Work provides definitive customer direction concerning
the program mission, objectives, schedules, documentation requirements,
and report requirements. It establishes the baseline for all
subsequent program activities. The Statement of Work should be
definitive and its terms and conditions mutually agreed to by all parties.
To facilitate detailed task evaluation, the Statement of Work is trans-
lated by Boeing into a Program Breakdown Structure. This delineation of
the Statement of Work establishes the relationship between major tasks
and work packages and becomes the basis for functional task definitions.
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A task team matrix is constructed to extend the Program Breakdown
Structure to: I) identify prime and support functional area respon-
sibility for each program task or package_ 2) identify the interrela-
tionship of prime and support functions_ 3) permit the evaluation of
functional performance in detail, either by task or by function_ and
4) provide a baseline for planning 9 scheduling_ and budgeting act-
ivities in each affected functional area.
0
0
Master schedules provide a display of significant milestones and pro-
gram phasing. The milestones are obtained from specific dates or flow
times prescribed by the customer in the contract or RFP Statement of
Work and from an evaluation of event/logic relationships to scheduled
task completion. These schedules provide the framework for preparing
detail schedules which will identify detail tasks, time-phased to
support the master schedules. Detail and master schedules will reflect
constraining dates set by the Statement of Work or by the Program
Manager.
The Program Breakdown Structure extended by the Task Team Matrix plus
the program schedules provides the necessary tools for assigning and
scheduling work, both on a task and on a functional basis. The systems
and controls for authorizing work and for monitoring and controlling
output are reflected on Figure 5.6-1. Combined cost and schedule
status will be displayed in the program control room. (The program
control room is described in Section 5.6.3.2 below.)
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The Implementation Plan is a composite of several corollary plans (see
Figure 5.6-1), the Master Schedule, the Program Breakdown Structure,
the Task Team Matrix, and the Statement of Work. These documents
provide the baseline information and detailed narrative description
of what is to be done, how and when it will be accomplished, the
functional and support area responsibilities, and how the effort will
be controlled.
5.6.2 Financial Control System
The Voyager Spacecraft System will utilize standard Boeing finance
practices to manage its financial affairs. The Boeing system employs
proven 9 effective methods for allocating and controlling direct and
indirect budgets, collecting and reporting costs and for developing
the data needed for timely and effective financial control. Figure
5.6-2 illustrates the system for managing direct costs.
Upon receipt of the contract, the Program Manager will establish
operating budgets for each program functional manger. Budgets will
be based on labor and non-labor cost estimates previously developed
for the work packages included in the task team matrix. Following
management review and approval, these cost estimates become the work
package budgets and form the basis for the Program Manager's allo-
cation of contract funds.
The Aero-Space Division has an effective dollar budgeting system for
the control of overhead costs. Total dollar budgets are established
5-50
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Figure 5.6-2: Direct-Cost Management System
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for functional organizations and programs. The Program Manager has
primary responsibility for controlling his assigned overhead budget.
Although he apportions his overhead budget dollars among his func-
tional managers, he retains primary responsibility for operatingwith-
in his total budget.
O
O
5.6.3 Proqram Control Techniques
Two of the most effective control techniques for assuring coordinated,
knowledgeable management of complex programs are i) a comprehensive
command media system, flexible enough to encompass basic company direc-
tion as well as being responsive to more specialized program needs,
and 2) a program control room which centralizes, interrelates and
displays in one convenient location all the data necessary for know-
ledgeable program management. Both of these techniques are discussed
below. In addition_ the key factors of the program reporting and
direction system are described.
O
O
5.6.3.1 Command Media
The Boeing command media system is the formal structure for providing
written policy and procedural direction to company personnel. It
provides for continuity of direction and uniformity of practice at all
levels of the organization from the corporate office to the operating
divisions. Hxisting Aero-Space Division command media will be
supplemented by internal policies or procedures as necessary to satisfy
Voyager Spacecraft System requirements.
O
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5.6.3.2 Program Control Room
The program control room is the focal point for providing the visi-
bility necessary for effective program management. The control room
includes carefully selected, graphically displayed in-house and sub-
contractor cost, schedule and technical performance data. This data,
updated weekly, reflects the latest program status and provides a
basis for management and customer decision-making and redirection.
The control room presentation stresses "management by exception" by
selecting data which highlights trends and identifies deviations from
targets. This technique enables the Program Manager, program functional
managers, Boeing subcontractors, and JPL to anticipate and avert
potential management problems. Here, the Program Manager and his pro-
gram functional managers convene to review program status, assign
action items and determine needed redirection based on complete, current
knowledge of program status. Division and corporate executives also
participate in program evaluation and decision-making reflecting close
attention to Voyager activities by top company executives.
The control room will include a list of critical items, at the sub-
system level, in the areas of design, fabrication, and testing which
are crucial to program success. This list will be updated regularly
and will be monitored by the Program Manager. The list will be avail-
able to JPL on request.
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The program control room satisfies the Project Control Center require-
ments outlined in the Phase II specimen Statement of Work. In addition,
it is designed so that it can easily be integrated into an overall
system of JPL project control such as the one discussed in Section 5.14.
Voyager Spacecraft System direction and redirection is accomplished
using a closed loop, completely integrated system. It achieves
positive management control by selecting key elements of operating
data, collecting these via the cost reporting system or by exception
reports, processing and reporting them to the Program Manager and to
program functional managers, who close the loop by providing appro-
priate direction or redirection.
5.6.4 Resources Control System
The Aero-Space Division maintains a central data bank of information
relating to the background and experience of all members of management
and engineers. This data bank covers 30 different fields with related
speciality and functional information for approximately 500 different
technical and business areas. It is screened regularly to determine
the availability of personnel who have skills and experience applicable
to the Voyager Spacecraft System gained from their participation on
such successful programs as HiBEX, Lunar Orbiter, Minuteman and Saturn.
Existing systems will be used to authorize, assign, modify and control
facility resources. Initial facility requirements have been identi-
fied, assigned and time-phased. Mechanized control status systems are
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used to monitor progress involving new purchases, installation,
modification and maintenance.
5.6.5 Make-or-Buy System
The Voyager Spacecraft System Make-or-Buy Management Committee is
established. The committee is chaired by the Voyager Spacecraft System
Program Manager with key management representatives from each concerned
program function.
PROGRAM
BREAKDOWN
STRUCTURE
Task Elements
Work Packages
The make-or-buy decision cycle is shown below:
J PROGRAM
FUNCTIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Investigate and
Recommend Make/Buy
Action
MAKE/BUY
COMMITTEE
Effect Make/Buy
Decision to Appli-
cable PBS Level
J PROGRAMFUNCTIONS
i
Establish PBS
Initiate Make/Buy
Action on PBS Changes
VOYAGER I
OFFICIAL
EquIP. LIST
Make/Buy Decisions
Published
5.6.6 Subcontractor Control System
Subcontractor management will be the prime responsibility of the Voyager
Spacecraft System Materiel Manager. He will receive direct support from
all other program functions with primary assistance from the Engineering,
Reliability, and Quality Control Managers. Figure 5.6-3 illustrates the
sequence of activity from the establishment of procurement requirements
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Figure 5.6-3: S ubcontractor Implementation-and-Control System
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@through the selection of subcontractors to specific subcontractor
administration and control.
@
@
@
@
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5.7 PRODUCT ASSURANCE
Voyager Spacecraft mission success is directly related to the emphasis
accorded product assurance disciplines throughout each phase of the pro-
gram. The Voyager product assurance function has been established to
guarantee the required Spacecraft System integrity.
The Product Assurance Manager will report directly to the Spacecraft
System Program Manager, and will be responsible for directing and inte-
grating Boeing and subcontractor quality assurance, reliability, safety
and configuration management and control functions.
There are several overriding considerations in a complex spacecraft pro-
gram such as Voyager. These considerations include: (i) the high cost
of a single launch, (2) the limited opportunities for launch, (3) the
long mission duration with its requirement for high reliability and
(4) the complexity of the overall spacecraft system itself with oppor-
tunities for reducing the probability of mission success during the long
process from design through launch.
To effectively combat the many potential sources of failure, Boeing has
established a management function to integrate the required disciplines
under the title of Product Assurance. This function will include:
i) Configuration Management, to maintain configuration control without
which all the other disciplines become ineffectual;
2) Reliability, to provide design assurance;
3) Quality assurance, to assure the precise translation of designs into
hardware, plus those additional measures required to preserve the
integrity of the design through launch; and
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Safety to assure freedom from hazards to personnel and equipment
during all phases of the program.
@
@
@
@
@
The Product Assurance Manager will integrate and direct these disciplines
through:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Policy dissemination;
Issuance of program plans, procedures, and budget;
Dissemination of reliability, safety, configuration control and
quality requirements;
Dissemination of requirements for data reporting, analysis and
documentation;
Establishment of a product assurance data central; and
Integrated program reviews and status reporting.
Using the integrated record system, the Product Assurance Data Central,
and the Cognizant Engineer assigned to the subsystems as sources of
information, the Product Assurance Manager maintains current status of
product configuration, reliability, quality and safety. He will supple-
ment these sources with periodic unscheduled audits to measure the
implementation of product assurance disciplines (i.e., reliability,
safety, quality and configuration control), by the responsible line
organizations.
Program reviews and status reporting to the customer and Boeing Manage-
ment will be integrated under product assurance to provide a completely
nonredundant picture of product status.
@
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A key feature of the product assurance approach is the assignment of a
Cognizant £ngineer to each subsystem. He will live with the subsystem
through establishment of customer requirements, design, fabrication, test,
delivery and launch, and will be the instrument for: (i) monitoring the
implementation of the total product assurance_ (2) identifying and re-
porting problems_ and (3) assuring adequate follow-up and close-out of
problems.
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5.8 QUALITY PROGRAM PLAN
The Quality Program Plan contains specific operating procedures for the
control of quality from the design concept through delivery and operation
of the Voyager Spacecraft and Operational Support Equipment. This plan is
composed of a Quality Assurance and Quality Control System and will be
submitted in detail form with the Phase IB proposal.
@
@
@
5.8.1 quality Assurance . System
The Quality Assurance (Q.A.) System concerns all actions necessary to
provide confidence that the technical customer requirements exist in
the finished product. Specific activities within the Q.A. System are:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Document the Quality Program Plan;
Manage a cognizant engineering function;
Develop implementing procedures for the Quality Program Plan;
Audit subcontractor and contractor functions;
Participate in Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews;
Assure that quality aspects are inherent in designs and test.
5.8.1.1 Quality Assurance Tasks
Quality Assurance tasks have been assigned to Engineering, Materiel,
Manufacturing, Quality Control, and Systems Test to ensure compliance
with quality program requirements. Procedures and directives documenting
these tasks will be identified during Phase IB, along with a description
of the means for implementing each task during Phase II and specific
evidence of compliance. Random unannounced audits by Quality Assurance
will be performed to measure the effectiveness of procedures and
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directives to properly control quality performance. Audits will be con-
ducted in the area or location where the work is actually being performed
and will measure compliance both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Analysis of audit results will provide the necessary visibility to pro-
gram management to assess the adequacy of controls and to report the
status of the Quality Program Plan. Periodic Quality Status and Audit
Reports will itemize quality problems, tabulate data, and summarize
corrective action.
5.8.1.2 Design Quality Assurance
Design planning procedures include: assignment of drawing and part
numbers to ensure traceability; selection of materials or components,
and establishment of fabrication processes to meet basic reliability and
producibility objectives; and assignment of tolerances for quality
characteristics.
Engineering requirements will be reviewed by Quality Assurance Cognizant
Engineers to identify controls to achieve quality, indicate metrology
requirements, define development needed, and verify inspectability and
interchangeability. Formal Phase II design reviews will ensure that
adequate quality assurance provisions have been incorporated. Change
control procedures, imposed in the design flow, provide added assurance
of configuration control at the system as well as at the component level.
Design quality assurance actions will reflect consideration of space-
craft and mission constraints in specifications and drawings. Critical
BOIJMMO
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characteristics, as dictated by spacecraft function, reliability, and
interchangeability, will be reflected in design parameters and quality
standards.
O
When a Voyager manufacturing process is considered reliability sensitive,
or when quality cannot be assured by nondestructive tests and only proc-
ess controls will assure quality, specific instructions are documented
for the process.
5.8.1.3 Subcontractor Quality Assurance Provisions
Specific quality assurance requirements will be contractually imposed on
each subcontractor through procurement documents reviewed and signed by
Quality personnel. Subcontractors will be surveyed for their knowledge,
understanding, and ability to design and produce subsystem hardware con-
sistent with Boeing quality assurance requirements. Review and approval
of subcontractor drawings_ specifications_ and inspection and test pro-
cedures will confirm that prime contract provisions are satisfied.
O Measurement of subcontractor quality performance and planned quality
audits conducted at each subcontractor's facilities by Boeing Quality
personnel will verify performance of his quality assurance system.
@
5.8.2 quality Control System
The Quality Control (Q.C.) System will provide documented evidence that
produced articles comply with predetermined design and specification
requirements. Specific objectives of this system will be:
O
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2)
3)
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Demonstrate through measurement and test the quality present in
deliverable end items from design and procurement through fabrica-
tion and test;
Document configuration status, change accountability, and materials
traceability;
Control special processes through certification and monitoring of
facilities and training and certification of personnel;
Record actions including human errors affecting the quality of space-
craft hardware and OSH;
Collect failure data, perform necessary investigations, and take
required corrective action to prevent recurrence_
Maintain calibration and certification control of measurement and
test equipment_
Participate in Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews.
5.8.2.1 Quality Control in Procured and Fabricated Articles
Purchased materials and components inspected at Boeing will undergo pre-
planned inspection and tests to verify conformance to procurement
documents and agreement with supplier designs, test reports, records,
and packing sheets.
The quality of workmanship required throughout fabrication, assembly,
and test will be designated in material and process specifications as
well as in drawings and test documents. This information will be pro-
vided to shop personnel in fabrication and inspection planning records,
reviewed and signed by Quality personnel. These records are checked
against latest drawing releases at time of release for fabrication and
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at each hardware inspection point. Flow diagrams will illustrate in
detail the fabrication and assembly sequence_ designate the inspection
and test points_ and identify the characteristic to be measured,
measurement methods, and tolerance requirements.
Release and control of materials used in fabrication and assembly will
be in accordance with Voyager-approved material specifications and work
instructions. Specific Voyager-oriented equipment and personnel qualifi-
cation and certification, including requalification and recertification
at prescribed intervals will be enforced. Personnel certification will
be based on satisfactory completion of approved training courses.
5.8.2.2 Test and Inspection Control of End Items
lest and inspection of deliverable end item hardware will be controlled
through use of integrated test sequences. Tests will be implemented at
the parts, components, subsystem, and system level to provide the specified
degree of quality assurance. Special attention will be given to assure
that human errors are recorded and analyzed for corrective action and
impact on the integrity of spacecraft hardware. Flight acceptance test
results will be compared with design criteria to assure that each end
item has been fabricated and assembled in accordance with design specifi-
cations and is compatible with 0SE.
Complete records and results of end item test and inspection will be
maintained to provide objective evidence of compliance with end item
specifications, test documents, and detail drawing requirements.
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Records used in fabrication, assembly, and test will be summarized on a
Configuration Accountability Record. Inspection and test data will be
available for review at time of delivery. Demonstration will be made to
JPL that spacecraft hardware and 0SH configuration is reflected in
delivery records.
5-68
BOHJNO
D2- 82709- I
5.9 RELIABILITY PROGRAM PLAN
A controlled reliability program in conjunction with selective use of
redundancy will provide assurance of mission success. Complete freedom
in the use of redundancy is not possible within the constraints of space-
craft envelope, weight, and power. Section 6.0 of this volume contains
the analyses supporting the design optimization for the Voyager Space-
craft System Phase IA definition study. The reliability program will
provide:
I) Thorough system engineering with reliability analyses and trades
to optimize design and the use of redundancy.
2) The use of screened high-reliability parts and effective materials
and process controls.
3) Highly disciplined design with part application reviews; electrical,
thermal and mechanical stress analyses; a.c., d.c. and transient
worst-case analyses; and design reviews.
4) Physics-of-failure analysis techniques to predict failure modes and
assist the design of effective screens, as well as to analyze
failures and identify needed corrective actions.
5) An integrated test program including component, subsystem, and sys-
tem type approval tests_ equipment burn-in, life testing and mission
simulation.
6) Effective subcontractor and supplier reliability controls.
• -^I_k_I" D_n_am Manaqement
The Voyager Reliability Program, initially implemented during Phase IA,
will reach full implementation during Phase IB. Major documentation for
implementation and control of the reliability program is shown in
5-69
BPlJM MG
D2-82709-I
Figure 5.9-1. Policies and directives disciplining the Boeing designs
and the procurement of components and subsystems will be released at the
beginning of Phase IB. Reliability training and motivation programs will
be initiated early in Phase IB for engineering personnel and expanded in
Phase II to include manufacturing, quality control and test personnel.
Key milestones of the program implementation are shown in Section 5.4.
5.9.1.1 Subcontractor and Supplier Control
Success of the Voyager program depends to a large extent on the perform-
ance of the major subcontractors and suppliers. Boeing requires all
subcontractors and suppliers to adhere to the same reliability disciplines
which it imposes upon itself. These disciplines will be monitored and
audited by Boeing to assure compliance.
Reliability participates through the Cognizant Hngineer in supplier sur-
veys, ratings, and selections and provides technical representation at
suppliers' plants to monitor reliability programs for critical equipment.
5.9.1.2 Program Control
The detailed Reliability Program Plan will identify each reliability task,
assign responsibility for its execution and specify the evidence of
completion.
5.9.1.3 Program Reviews
Scheduled program reviews will be conducted as formal JPL/Boeing monitor-
ing points. Quarterly reviews are planned in Phase II with more frequent
reviews during the critical IB phase. These reviews are part of the
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overall product assurance loop described in Section 5.7. They present
status of Boeing and subcontractor reliability effort, and provide for
effective program adjustment or redirection.
5.9.1.4 Status Reporting
Reliability program status reports include:
i) Weekly Reliability Program Summaries--Brief reports to JPL trans-
mitted by teletype or as prescribed by JPL. They contain highlights
of the week's progress such as completions, unscheduled meetings
and problem areas.
2) Quarterly Progress Reports--The formal reliability report to JPL
containing detailed reliability technical progress during the pre-
ceding 3-month period, and detailed information on problem areas
and schedule performance.
5.9.1.5 Training
Reliability training is planned for all Voyager personnel whose work
directly affects reliability. This training is designed to acquaint
each employee with the part reliability plays in a successful Voyager
mission and his personal potential contribution to that goal.
5.9.1.6 Parts, Materials and Processes Program
The use of parts and materials will be controlled to maximize quality
and standardization. A minimum of part and material types necessary to
satisfy design requirements will be maintained as a goal, and emphasized
in the training program for designers. The use of parts or materials
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other than those on the Voyager approved lists must be formally requested,
justified, and provisions must be made for their qualification to Voyager
requirements.
5.9.1.7 Data Central
A Data Central will be established in Phase IB and maintained as the
central agency for all product assurance data and documentation. The
activities of Data Central includez
i) Definition and implementation of electronic data programs for proc-
2)
3)
4)
essing, presentation, storage and retrieval of data,
Failure data collection, collation and presentation,
Identification of reliability trends and problem areas and monitoring
of analyses and corrective actions,
Preparation of status reports for management.
5.9.1.8 Failure Analysis and Recurrence Prevention
All failures of parts, components or subsystems occurring during accept-
ance testing, assembly, and component, subsystem, and system tests at
the factory and the launch site will be formally reported and analyzed.
The cause of failure will be identified and appropriate corrective action
to prevent recurrence initiated and monitored through to completion.
Physics-of-failure analyses will be performed where sophisticated diagno-
sis of electronics part failure is required to determine the cause.
Failure data will be collected and processed by Data Central to present
visibility of the effectiveness of the recurrence prevention program.
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5.10 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN
Configuration Management is defined as a systematic way of _dentifylng,
controlling and accounting for the configuration of a product. It relates
to all activities that influence determination of physical and functional
characteristics of that product. It includes the control of compliance
to (a) the contractual definition, and (b) all specifications, drawings,
and documentation used in conjunction with the development, testing and
use of that product.
Boeing believes in using proven Configuration Management practices to assure
the maintenance of system configuration integrity through an end-to-end con-
trol of configuration. This control begins with the establishment of a sys-
tems requirements baseline and continues through the development and design
stages, procurement, fabrication and test to the end of a system's life.
Configuration Management practices developed and refined by Boeing have
been used successfully in the Minuteman and Saturn Programs and are now
being used effectively on the Lunar Orbiter Program. These practices
recognize the unique requirements of space programs and feature basic con-
figuration requirements for programs requiring rapid reaction to change
while maintaining stringent control.
This subsection summarizes the Configuration Management Plan approach re-
commended for the Voyager Spacecraft System. Boeing is prepared to use
variations or modifications to this approach suited to JPL's needs. In
this respect Boeing recognizes the existence of JPL's Integrated Infor-
mation System (IIS) and Central Data Bank.
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The Configuration Management Plan will be expanded in the Phase IB Pro-
posal for use during Phases IB and II. During Phase IB, the plan will
be modified as directed by J-PL and the approved portions applicable to
Phase IB implemented according to the Contractual Statement of Work.
Boeing will be responsible for requiring its suppliers to comply with the
approved Configuration Management Plan. The description and implementa-
tion of the plan covers the three major areas that make up configuration
management--i.e., identification, control, and accounting.
5.10.1 Configuration Identification
Configuration identification will be required to completely define and
identify the Voyager Spacecraft System in terms of its subsystems, hard-
ware, and software; software being all specifications, drawings, documen-
tation and other data required to define a product.
5.10.i.i Voyager Spacecraft System Specifications
The Voyager 1971 Mission Specification, planned for publication by JPL in
the fourth quarter of 1965 will technically define the Spacecraft System.
Each subsystem or piece of equipment designated as a deliverable con-
tract end-item will be technically defined by end-item design and detail
specifications.
5.10.I.2 Specifications Maintenance Control
Boeing will establish a specification control center at the start of
Phase IB for specification maintenance control. The control center will
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provide specification number control.
Boeing will use standard identification numbers in accordance with es-
tablished company procedures to identify spacecraft system configurations
during Phase IB and II.
5.10.1.3 Engineering Drawings
Boeing's established drawing procedures, set forth in Corporate ProcedUres
Manual D-4900, will be used for the spacecraft system. These procedures
comply with the requirements of Military Specification MIL-D-70327 as
amended.
5.10.2 Configuration Control
The major tools of Configuration Control are Baseline Control, Engineering
Release Control, Change Control, Interface Control, and Formal Configura-
tion Management Reviews.
5.10.2.1 Baseline Control
Configuration baselines will be established to define formal departure
points for future changes in performance and design. It is assumed that
JPL will use the following baselines for the definition and acquisition
of the spacecraft system; i.e., (i) the Project/System Requirements Base-
line; _2) the Design Requirements Baseline; (3) the Drawing Baseline; and
(4) the Product Configuration Baseline. Changes to these baselines will
be made as directed by JPL.
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5.10.2.2 Engineering Release and Records Control System
At the start of Phase IB, Boeing shall establish and implement an Engine-
ering Release and Records Control System in accordance with established
Boeing procedures used sucGessfully on other programs.
5.10.2.3 Change Control
Change Control is the controlled management of engineering design
changes to a _oduct and its associated documentation from the time
changes are initiated to the time they are incorporated into the
product and accounted for in the change record system. Class I changes
or deviations from the approved configuration will not be incorporated
until they are properly processed through JPL for approval. Class II
non-negotiable changes will be processed through the local NASA/JPL
representative prior to incorporation.
Chanqe Control and Implementation--A Configuration Control Center will be
established at the beginning of Phase II to exercise primary cognizance
over the hardware and software configuration of the flight spacecraft, test
models, OSE and associated facilities. The activities of the Change Control
Board will be coordinated by the Configuration Control Center. Figure 5.10-1
shows the flow for controlling and processing Class I and II changes as well
as the disciplines required to insure the kind of configuration management
considered necessary for the Voyager Spacecraft System.
5.10.2.4 Interface Control
During Phase IB, an examination of the Voyager 1971 mission specifications,
functional flows, schematic diagrams, functional specifications, design
specifications, and layout drawings will result in the identification of
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interface control areas_ Interface control documents and supporting
interface control drawings will be used as required.
O
Interface Control Relationships with Other Voysger Contractors--Boeing
will establish interface control relationships with other Voyager con-
tractors as directed by JPL. In the event that an Interface Control
Panel (ICP) is established by JPL at the Project level, Boeing will fur-
nish representation to the panel.
5.10.2.5 Formal Configuration Management Reviews
Formal Configuration Management Reviews are a series of technical re-
views conducted by JPL for the purpose of identifying and approving
specific configuration data at discrete points in the Spacecraft System.
Preliminary Design Review (PDR)--At the start of Phase II, preliminary de-
sign reviews (PDRs) of the "Basic Design Approach" will be held by JPL to
review and approve the design specifica_ons for the spacecraft components
and subsystems and for the flight spacecraft and OSH.
Critical Design Review (CDR)--Prior to initiating manufacture, critical
design reviews (CDRs) of spacecraft components and subsystems and the
spacecraft and OSH will be held by JPL to approve detail specifications,
drawings and data for fabrication release.
First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI)--A First Article Configura-
tion Inspection (FACI) will be conducted by JPL to ensure that the first
completed article is in accordance with the specifications and related
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engineering drawings and data. In view of the small quantity of articles
to be produced, Boeing will establish a configuration inspection plan re-
quiring inspections for each article.
Mission Acceptance Review (MAR)--A mission acceptance review of flight
hardware will be conducted at Seattle by JPL prior to shipping to the
Eastern Test Range (ETR). This review occurs after all test and training
operations, with the exception of pre-launch operations, are completed.
Final Confiquration Review (FCR)--Prior to the initiation of a simulated
countdown, Boeing shall participate as required in the "Final Configura-
tion Review" (FCR) if conducted by JPL at ETR.
Monitoring Status of Configuration Management Program Milestones--Boeing
will schedule each PDR, CDR, FACI, MAR and FCR and will monitor the sche-
dules for these milestones to assure that the configuration definition
and status at each milestone is documented for future reference in the
program.
5.10.3 Confiquration Accountinq
Boeing will implement a configuration accounting system that will provide
the following:
i) Accounting of configuration identification documentation
2) Equipment configuration reports
Accountinq of Confiquration Identification Documentation--The functional
and end-item design and detail specifications will be the prime document
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@of configuration definition. The development of specifications will be
monitored and accounted for from the assignment of the specification number
through all approved changes to the specifications.
Hquipment Configuration Reports--Configuration Identification Accounting
and Status reports comprise a comprehensive system of equipment configura-
tion reports which Boeing will use for the Spacecraft System. These reports
can be modified to suit JPL. After Phase II starts, inputs will be made
into Boeing's Configuration Accounting Report and submitted to JPL on a
monthly basis.
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5.11 SAFHTY PLAN
Analysis of the Voyager 1971 Mission Specifications and the spacecraft
configuration developed in Phase IA indicates that the required assurance
of personnel and equipment safety can be achieved with a well planned and
implemented safety program. No problems beyond the state-of-the-art in
safety control are evident. For this system, even minor hazards capable
of disabling equipment are recognized as significant threats to mission
success because of the limited quantity of spacecraft and equipment avail-
able to support each launch opportunity. Boeing has developed effective
safety methods for the potential problems evident in the pyrotechnics,
propellants, high voltages, pressure vessels, and radioactive materials
present, or likely to be present in the system°
@
@
@
5.11.1 Safety Program Implementation
The Voyager Safety Office will be implemented early in Phase IB during
development of the design. Policies and directives will be released im-
posing safety disciplines on the design and procurement of equipment and
subsystems. Analyses and trades will be performed during the IB deve-
lopment to optimize safety design and operational requirements. Confor-
mance to the safety criteria will be confirmed during Phase IB at the sub-
system Preliminary Design Reviews and during Phase II at the subsystem
Critical Design Reviews. As test and operational data become available
in Phase II, safety achievement relative to the goals will be assessed
and corrective action initiated as warranted. Key milestones are shown
in the schedules of Section 5.4, and the safety organizational relation _
ship is shown in Section 5.5 of this volume.
@
@
@
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@5.11.1.1 Design Disciplines
Restraints on the Voyager Spacecraft System design for consideration of
safety are discussed in Section 2 of this volume. Activities to imple-
ment and control these restraints are discussed below:
Directives--Program directives imposing the safety restraints on design
will be released at the beginning of Phase IB.
Analyses--Analyses and trade-off studies will be conducted to optimize
safety design and operational requirements. Qualitative analyses will be
performed early in Phase IB to determine the potential hazards without
regard to the probability of their occurrence. Potential hazards will be
classified as to criticality and grouped by cause category. Improvement
alternatives will be identified and preliminary safety design requirements
established. Later in Phase IB, quantitative analyses will be performed
to predict the probability of occurrence of undesired events. The "Fault
Tree Analysis" technique will be used to identify and evaluate the most
critical potential fault paths, determine the effects on the system and
operating personnel and optimize the safety and cost trades. The fault
tree analyses will use quantative data from the Reliability failure mode
analyses. An example of the Fault Tree Analysis technique as applied to
the undesired event of contaminating Mars is available in Section 3.7 of
reference document D2-82724-I_ Voyager Reliability.
Design Review--The Safety Office will provide active participation in
all preliminary and critical design reviews to assure conformance to the
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established safety criteria. Action items will be initiated to correct
deficiencies and monitored to completion.
5.11.1.2 Safety Assesement
Safety assessments will be performed from test and operational data col-
lected during Phase II. When comparison of the assessed safety with the
goals and requirements establishes the need for corrective action, systems
safety shall recommend appropriate revision to the design or operational
procedures and monitor corrective action through to completion. Assess-
ment analyses and results of corrective actions will be documented and
available to JPL.
5.11.1.3 Recurrence Prevention
The Safety Office personnel actively participate in investigations of
all mishaps that have or could have resulted in personnel injury or equip-
ment damage. After identification of the cause and analysis of preven-
tive measures, corrective action will be initiated and monitored to com-
pletion. All such investigations and the results will be documented.
5.11.1.4 Personnel Health and Safety
The Boeing Corporate Health and Safety Policy will be effected to safe-
guard the personnel associated with the program. The use of hazardous
materials is controlled. For example, the use of ethylene oxide is con-
trolled by Industrial Hazard Control Bulletin No. 56.
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5.12 PROCUPEMENT PLAN
This sub-section summarizes major procurement tasks and how they are
accomplished for the Boeing Voyager Spacecraft System program.
O
O
O
O
O
O
5.12.1 Buy Items Identified
Program requirements for procurement support are established by the
Voyager Make or Buy Committee, which is chaired by the Voyager Spacecraft
Program Manager. This committee is comprised of Voyager functional mana-
gers and Aerospace Division Planning and Engineering representatives.
Each functional manager documents his recommendations to the committee
and final decisions are based on the criteria shown on the "Make/Buy Data
Record-Summary _' which becomes the final Make/Buy documentation. See
Figure 5.12-1.
5.12.2 Requirements of Each Procurement
Total requirements are established for each procurement. These require-
ments are described in specifications, documents, terms and conditions
and proposal instructions.
The Voyager General Requirements Document identifies the systems a subcon-
tractor must have to control reliability, quality, configuration, schedules,
cost, and audit of these controls to assure they are being used. The
design specification identifies specific function, configuration, perfor-
mance, quality, reliability, maintainability, FAT test, and TAT test
requirements. The Administration document describes the Boeing controls
and working relationships required during the Administration of the con-
tract. The proposal instructions identify quantities, schedules, methods
of shipment, contract type and proposal time.
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VOYAGER PROGRAM
SUMMARY
MAKE-OR-BUY DATA RECORD
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
Item Nomenclature
Management Committee Decision: Make
Functional Representatives Recommendation:
Est. Unit Cost
Total Program Dollar Potential
Decision Criteria
1. Relative cost,
subcontractor.
contractor vs. potential
Buy GFE
Make _ Buy GFE
2. Item critical to program mission.
3. Development/Fabrication complexity.
4. Critical schedule requirements
5. Complexity of interfaces with other equipment.
6. Availability of facilities, contractor vs.
subcontractor.
7. Similar to Boeing product line; and capability
for end item delivery exists at Boeing.
8. Special installation techniques or testing
requirements are critical to performance
and reliability.
9. Off-the-shelf equipment or previously developed
equipment meets requirements.
10. Patent or proprietary rights involved.
11. Potential for small business subcontractors.
12. Subcontractors are available with a proven
history of development and production
in this field.
Percent Inplant Labor
Total Quantity
MAKE BUY GFE
II
II
Figure 5. 12-i:Voyager Program -- Make-Or-Buy Data
Summary -- Committee Chairman
5-88
Record
II
@@
@
@
@
@
@
BOEJM M_
D2-82709-I
5.12.3 Selection of the Best Source to Meet Requirements
A source selection team, comprised of competent personnel with product
experience applicable to the item being procured, from Engineering,
Materiel, quality Assurance, Manufacturing, and Finance is established.
This team is responsible for evaluating industry capabilities against
the requirements to develop bidders lists, select the source, negotiate
the subcontract and obtain management approval of each decision as well
as customer desired reviews and approvals of decisions. (See Figure
5.12-2)
5.12.4 Subcontract Controls
Control is maintained through contractual requirements for reports com-
parable to in-house reporting for subsystems such as:
i) Program plan and/or master phasing charts;
2) Subassembly and major assembly status charts;
3) Fabrication order status (actual vs. schedule);
4) Developmental, reliability and qualification test reports;
5) Management and technical progress reports;
6) Program hours and overtime reports;
7) Cost vs. schedule reports;
8) Procurement committments vs. available prime contract funds;
9) Preliminary Design Reviews;
I0) Critical Design Reviews;
ii) Quality Assurance Audits.
These reports, their evaluation, and action being taken on possible
problem areas becomes part of the Voyager Spacecraft System Control Room
data. See Figure 5.12-3 and 5.12-4.
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All subcontract changes involving either hardware or software are control-
led by the Voyager Spacecraft System Change Control Board. Firm data is
developed prior to change negotiations and subcontractor response times
for estimated and firm commitments to cost and schedule changes are con-
tractually established.
5.12.5 Subcontractor Surveillance
Continuous surveillance activities are accomplished by Quality Assurance,
Engineering and Materiel personnel in residence at major subcontractors.
Beoing Aero-Space Division field personnel accomplish Quality Control
surveillance for small subcontracts and suppliers, Figure 5.12-5. These
surveillance activities at supplier facilities are an extension of the
"in-house" procurement teams and subcontract monitoring activities.
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5.13 MANUFACTURING PLAN
The plan for manufacture of the Voyager Spacecraft System provides for
in-plant manufacture of structural components, for the assembly and in-
stallation of electrical/electronic components and systems manufactured
both by Boeing and suppliers, and for the provisioning and integration of
all Operational Support Equipment. The plan integrates quality control
and systems test organizations at all required stages of fabrication,
assembly, functional test and checkout. The Boeing facilities within
which the various tasks will be accomplished are appropriate to the
physical and environmental requirements of spacecraft fabrication and
testing. The organizations responsible for the various functions are
manned with skilled craftsmen in all areas of fabrication.
The manufacturing tasks for Phase II of the Voyager Spacecraft System
are as followss
i) The implementation of the manufacturing plans developed during Phase
IB which provide direction for the fabrication and quality control
in compliance with the engineering drawing and specifications.
2) The fabrication, assembly, checkout and quality acceptance of the
Spacecraft Operational Support Equipment, and Special Tooling.
3) The documentation and maintenance of the manufacturing control media
to accomplish configuration management and quality assurance.
5.13.1 Manufacturing Plans
Manufacturing plans originate du:ing the preliminary design stages where
qualified manufacturing engineering personnel, located in the design groups
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assist in the development of the product design as well as initiate early
activities if required in the area of Manufacturing Development and
Facilities Procurement.
Subsequent to the release of formal drawings through the engineering
release system, detailed manufacturing plans and special tooling require-
ments are formally established on an Integrated Record System format.
This format is used for configuration and quality control as well as
historical record of events and is approved by quality assurance personnel
prior to release. (Ref. Figure 5.13-1). Actual values within a given
tolerance will be entered on the integrated records for all critical
measurements.
The release of plans to the manufacturing and tooling shops initiates
fabrication activity only after a concurrency audit against the engineering
drawings. Revisions to these plans can be accomplished only by Manufac-
turing Engineering personnel through the use of personally assigned
"planners stamps _' on each change.
5.13.2 Tool Design and Fabrication
In accordance with the established tooling philosophy and upon receipt of
engineering designs special tool design drawings will be prepared for
fabrication of all major jigs and fixtures, including provisions for
coordination to design master tooling when essential to the requirements
for interchangeability. Standards for design of handling equipment other
than OSE and special considerations regarding the magnetic influence
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of all tools will be provided. Tools designed for use in clean rooms will
have special surface preparation and design features to assist in the
maintenance of cleanliness standards.
@
5.13.3 Fabrication t Assembly and Checkout
The fabrication, assembly and checkout of the spacecraft will be accom-
plished by skilled technicians in modern aero-space facilities. Only
approved materials will be used. Control of details throughout the
fabrication sequence will be established through strict part identifica-
tion.
@
@
The requirement for structural interchangeability is accomplished by
precision machining, and use of master-tool-coordinated special tooling
during assembly of the major subsystems.
Spacecraft and OSE electrical and electronic components and subsystems
will be produced in the Boeing integrated electronics manufacturing
facility. Recent experience in producing equipment for the Lunar Orbiter
spacecraft has resulted in the development of manufacturing processes and
controls unique to advanced spacecraft electronics directly applicable to
the Voyager Spacecraft System. These processes have been qualified to
NASA specifications or NASA-approved Boeing specifications.
Punctional testing of electronic assemblies will be performed at succes-
sive stages of manufacture by skilled personnel to formal test procedures,
approved by quality assurance and test results recorded. All test equip-
ment is calibrated at controlled intervals in Quality Control laboratories
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utilizing standards traceable to the National Bureau of Standards through
the Boeing Metrology Lab.
@
O
@
Electronic packages will be assembled in a clean room where wire harness,
connectors, and hardware installation and in-place wiring will be accom-
plished. After completion, units will receive functional and environ-
mental testing per engineering documents and results recorded by Quality
Control. Upon acceptance, assemblies will be protective wrapped and
routed to the Voyager assembly area for installation. Systems integration
including final assembly, installation, and checkout will be conducted in
a special clean room operated solely by Voyager Project personnel. With
the exception of the Reaction Control and Propulsion Systems, all assembly
work will be accomplished in a down flow clean room complying with Federal
Standard 209, Class I00,000. The Reaction Control and Propulsion Systems,
due to sensitive valving, require assembly in a Class i00 bench-type
environment.
@
O
5.13.4 Shippin 9 and Packaginq
All packaging and shipping is accomplished by a specialized packaging,
preservation, and shipping organization to documented standards which
are established in compliance with applicable NASA and military specifi-
cations appropriate to the characteristics of the item being packaged and
shipped and the anticipated transportation and storage conditions.
O
All shipments are processed through use of appropriate NASA and government
forms providing for approvals by representative personnel of Boeing Quality
Control and the customer.
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5.14 VOYAGER PROJECT CONTROL SYSYE_
Based on the specimen statement of work for Phase II, one of the tasks
that the spacecraft contractor must accomplish is to "establish and main-
tain a project control center to provide continuing surveillance, evaluat-
ion, and measurement of technical, schedule, and cost performance." For
this reason, Boeing believes that a project control system operated by
JPL management will materially contribute to the success of the total
Voyager project. Drawing from its successful experience in implementing
project control centers at Marshall Space Flight Center and Ballistic
Systems Division, Boeing proposes a complete system of project control
for JPL's use in managing the total Voyager project. The proposal is
detailed in the following discussion.
@
@
@
Boeing recommends for use by JPL a project control system that features
central and supporting control centers with advanced, integrated con_n-
unications, and computerized information processing. The recommended
system will furnish JPL management with complete project visibility,
rapid access to predefined levels of project-oriented data and the
conferencing capability to quickly convene project personnel throughout
the nation so that full and immediate attention can be given to problems.
@
@
The need for project control is apparent from the many complex interfaces
that must be coordinated to meet the critical launch dates. Despite
Voyager's magnitude, a "no surprises" project is possible with the maximum
assurance that the overall technical, schedule, and cost objectives can
be met. This can be accomplished by a relatively small, fast-reacting
JPL staff because Boeing's system places the project manager in "all
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@places at all times." The following sections describe the important
aspects of the recommended system.
@
0
0
0
@
0
5.14.1 Voyager Project Characteristics
The important project characteristics that influence the system design
are apparent from the project and mission descriptions. Voyager's multiple
coordination paths identified by Boeing are shown in Figure 5.14-1 which
shows that JPL must direct a nationwide effort. It involves several
major system contractors and many cognizant NASA agencies who, in turn,
direct the efforts of other important system contractors. During Voyager's
7-year minimum duration, there will be a continuing need to control the
large data flows directed to and from JPL and a need for permanent, re-
trievable storage of all project data for the duration of the project.
5.14-2 Voyager Project Control
Boeing has developed insights into project management from 15 years
successful experience in managing increasingly dispersed, complex pro-
jects that were paced by difficult schedule objectives. Minuteman and
Saturn technical/schedule/cost objectives have been met or bettered
because Boeing achieved control over these projects. Boeing recommends
that JPL consider the following kinds of information to be reported in
the proposed project control system:
i) Technical performance control on the ma_or technical oarameters.
Science payload status and trends, booster performance and trends_
component qualification testing, and other technical parameters can
be reported in relation to specifications, to specification profiles,
or to mission phases.
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I2)
3)
Schedule control at the first-tier team-member level Ima_or system
contractors and cognizant NASA agencies ). All schedule milestones,
including important supporting milestones, should be monitored.
For every milestone slippage or potential slippage that occurs,
the affected follow-on milestones should be identified and analyzed
for program impact.
Financial control over the first-tier team members. This should
include current and cumulative expenditures of labor and non-
labor reported in relation to required and allocated funding,
cost to complete, and percentage of project complete.
Experience has shown that technical, schedule and financial controls are
most useful when the relationships between these three elements can be
determined. While not always easy to trace, the existence of a schedule
or cost problem may signify an underlying technical problem. Conversely,
technical performance may adversely impact program cost and schedule. The
recommended system would be designed to accomplish the analysis of data
designated by JPL. It is also designed to accommodate additional con-
trol methods such as reliability assurance, quality control, testing, and
documentation identification.
5.14.3 Boeinq Project Control Concepts
Boeing's experience has demonstrated that control of far-flung projects
with complex interfaces can be achieved by making it appear to the
project manager and all team members that the project is in one place
in one time period under one management. The proposed system will achieve
this goal by furnishing tools to JPL's project management at Pasadena
so that they can be in "all places at all times" to achieve the
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continuing result of no project "surprises." To accomplish these results,
3PL will need:
l) "Face-to-face" conferencing capability between JPL and all first-
tier team members.
2) Information at JPL and at all first-tier team members that is in
the same time frame, the same format, prepared under the same ground
rules, and available to JPL through one mode of inquiry.
Boeing's recommended project control system is based on a closed loop
control as reflected on Figure 5.14-2. An important innovation in the
control loop is the use of GO/NO-GO authorization "switches" operating
at the JPL level. At scheduled expenditure thresholds_ designated managers
must make explicit decisions to either authorize or postpone resource expen-
ditures on predefined major project sections. Unauthorized portions halt
automatically on decision day. Thus, each manager is made an active par-
ticipant in the dynamic controlling process. The managers must personally
certify that they have sufficient knowledge on which to begin each major
series of resource-consuming actions. Conditional, partial authorizations
can be made and additional authorization "switches" set up. This auth-
orization approach can rather easily be made part of a PERT-type com-
puter system. Naturally, only appropriately high-level decisions
would act as "switches."
5.14.4 Control Centers
Project control revolves about a network of interlinked project control
centers. Voyager Control Central is at JPL. Every first-tier team
member has a supporting control center connected to Control Central with
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PROJECT PLAN
SET
GO/NO-GO
"SWITCHES"
T
ADJUST PLAN
AND/OR
MODIFY
ACTION
( GO/NO-GO
"SWITCHES"
AUTHORIZE
RESOURCE
EXPE NDITURES
ANALYZE
PROJECT
IMPACT OF "
EXCEPTIONS
I
"SW ITCH"TRIPPED
BY OCCURENCE OF
EVENT OR PASS-
AGE OF TIME
TAKE ACTION
TO CARRY OUT
PLAN
MEASURE
RESULTS
AND REPORT
EXCEPTIONS
Figure 5. !4-2: Closed-Loop Control with Go/No-Go
Authorization "Switches"
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a wide range of communication media. Control Central will provide JPL
top management with a single gathering point where overall perspective
can be gained, relative positions compared t and management review
meetings held.
£mphasis will be directed toward presenting to the proper level of man-
agement actual and potential problems that have been analyzed for total
program impact. In this manner, managerial time and talent are focused
on the most important problems. JPL Control Central in the proposed
project control system will have six elements:
i) Highly selected, clearly presented information in open displays.
2) "Single-thread continuity" of tiered information for vertical
and horizontal tracing of project interrelationships.
3) Close correspondence between "reality" and the displays and re-
porting in Control Central.
4) Data that is processed only once, either in the field or at
Control Central, before going on display.
5) Detailed top problem followup.
6) Rapid retrieval of all types of information at any level through-
out the project presented at quickly convened meetings with the
responsible managers and technical experts. Thus, necessary
resources can be simultaneously brought to bear on problems.
Boeing employs a separate working control center for every major project.
These working control centers serve as project management's base of
@
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operations. Figure 5.14-3 illustrates and describes the control center
that Boeing designed, built, and installed for the NASA Saturn management.
5.14.5 Communication Network
A high capacity, multimedia nationwide dial communications network that
links all of the Voyager control centers will be installed exclusively
for Voyager. The network will be controlled by JPL's management to
guarantee adequate capacity at all times. Voyager's recommended comm-
unications network is very similar to the all media common control
switching arrangement (GGSA) that AY&T will implement for Boeing in the
third quarter of 1966. OOSA is the most important of the many business
communication advances first advocated by Boeing. It is a dial network
that uses a portion of the nationwide dial switching equipment that is
set aside for the subscribers exclusive use. Figure 5.14-4 illustrates
and describes the features and capabilities of the Voyager communication
network.
5.14.6 Information Processinq
The information processing will be integrated with the communication
network to provide a flexible, efficient project control system.
Information processing/communications will be designed modularly so
that they can grow with the project's needs. The several files of in-
formation are open-ended to encourage orderly file growth while main-
taining continuity of information reporting. The key is a well-defined
information master plan and the building of all information files on a
complete coding system from the outset. The Mariner G Configuration
Identification Index is an indentured coding structure that should be
5-I07
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SATURN V PROGRAM CONTROL CENTER 
The diagrams illustrate the Saturn V program control center at  Marshall Space 
FI ight  Center that Boeing designed and instal led under a separate contract. 
The center was operational by June 1, 1965, and i s  operated for NASA by 
Boeing. Complete program data i s  displayed on approximately 55 charts. 
Al l  charts are set up on 3/8-inch translucent plastic back-lighted to 
high1 ight information. Progran-level summary information i s  portrayed 
on 7' by 10' boards. Stage-level schedules, technical performance, and 
software information i s  portrayed on 5' by 8' boards. In addition, one end 
wal l  of the room i s  covered by an 8' by 15' summary PERT network of the 
program. The other end wall includes two rear-projection screens for slide 
projection, 16-mm films, and television receiver projection. There are 
three storage bins where classified and sensitive information, i n  the form 
of 30" by 40" cards, can be stored. Lighting, sound control, slide pro- 
jection, films, and television can be controlled either from a console in 
the lecturn or from a console i n  the middle of the conference table. The 
room hormally seats up to 20 persons and can accommodate an additional 
30 persons when chairs are placed along the side walls. 
The NASA Saturn V program manager uses this control center for his staff 
meetings and for a monthly program-level meeting of a l l  MSFC Saturn V 
project chiefs. The room i s  also avaiIable.for meetings by any of the 
Saturn V project offices as a place for reviews and familiarization of 
visitors and for day-to-day program progress review by  the Saturn V 
program manager or any of his project chiefs. Closed-circuit television 
i s  planned for installation by October 1965 between the center and the 
Saturn test towers and the Saturn faci l i t ies at  Cape Kennedy and Houston. 
BOEING CONTROL CENTER BACKGROUND 
The Saturn Control Center i s  the latest of many control centers of  similar 
design that Boeing has installed since 1961 when the Minuteman control 
center began service. Shortly after that time, Boeing installed under 
separate contract an alrliGjt Identlca! .Minuteman control center a t  BSD 
Minuteman headquarters, San Bernadino, California. The instai ia i io i i  
was made in  5 days. BSD frequently uses its conferencing capabil ity 
for discussions wi th  Boeing in  Seattle. The Lunar Orbiter Control Center 
at Boeing i n  Seattle is another effective center. It is connected 
each week w i th  NASA Lunar Orbiter management i n  Washington, 
D.C. , for project reviews. 
conduct simultaneous quarterly company status reviews wi th  al l  of its 
major locations throughout the nation. A l l  centers project identical 
fiim-strips of charts nnd graphs that are distributed just prior to the 
meeting. The f i lm contents are shown in  synchronizailon to the several 
audiences whi le Boeing President Wi l l iam M. Allen and other speakers 
discuss the status of a l l  divisions or review major program developments. 
Boeing also uses conferencing capabil ity to 
Figure 5.14-3: Saturn V Program Control Center 
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total communications system. Basically+
through telephone company switching of
at wholesale rates. The switching offic,
specific features are listed below.
FACSIMILE • 4 or 7
VOICE & TELETYPE • Natio_
OFF-I
TELEGRAMS & TELEX • Route<
DATA TRANSMISSION • 120-
ELECTRONIC LONGHAND • Contn
REMOTE DATA INQUIRY/DISPLAY • Flicke
retri_
VIEWS DEPICT SIMULTANEOUS DAT
DISPLAYS IN SEPARATE CONTROL
CENTERS PERMITTING IMMEDIATE
COORDINATION AND RAPID PROBI
RESOLUTION
LOS ANGELES
JPL
O Mai°r Terminal
B Switching Center
Control Central
Note: Routing will depend on locations
served and traffic volumes
HOI
i i
_arrangement that combines a wide range of services into an efficient, economical,
lit is a direct, distant-dial network exclusively for Voyager which is interconnected
ices It bands together large circuit groups and takes advantage of bulk-buying
s will automatically route calls by the most economical service available, The
minutes per page aver voice circuits and 2 pages per minute over wide-band data circuits.
_vide paint-to-paint dialing (8 digits between ON-NETWORK users - II digits to reach
4ETWORK users).
via Voyager Network to the Western Union refile paint nearest the addressee.
_00 Characters Per Second (CPS) over voice circuits and 5000 CPS over wide-band circuits
center to control center imtanteous transmittal and projection of handwritten material.
-Free, 20 x 20 inch, back-lighted, color or black & white data display consoles for
_1 from random-access computer storage or closed-circuit slo-scan TV pro| ected on large screem.
i
PH ILA DEL PH IA
CHICAGO
NEW
YORK
WASHINGTON, D.C.
HUNTSVILLE
ISTON MICHOUD
AFETR
Figure 5.14-4: Voyager NationwideCommunications Network
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considered for use. Boeing has recently developed "BALANCE," a universal
computerized project coding method, the use of which would also yield an
effective coding structure. Modular development will be accomplished on a
section-by-section implementation of each file into data banks, as the
files are made ready. Development will go through a series of formal
phases to precisely define managerial requirements before major programming
and equipment decisions are finalized.
Reporting will concentrate on the deviations and exceptions to predeter-
mined project plans, milestones, specifications, funding and other sig-
nificant criteria. All tiers of project management will receive reporting
tailored to their needs. Though highly selective, reporting coverage will
be complete to minimize special information requests. All input data will
be assigned a specific cutoff time (e.g., daily at I0:00 p.m., Pacific
Standard Time). Subsequent file updates throughout the system will put
all files in the same time frame. That is, cost data would correlate with
schedule data, etc. By the ground rules of the system_ JPL would be assured
that all data available to it was time coordinated and certified accurate by
the input groups. Figure 5.14-5 illustrates the information flow.
JPL's computer files will build up from the contract end item. First-tier
team members' computer files will build up from the lowest level of detail.
As a result, JPL will have available for inquiry its own project level com-
puter files and first-tier team member project-oriented computer files via
the methods described in the next paragraph. This network of computer files
is the equivalent of a single_ minimum redundancy project data file. JPL
will specify for each information element (e.g., schedule data) the data
retrieval requirements from team member computer files and control center
displays.
5-113
BgEIA/'_
D2- 82 70 9 - 1
__..<
--_r_
<NW
_Z
o
I--'I--
o,_ _,_,
,,,.< 0
3_ z
0
,-- _o
Z .<Z
o __
u ,'r .< _
i.--
0 "<
t.)
Z
_,_ •
0 ,,--_
0
z_ _
-_" O0
u_
i U
Z
O_
n-,
t-
O
o_
E
0
t-
in
I
0
¢-
0
0
Q-
!
Om
I.I_
5-114
The three primary data retrieval methods that can be designated are
telephone inquiry, direct TV viewing of control room displays and direct
inquiry into any program-oriented data portions of first-tier team mem-
bers on-line computer storage. With immediate computer storage inquiry
capability throughout the network, JPL management has access to the latest
project data. Computer file inquiry can be made without the knowledge or
participation of the team members. To augment control room charts and
to track problems in successively greater levels of detail (this is
single-thread continuity) computer inquiry is done through remote in-
quiry devices (like typewriters). Data from computer storage is dis-
played on an output display device. Copies of the display data can be
made on paper for further use, if required. Both devices will be located
in the control center. JPL will assure itself of coordinated information
processing, reporting_ and file interrogation capability through common
contractual requirements on first-tier team members and by conducting per-
iodic audits to evaluate compliance.
Boeing has long maintained one of the foremost business computer capabilities
in the aerospace industry. Experience has been gained on a wide range of
important_ complex computer applications that have been developed for divi-
sional management purposes as well as under contracts for project manage-
ment. These computer systems play a significant role in our management mode.
For example, Boeing has two remote data collection systems (Aero-$pace
Division and Commercial Airplane Division) that are among the largest in the
nation. The Aero-Space Division system feeds directly into a computer.
Another example is the Minuteman RECON system. Developed, installed_ and
operated by Boeing at every Minuteman base, it is a successful end-to-end
5-115
computer system using random-access files. The latest configuration of
every missile installed at a base is available through this system. As
each base is fully activated, the entire RECON system for that base is
turned over to Air Force personnel.
The Aero-Space Division now has under development a long-range complete
divisional information master plan that is similar to the information
processing recommended for Voyager. The master plan will utilize direct
access massive storage and the most advanced generation of computers
available to industry. This plan considers as a totality, division
information needs in every sphere of division activity.
5.14.7 Systems Benefits
"All places at all times" is the capability which JPL management will
derive from the recommended project control system. With all-level
information availability project visibility, JPL will have maximum assur-
ance of a "no surprises" project that achieves its objectives. Using a
relatively small, flexible project management staff, JPL gains the ad-
vantages of centralized management while maintaining its traditional
decentralized assignment of component work packages to the cognizant
engineers. The cognizant engineer obtains the same management advan-
tages from the recommended system for his work package as JPL obtains at
the project level. The cognizant engineers and first-tier team members
gain the advantages of minimum time consumed for status reporting. Early
warning indicators assist on-schedule recovery without undue expense.
Management's attention can be more easily focused on those areas needing
additional resources.
5-116
Conferencing capability achieves real-time audio-visual rapport between
JPL and all participants in the discussion even though many of them
are hundreds of miles apart. Misunderstandings, delayed messages,
incomplete coordination and consultation, burdensome paper work systems,
and hidden variances no longer have to be excused or tolerated. Decisions
made during interface conferences, technical performance reviews,
schedule, and financial reviews will result in information file up-
date changes and project redirection authorized and made on the spot.
Confirming facsimile messages can be sent to all participants before
the meeting's close. This arrangement for information retrieval will
have the least possible disrupting effect on team member's day-to-day
aGtivities.
The proposed system might well be considered for adoption as the
principal JPL control system mode for interplanetary missions other
than Voyager.
5.14.8 Development_ Implementation and Operation
Boeing believes that the probability for total Voyager project success
will be significantly increased by an advanced project control system
of the type proposed in the foregoing pages. Boeing stands ready to
assign its proven, extensive capability to design, develop, and imple-
ment the proposed system, or any modification thereof, for JPL.
This could include assisting JPL in the definition of the control method
requirements, complete system documentation, all computer pro-
gramming, engineering, manufacturing, and installing the remote
5-117
inquiry and display units, procuring all communication computer hardware,
including the interfacing computer switch (necessary so that anticipated
variety of computers throughout the network talk the same language), de-
signing and installing the control rooms, and implementing the complete
system. Boeing could also operate the system for JPL under a separate
contract, similar to the contract under which Boeing operates the control
center for NASA at Marshall Space Flight Center. Under this arrangement_
JPL could devote its major effort to the complex responsibilities implicit
in the overall management and technical direction of the Voyager pro-
ject.
Boeing could provide JPL _th increasing control system capabilities on
a realistic phasing basis as shown on Figure 5.14-6. Phase IB will have
manual project control. During this period, Boeing will make available
to JPL any applicable business computer systems that it now has in
operation. During this period, a comprehensive interim project control
system will be readied for Phase II start. A more sophisticated final
project control system could be operational in early 1969.
This schedule, shown on Figure 5.14-6, presupposes an early commitment
by JPL to proceed with development so that the critical initial planning
and determination of a coding structure can start at the beginning of
the fourth quarter in 1965. The long lead times inherent in the advanced
equipment necessary for the proposed system make early letter of intent
releases to equipment manufacturers vital.
Detailed plans for the recommended system are now being prepared as a
5-118
41'Ol#N_
O ,
gO
I",.
:8
(3",
("4
_o
O= ,,
-o__
O 0
QDO
1S31
D2- 82709- I
J
;y
In u
o-
oB
a- _ C C
_) G "-
..oc_
1 e-v -0
1- g_
_ "2 U
_- P
8 _e
m
I---
u
F--
7"
.°°°, ..j .°°,,,,
"Nm iiii',iiiiiii iii iiiiiiiiim
_ :'!.::i!iiiii""%2!ii!i!i!!i!i!i!i
•%'-:':,:-1-:.: .--4 ".-'-'.'.'.°,'
i:i:::::::::::::Z _ !:::!:!:i:i:i:i
,.- ::::!:!:i:!:!::_L _ :i:::::::
-lii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiii
e-
e-
e_
e-
I
E
0
C
0
e_
0
0
_e
!
t_
el
5-119
BOXJNG
D2-82709-I
part of the Phase IB proposal effort. Because the approach taken could
be significantly modified by JPL's analysis of the system requirements,
Boeing would appreciate an early expression of JPL's interest in this
system.
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6.0 SYSTEM RELIABILITY SUMMARY
6. i INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 Purpose
Successful accomplishment of the Voyager 1971 mission, with its
attendant complexity and critical timing, will depend to a large extent
on the treatment of reliability as a significant parameter in system and
design studies. Documentation of reliability studies, appropriate to
various treatments of system elements are dispersed throughout Volumes
A through E. The purpose of this section is to introduce the governing
approach to system and design reliability and to bring together and
summarize the various discussions so as to give overall system clarity.
O
O
6.1.2 Approach
The reliability requirements of the Voyager mission, in terms of dur-
ation, uncharted environments, and system sophistication, require new
highs in system reliability. Analysis shows that these requirements can
be met, but will require careful attention to reliability at all levels
of design from system to detailed part. To remain within the restraints
of weight, volume, and electrical power will also require carefully
selected applications of redundancy.
O
O
The general approach to meeting this requirement will be to use screened
high-reliability parts; highly disciplined design to ensure that the
parts develop their potential reliability; redundant components selected
on the basis of weight and cost effectiveness; part, component, sub-
system, and system burn-in; and a comprehensive test program with
6-I
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effective failure detection, investigation, and follow-up. Within
this general framework, system and design reliability evaluation
studies were undertaken to provide design direction to optimize mission
success probability.
6.1.3 Summary
This section summarizes reliability criteria and requirement studies,
evaluations, trade analyses, and allocations. The material is treated
systematically according to the actual design sequence: starting with
an analysis of mission criteria and requirements; proceeding with
feasibility investigations, initial allocations, and analyses of design
alternates; and concluding with sections on the 1971 preferred and 1969
test systems. Supplementary documentation in support of these studies
is contained in D2-82724-1, "Voyager Reliability;"D2-82724-2, "Voyager
Failure Mode and Effects Analyses"; and D2-82724-3, "Voyager Program
Reliability Analysis and Prediction Standards."
The above studies were directed primarily at the Spacecraft Bus and its
subsystems and components. However, for the purposes of evaluating
compliance with overall mission objectives, analyses of the Saturn IB/
Centaur launch vehicle, science payload, and operational support equip-
ment _05£) were included.
In the design area, the principal efforts were directed toward:
l) Establishing ranges of reliability feasibility correlated with
defined improvement schemes and compatible with specified require-
ments;
6-2
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3)
Defining reliability restraints in the form of requirements
allocated to the subsystem and component level;
Assessing the reliability of candidate configurations as a part of
the evolutionary process leading to the preferred system.
To ensure translation of the design reliability features into the
Voyager equipment, essential program activities and tasks are defined
and documented in a series of implementation plans covering the areas
of: (1) general reliability program tasks; (2) parts, materials, and
processes; (3) integrated test activities; (4) safety; arid (5) reli-
ability data. Summaries of these activities are contained in Volume
A, Section 5.9, "Reliability Program Plan" and Section 5.11, "Safety
Plan."
@
@
@
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6.2 SUCCESS CRITERIA AND REQUIREMENT
6.2.1 Voyaqer 1971 Mission Criteria and Requirements
Section IIA of V-MA-O04-OOI-14-03, "Preliminary Voyager 1971 Mission
SpecificatioN', defines the mission functions needed to accomplish the
1971 mission objectives. These objectives constitute the top level of
success criteria used as a standard for reliability development. An
ordered listing of these criteria, along with the associated cumulative
success objectives as applied to the Flight Spacecraft system and its
launch vehicle, is given below. (Figure 6-1 graphically displays the
cumulative success objectives as a function of mission phase.)
l) Perform a successful launch and injection of the Planetary Vehicle
into a prescribed transfer orbit--90-percent probability of
success.
2) Perform a successful spacecraft-capsule separation maneuver at a
preselected time and location--80-percent probability of success,
3) Place an operating science payload in a selected orbit about Mars
and perform the functions necessary to begin orbital operations--
65-percent probability of success.
4) Perform necessary orbital operations to obtain data from the
orbital science payload and return the data to Earth, for a speci-
fied time of l month and as long thereafter as possible--45-percent
probability of success.
Included in the above listing of objectives are the necessary Flight
Spacecraft operations required to support successful Flight Capsule
operations. These include the necessary operations associated with
6-4
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Flight Capsule separation (Objective 2) and the provision of a Flight
Capsule communication link (Objective 4). The latter provision has
been included as a requirement for the telecommunications system
(relay subsystem).
Since reliability is defined as the probability of no equipment
failure that would terminate or significantly degrade the mission, it
is necessary to identify the relationship of other contributing factors
along with reliability in the formulation of overall mission success.
An adequate description of this relationship is given by the following
series model:
Ps = Pl X P2 X..X Pn X Pr
where Ps is the probability of mission success, PI' P2''''' pn refer
to nonreliability factors, and Pr is reliability.
6.2.2 Fliqht Spacecraft System Criteria and Requirements
By the definition in Section 6.2.1, reliability must ultimately concern
the proper operation or performance of the equipment that contributes to
essential mission functions. Each of the four mission phases identified
by the Voyager 1971 mission objectives involves spacecraft equipment
operating (1) at different duty levels, (2) for various duty periods,
and (3) under various environmental stresses. The success of an equip-
ment item is measured by its ability to perform as a function of these
factors or criteria.
The above factors are applied to the problem of reliability evaluation
by adjusting the generic failure rates applicable to each equipment
6-6
item and applying the adjusted failure rates over the appropriate duty
periods. The adjustments to generic failure rates to account for
different duty levels and environments are referredto as K factors.
Table 6-1 shows the duty level (Kd) and environmental (Ke) factors as
a function of equipment type. Table 6-2 shows an example of duty
levels and duty periods as they apply to the electrical power subsystems.
A complete listing of success criteria for the spacecraft may be found
in Boeing Document D2-82724-1 "Voyager Reliability o"
System requirements broken down to the major-component level are set
forth in the preferred system reliability allocation of Section 6.6.
These requirements are based on meeting or exceeding the mission
requirement set forth in Section 6.2.1.
6.2.3 Operational Support Equipment Criteria and Requirements
The mission success criteria of Section 6.2 assumed a readiness or
"launch on tim@'condition at the time of launch commitment. Major
factors contributing to the launch readiness are: (1) flight vehicle
prelaunch reliability and maintainability and (2) OSE reliability and
maintainability. Paragraph 9 of Section D of V-MA-O04-OOI-14-03 states
the success criteria and associated success objective for the launch
readiness condition:
* Operational support equipment requirements as they relate to flight
are contained in the requirements of Section 6.2.2.
6-7
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Failure Frequency Adjustment Factors --
Duty (Kd) and Environmental (Ke) for
Various Loadings and Equipment Types
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"The capability shall be provided for two launches from
two launch pads in a 30 day period, with a probability of
0.99, assuming an interval between launches of 5 days and
a daily firing window as short as 1 hour. A minimum
interval between launches of 2 days shall be required."
Because of the stringent inflight requirements placed on the Flight
Spacecraft, the reliability of the preflight operations is not consid-
ered a significant addition. Therefore, the above objective is inter-
preted to apply to the 0SE and launch vehicle. Furthermore, the
objective is interpreted as a joint reliability maintainability
requirement, inasmuch as delays are a function of both failures and
failure repair time.
A model for interpreting the above requirements in terms of specific
equipment reliability and maintenance downtimes will be advanced. This
model will develop the probability of no launch cancellation as a
function of equipment reliability, mean downtime, and launch window
duration, and relate this probability to the number of launch opportun-
ities available within a 30-day period considering various interval
times between launches. From this model, mean-time-between-failure
(MTBF) and mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) requirements will be developed
during Phase IB and allocated down to specific equipment items.
6.2.4 Mars Contamination Constraints
The requirement to ensure that the probability of contaminating Mars is
less than I in I0,000 for a single Mars mission implies another set of
6-10
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reliability criteria. These criteria, in general, restrict the enroute
probability of contaminating the sterile capsule and limits the pro-
bability of nonsterile equipment or particulate matter landing on Mars.
An analysis of these requirements is contained in Section 3.7 of
D2-82724-1, "Voyager Reliability."
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SYSTEM FEASIBILITY EVALUATION AND INITIAL ALLOCATION
6.3.1 General
A first step in providing reliability direction to the preliminary
design of the Voyager system was to perform a reliability evaluation.
This evaluation was performed on a single-thread and redundant configura-
tion to establish a range of feasibility correlated with defined
assumptions or improvement factors. A summary comparison of a single-
thread and redundant configuration with the requirements of Section 6.2
is given in Figure 6-2. The ranged feasibility is indicated by the
cross-hatched area between the single-thread and redundant configuration
curves.
Both the single-thread and redundant configurations were assessed using
the following assumptions:
i) Component and parts at least as reliable as those employed on
Minuteman hardware;
2) Design disciplines equivalent to those employed on Minuteman hard-
ware;
3) Failure rates corresponding to Assumptions 1 and 2 and demonstrated
by field experience.
In general, the redundant configuration provided redundancy on all
critical functions in the form of either single standby elements or
"inherent" redundancy. The results of the assessment show that even
with close control of components and parts and design and manufacturing
disciplines, specified requirements cannot be met without providing
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redundant or alternate modes on many critical functions. This fact is
reflected in the preliminary design proposed by Boeing and the associ-
ated reliability allocation described in Section 6.6
Details of the feasibility assessment, along with initial allocations,
are contained in the following paragraphs.
6.3.2 Feasibility Analysis
The range of reliability feasibility was established by performing an
evaluation of a single-thread and a redundant Spacecraft Bus configur-
ation and supplementing these studies with the results of a reliability-
versus-weight optimization study. The single-thread configuration
corresponded approximately to a minimum weight system. It contained no
redundancy except that inherent in the design of the components. The
redundant configuration used standby units on all critical elements
except those protected by inherent redundancy. Failure rates as describ-
ed in Section 6.3.1 and documented in D2-82724-3 were used in the
evaluation of both configurations.
The results, to the subsystem level, of the comparative evaluation of
the two configurations are summarized in Table 6-3. As noted in the
table, common mission success values for "other" factors are used for
both configurations. This was done to enable a comparison between the
two Spacecraft Bus configurations insofar as they relate to achievement
of overall mission objectives. It should also be noted, that the
allocated science subsystem value _.65) corresponds to the condition of
6-14
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Table 6-3:
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Feasibility Evaluation
SUBSYSTEM
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
I Iml
STRUCTURES & MECHANISMS
POWER
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
ATTITUDE CONTROL
COMPUTER & SEQUENCER
PROPULSION
TELECOMMUNICATION
REACTION CONTROL
SCIENCE
SUBTOTAL
OTHER FACTORS
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
(Mission Dependent Equipment Only)
LAUNCH VEHICLE & TRANS-MARS INJECTION
HITTING AIM POINT, + 500 KM, WITH
FOUR MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS
ORBIT INJECTION
PROBABILITY OF NO METEOROID DAMAGE
ORBIT TRIM
TOTAL
RELIABILITY
REDUNDANT
0.999
0.999
0.997
0.995
0.993
0.989
0 o980
0.956
O. 650
0.592
SINGLE
THREAD
0.991
0.975
0.55
0. 862
0. 876
0.946
0.610
t
0.650
O. 144
0.97
0°90
0 997
0.997
0.99
0.999
0.508 0.123
* SINGLE THREAD NOT CONSIDERED
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complete success on all data-gathering functions, some of which provide
overlapping data. A cursory analysis of this subsystem has indicated
that reliability values in the neighborhood of 0.90 can be achieved by
using success criteria based on data return requirements rather than
operation of all experiments for the full time.
A summary of the reliability versus Spacecraft Bus (excluding science
payload) weight trades is shown in Figure 6-3. The curves shown were
developed by plotting ordered cumulative reliability gains achieved by
the addition of redundant elements as a function of the corresponding
weight increases due to the added redundancy. All plots have, as a
starting point, a reliability and a weight corresponding to a single-
thread Spacecraft Bus system. Ordering was in accordance with the
magnitude of the ratio _R/ AW (i.e., in order of the largest reli-
ability gain for the least weight).
Plot A is a theoretical optimum curve (based on work done by Dr. Frank
Proschan of the Boeing Scientific Research Laboratories and documented
in Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Barlam & Proschan, John Wiley
and Sons, 1965) based on unrestricted choice of the number of redundant
components. Plot B reflects the case where a restriction is placed in
the form of no more than one redundant component for each basic com-
ponent (corresponds generally to what has been described as the
"redundant" configuration).
Investigation of the plots shows good agreement in the weight range of
interest between the redundant configuration (chosen as a basis for the
6-16
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A
OPTIMUM REDUNDANCY
LIMIT OF ONE REDUNDANCY
PER COMPONENT
0.2 ¸
Ool
SINGLE
THREAD
- (5100 Ibs)
RAN GE
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!
I I
500 1000
TOTAL WEIGHT OF ADDED COMPONENTS (POUNDS)
Figure 6-3: Spacecraft Bus - Reliability vs Weight
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feasibility upper limit) and the theoretical optimum configuration.
Practical design configurations concerning sensing, switching, etc.,
preclude complete adherence to the theoretical optimum.
6.3.3 Initial Reliability Allocation
6.3.3.1 Rationale
The results of the feasibility evaluation of Section 6.3.2 showed good
potential for compliance with, or betterment of, Voyager 1971 mission
success objectives without undue weight penalties. As a result, the
initial reliability allocation was based directly on the upper limit of
feasibility established by this evaluation.
6.3.3.2 Allocation
Table 6-4 shows the initial allocation of mission success for the
Voyager system. It includes reliabilities for the Spacecraft Bus,
science payload, 0SH, and launch vehicle, and probability of success
for categories of: no meteoroid damage, midcourse correction, orbit
trim, and orbit injection. A contingency category, for the purpose of
accounting for undefined equipment and environments, is also included.
6-18
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Table 6-4:
D2 - 82 70 9- ]
VoyagerSpacecraft Mission-I nitial
ReliabJlity Allocation
4J(
q
t
t
9(
SUBSYSTEM
COMPONENT
SPACECRAFT BUS
ATTITUDE CONTROL
INERTIAL REFERENCE UNIT
REACTION CONTROL ELECTRONICS
CANOPUS TRACKER
SUN SENSOR
PLANET SENSOR
REACTION CONTROL
HIGH PRESSURE GAS
NOZZLE ASSY
CENTRAL COMPUTER AND SEQUENCER
ALLOCATION
CONFIGURATION
CODE
IR
R
R
R
R
IR
SUBSYSTEM
R
• 995
•956
.993
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
RADIO--S - BAND
RADIO -- VHF
COMMAND
TELEMETRY
ANTENNA
HIGH GAIN S--BAND
.980
R
R
R
R
R
R
LOW GAIN S - BAND AND VHF
ELECTRICAL POWER
SOLAR ARRAY
BATTERY
ELECTRICAL POWER CONVERSION &
CONTROL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
STRUCTURES & MECHANISM
ACTUATOR ASSY, SOLAR PANEL
PLANET SCAN PLATFORM DRIVE
ANTENNA DRIVE, HIGH GAIN
ACTUATOR ASSY, LOW GAIN ANTENNA
ACTUATOR ASSY, VHF ANTENNA
STRUCTURES, BASIC
SPACECRAFT PROPULSION
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION
MARS ORBIT
SCIENCE PAYLOAD
SPACECRAFT SUBTOTAL
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
LAUNCH VEHICLE & TRANS-MARS INJECTION
HITTING AIM POINT +_ 500 KM WITH FOUR
MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS
ORBIT INJECTION
ORBIT TRIM
PROBABILITY OF NO METEOROID DAMAGE
CONTINGENCY 2[_
MISSION TOTAL
IR
R
R
IR
• 999
• 997
•999
.989
.65
• 592
.97
.90
• 997
.997
• 999
.99
• 885
• 45
COMPONENT
LEVEL
R
.9965
.9996
.9995
.9999
.9995
.9991
.9568
.9887
.9999
.9994
.9919
.9997
.9999
•9997
.9995
.9993
.9999
.9999
.9998
.9998
.9999
• 999
•990
9(
J_"CONFIGURATION CODE: IR INHERENTLY REDUNDANT
R REDUNDANT COMPONENT
S SINGLE THREAD
TO ACCOUNT FOR AS YET UNDEFINED VARIATIONS IN SPACECRAFT EQUIPMENT,
SCIENCE PAYLOAD, AND SPACE ENVIRONMENT.
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Constraints such as weight, cost, and development time place limits on
the choice and degree of implementation of improvement options. While
redundancy can provide significant improvements in reliability, it does
have disadvantages in terms of both weight and cost. This fact is
illustrated in Figure 6-4 where kt reductio:,s are plotted as a
function of both additional weight and cost for five selected components.
As was the case of the reliability-versus-weight trade curves shown pre-
viously, reliability gains (or equivalent kt reductions) are plotted
in a cumulative, ordered manner. It will be noted, with the exception
of the inversion of Items 2 and 3 on the weight curve, that there is
agreement between the order of components, indicating correlation of
the two penalty factors. Extrapolation from these curves (and reference
to Figure 6-3) indicates the magnitude of the weight and cost problem
when requirements dictate redundancy on many of the Spacecraft Bus
functions. In general, choice of improvement options will depend on
the effectiveness of the option in a particular application. More
detailed discussion of these options is contained in Section 6.5.
D
6-22
BO, E'J,,AI/',_'
D2-82 709-1
Z
Z
iii
I,-
Z
<_
r_
Z
I
I
0
c,,I
o
ooo
o
• • 0 qO 0 _0
d d d o d o c; d c; o d
SIN:::INOdWOD ::IAI-I _t0::1 (iX) 31V_1 ::I_IFITIV:I :::IAILD3-1-1:I
Ii
o
Z
<1:
o
7-
I'--
o
u
I--
o
o
u ',_1-
O
mo,I
_o
I.)
o
v
_o_ I
C0
w
z _
e_
CM _
O
I
6-23
80fJNG
D2-82 709- I
6.5 ANALYSES OF ALTERNATE AND PREFERRED SUBSYSTEM
6.5.1 General
The following paragraphs summarize and discuss the reliability analyses
performed on candidate Spacecraft Bus subsystems. Included also are
analyses of the Saturn IB/Centaur launch vehicle, science subsystem, and
operational support equipment that were used in determining compliance
with overall mission objectives. The material is organized by individual
subsystems, with each subsystem section containing material relating to
both alternate and preferred designs.
Technical data for each subsystem are presented in summary form. Sub-
stantiating data, including mathematical models, data standards, de-
tailed probability analyses, and failure mode and effect analyses are
contained in the backup documents referenced in Section 6.1: D2-82724-I,
"Voyager Reliability"; D2-82724-2, "Voyager Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis"; and D2-82724-3, "Voyager Program Reliability Analysis and
Prediction Standards." Examples of the material contained in these
documents are illustrated in Tables 6-6, 6-7, and 6-8, respectively.
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REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FAILURE
RATE PER
106 HOURS
N 2 TANK (2 PAIR, NEED ONE) 0.08x2
N 2TANK (2 PAIR, NEED ONE) 0.08x2
TANK _.T
CUM. TANK ;kT
R OF TWO PAIR R= 1 -Q_ PR.
SOLENOID VALVE iPF = 0.00001
2.4REGULATOR
LAUNCH & BOOS
CUMULATIVE TIME 0.50
KD KE A T
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
REGULATOR 2.4
NOZZLE AND CONTROLS 1.1 x 8
NOZZLE AND CONTROLS 1.1 x 8
NOZZLE AND CONTROLS 1.1 x 8
NOZZLE AND CONTROLS 1.1 x 8
SUMMARY FOR SINGLE BRANCH (_.t)
CUMUL. ;kt FOR SINGLE BRANCH
CUMUL. R FOR SINGLE BRANCH
FAILURE DETECTION 1.0
FAILURE DETECTION _Xt
FAILURE DETECTION CUMUL. At
DETECTION AND SWITCHING (0.99) COMBINED
STANDBY BRANCH Xt
STANDBY BRANCH CUMUL. X_-
REACTION CONTR. INST. CUM. REL.
0.1
0.1
300 0.04 0.00
6 0.46 0.00
0.00
0.00
1.0
300 0.04
6 0.46
500 0.04 0.00(
10 0.46
O. 00(
O. 00(
0.99(
300 0.03 0.00(
6 0.46 0.00(
0.00(
0.00(
0.99
O. 00(
0.00
0.99'
THE FILTER USED IN FILLING THE N 2 TANKS IS ASSUMED TO BE DISCONNECTED ANt
THE GROUND. WHEN CAPPED AFTER FILLING, THE FILL AND VENT VALVE IS CONSI[
CONTRIBUTE NEGLIGIBLE UNREALIABILITY. QUAD CHECK VALVES ALSO CONTRIBUTE
UNRELIABILITY.
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OURS
3019
)00.44
)0234
)0234
TRANSIT--EARTHORBIT
CAPSULESEPARATION
SPACECRAFTINSERTION
INTO MARSORBIT
CUMULATIVETIME4968HOURS
KD KE 6,T XT KD KE
0.000794
0.000794
0.000796
0.999999+
1 6 0.03
1 1 4968
I CYCLE 0.00001
I 6 0.03 0.0000004
I I 4968 0.011923
i0.001 10 0.03 ---
0.001 1 4968 0.0000437
1 1_0I_EGL ....
14ILl ,,__24gu__
6 0.3
0.0000002
0.011977
0.0119773
0.9881
O.OOO0OO18
0.004968
0.00496818
J0.00496965
0.9851
0.0000556
0.0000559
CUMULATIVE TIME 5160 HOURS
AT _.T
I 6 0.083 ---
I I 192 0.000031
0.000031
0.0008273
0.999999+
--- 0.00001
I 6 0.083 0.0000012
I I 192 0.000461
0.001 10 0.083 ---
0.001 I 192 0.000017
] 10 NEGL. ---
I I 0.000864 ---
0.0004739
0.0124512
0.9876
I 6 0.083 0.0000005
I I 192 0.000192
0.0001925
0.00516215
0.9849
0.0000175
0.0000734
0.99963
D027 1 1 4968
)147
)147
0.999758
0.99970_+
I
1i 1
LEFT ON
RED TO
4EGLIGIBLE
SPACECRAFT IN MARS ORBIT
ONE MONTH
0.001
CUMULATIVE TIME 5880 HOURS
K D K E &T XT
1 1 720 0.000115
0.000115
0.000942
0.999999+
--- 0.00001
I I 720 0.001728
I 720 0.0000063
I I 0.00324 ---
0.001744
0.0141952
0.9859
I I 720 0.000720
0.000720
0.00588215
0.9842
0.000008
0.0000814
0.99959
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SUBSYSTEM TemperatureControl
COMPONENT NO.
Electric heating
elementslocated to
supplementheatdemands
of the electronic1
propulsion, and mechanical
elementsof the spacecraft.
16
FUNCTION
Dissipatesheat to local area
deficient. Turnson upon
demandof a temperature
sensor. Heatershave not
yet beenlocated relative
to internal electronic
packages. It is plannedto
locate in placeswhere the
electronic gear is dormant
for significantly long times
and thusnot generatingany
heat.
O /
DWG. NO. BY Voyager Re
FAILURE MODE
FAILURE
MODE CLASS-
IFICATION
COMP MISS
Fails open I .7.6
A
2 togr • _ _Jlllm_l b_"eb
" Leads sh°rt %°_ _Jljl_lb_ qtOoqt_e_
RELAT I VE
CHANCE
TO
OCCUR
Possible
Possible
ON COMPONENT
Will not heat thus
allowing the local
area to drop below
lower temperature
limit.
Heater fails to deliver
heat.
Heater detached from
conducting material
Heater activated
erroneously
I °7.6
3°7.6
Possible
Possible
Heater fails to deliver
heat to area
electronics.
Heater adds heat to an
area ,,_,,_,,,anuil,y
heat.
BOEING
Table 6-7:
D2-82 709-1
SubsystemFailure ModesandEffects
bliabll ity 2-5956-0
EFFECTS
ON
SUBSYSTEM
Local area
el ec tron ics
operating at
lower limits of
temperature. Will
serve to increase
failure probability
of "turnon" stresses°
Arcing or contaminants
ejected. Ground
potential spikes
produced. RFI induced.
Dissipates battery.
Local ized cool ing
of dormant
electronics. May
increase fail ure
probabil ity of
electronic parts.
Temperature starts
up and louver
controJ activates
for greater
dissipation.
ON MISSION
Little or none
Unknown until
positioning of
heaters known
in more detail.
Some will cause
mission loss
(e.g. inertial
reference unit)
None
None
ALTERNATIVES
The temperature
control concept is
based on sufficient
solar gain to maintain
temp limits throughout
mission without heaters
except for localized
conditions. If conduc-
tion paths can be
devised to level heat
dissipation from internal
components, louver
control will be adequal;e.
It is assumed that some
sort of short protection
such as fuzing will
be employed.
Louver control plus
good design to level
heat gradients will
minimize
Louver design will
consider individua!
louver or small groups
control led and
activated separately.
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THE '_D'L_',_'f,A/'G CO.PAN'_
5.0 PARTS STANDARD
NOMENCLATURE
FAILURE RATES
PART
CLASS
TRANSDUCERS (CONT)
TEMPERATURE (THERMOCOUPLE)
(SEE ALSO SPECIFIC PART OR
ASSEMBLY TYPE)
TRANSFORMERS
AUDIO
MAGNETIC LOGIC, TORROIDAL
MEMORY CORE (SEE CORE--If
FERRITE MEMORY) _/' _
POWER, LOW VOLTAGE
POWER, HIGH VOLTAGE
PULSE
RADIO FREQUENCY
SATURABLE, CONVERTER
TRANS ISTORS
GERMANIUM, HIGH POWER
GERMANIUM, SWITCH
SILICON, FIELD EFFECT
SILICON, POWER
SILICON, SMALL SIGNAL
NUMBER D2-82724-3
Table 6-8: REVLTR B
(CONT'D)
SOURCE
ELECTR BOE.JING
ELECTR A
 LEcT 
_IL.7 _n-o
F_ _k '_,)_' A
_CTR PH,_CO
ELECTR C
ELECTR M
PHILCO
ELECTR A
ELECTR D
ELECTR D
I=1 I::(" T D
ELECTR D
FAILURE RATE
(FAILURES PER
HR X 106)
31 A
O.011//WINDING
O.02/'WINDING
0.018/'WINDING
0.1/WINDING
0.01/WINDING
0.003/WINDING
0.006/WINDING
0. 041
0.017
0.05
0. 051
0. 034
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6.5.2 Telecommunications Subsystem
6.5.2.1 Summary Data
Table 6-9 presents summary data for the telecommunications subsystem.
Table 6-9: TELECOmmUNICATIONS RELIABILITY SUMMARY
MISSION RELIABILITY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment*
Revised Allocation
0.6100 to 0.9800
0.9800
0.6191 to 0.9743
0.8416
0.841
6.5.2.2 Discussion
Table 6-9 is a capsule summary of the pertinent reliability values derived
for the telecommunications subsystem. The preferred subsystem reliabil-
ity assessment of 0.8416 is based on the reliability block diagram in
Figure 6-5.
Figure 6-6 summarizes the mission reliability evaluations for the pre-
ferred telecommunications subsystem and its major components. It also
shows the cumulative mission reliability by mission phase.
The major contribution (approximately 71 percent) to the unreliability
of the preferred telecommunication system is made by the telemetry and
data storage component, and is primarily due to two subcomponents,
*See footnote to Table 6-17.
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COMPONENT
ANTENNA
RELAY RADIO
TELEMETRY & DATA STORAGE
RAD IO
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.9838
0.9945
O.8833
0.9738
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
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Figure 6-6: Preferred SubsystemReliability
Telecommunications Subsystem
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namely, the data processing unit, which is used to process all data,
and the cruise/engineering data acquisition and storage unit, which is
used primarily to obtain engineering data. The former unit accounts for
28 percent of the telemetry data and storage component unreliability and
the latter accounts for 60 percent. The radio component, with an assessed
reliability of 0.97389 provides the second largest contribution (16 per-
cent) to the preferred telecommunications subsystem unreliability. Al-
though the main r.f. power amplifier section including exciter is redun-
dant, it accounts for 53 percent of radio component unreliability. The
unreliability of the antenna control assembly (6@ percent of the antenna
component) is primarily responsible for the antenna component account-
ing for i0 percent of telecommunications subsystem unreliability.
Significant improvement in the reliability of any of the above three
systems would result in a worthwhile improvement in telecommunications
subsystem reliability. Trade studies indicate that the greatest
improvement in the telecommunications subsystem's reliability can be
achieved by more extensive use of redundancy in the sync/subcarrier
generator, format generator and engineering multiplexer/encoder
modules. By this _neans, the unreliability of the telemetry and data-
storage component can be reduced by about a factor of 5. This would
result in an increase in subsystem reliability from 0.84 to about
0.91.
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06.5.2.3 Failure Mode and Effect Analyses Summary
A detailed failure mode and effect analyses summary_ by critical compo-
nent_ is shown below.
CRITICAL
COMPONENT
High-Gain Antenna
VHF Antenna
Relay Radio Subsystem
FAI LURE MODE
Data Processing
High Gain Antenna
Receiver Selector
Switch
Hy-Brid
Notch Filter
Transmitting
Antenna Selector
Switch
No signal to
receiver
No signal to Earth
No signal to relay
radio
No output
No output
Fail - off
Improper output
No output
Filter failure
causing damage
to receivers
Fail open
EFFECT ON MISSION
Loss of command and
tracking (T = 60
days and on_
Loss of mission through
loss of data and track-
ing (T = 60 days and on)
Loss of capsule; Mars
entry and surface data
Loss of capsule; Mars
entry and surface data
Loss of mission; no
capsule, planet orbit
or cruise/engineering
data
Loss of command and
tracking (T = 60 days
and on)
Loss of mission through
loss of data and track-
ing on both high-gain
and low-gain circuits
Loss of mission through
loss of high-gain and
low-gain transmission
of data and tracking
Loss of command and
tracking
Loss of mission through
loss of high-gain and
low-gain transmission
of data and tracking.
*T=O is the time of launch
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CRITICAL
COMPONENT
Transmitting
Antenna Selector
Switch (continued)
High-Gain Antenna
Preselect
FAILURE MODE
Fail to switch to
high gain
Open circuit -
No output
EFFECT ON MISSION
Loss of mission through
loss of high-gain data
and tracking (T = 60
days and on)
Loss of high-gain com-
mand and tracking
(T = 60 days and on)
6.5.3 Attitude References Subsystem
6.5.3.1 Summary Data
Table 6-10 presents summary data for the attitude references subsystem.
Table 6-10: ATTITUDE REFERENCES RELIABILITY
SUMMARY
MISSION RELIABILITY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
0.87 to 0.997
0.9954
0.995 to 0.997
0.9969
0.996
6.5.3.2 Discussion
The reliability allocation, feasibility range, trade range, and pre-
ferred system assessment for the attitude references subsystem are
shown in Table 6-10. The preferred system configuration includes com-
plete zedundancy as shown in the reliability block diagram of Figure
6-7.
L_
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Figure 6-8 summarizes the reliability assessment of the preferred atti-
tude references subsystem. Also shown is the subsystem cumulative
reliability by mission phase. Several lower-level trade-offs were con-
sidered, with results shown in Table 6-11. To reduce the possibility of
systematic failures occurring simultaneously in both of two redundant
channels, when feasible the preferred subsystem mechanization consists
of alternate hardware produced by different manufacturers. The mechani-
zation should be as different as is consistent with the requirement that
they present the same interface to other subsystems.
a reliability summary of the redundancy trades considered is tabulated
in Table 6-12. Several lower-level trades considered are also shown in
Table 6-11.
SUBSYSTEM
Table 6-12 RELIABILITY TRADE SUMMARY
SINGLE THREAD REDUNDANT
0.9574 0.99937
0.99938 0.99996
0.9411 0.9992
0.9606 0.9984
0.8650 0.9969
Gyro
Accelerometer
Sun Sensor
Canopus Tracker
Total Attitude Reference
6.5.3.3 Failure-Mode and Effects Summary
The predominant failure modes within the gyro unit are:
l)
2)
3)
Loss of one axis data output;
Loss of one gyro data output;
Loss of one power supply input.
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COMPONENT
Gyro Unit
Accelerometer
Sun Sensor
Canopus Tracker
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.99937
0.99996
0.9992
0.9984
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
II "_ O. 99757
Z "997 0.9969
O IBOOST TRANS-MARS MARS
4968 HR ORBIT
INSER-
TION
192 HR
MARS
ORBIT
720 HR
MISSION TIME
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Figure 6-8: Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary
Attitude References
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Table 6-II: Reliability Trades
SUBSYSTEM PRIMARY BAC KUP MISSIO N
ELEMENTS ELEMENTS REL lAB ILITY
Gyro Unit 2 Duai-Axls Gyros
3 Single-Axis Gyros
1 Dual-Axis Gyro
3 Single-Axls Gyros
0. 99937
0. 95809
Accelerometer EMA _ EMA _ 0.99999
EMA Bell 0. 99996 *
Bell Bell 0. 9967
Canopus Tracker Barnes Barnes
Barnes ITT
ITT ITT
0.9984
0.9984
0.9983
Sun Sensor Nortronics Nortronics 0. 9965
Ball Bros. Nortronics 0.9992 *
Ball Bros. Ball Bros. 0.9998
|
* Preferred Subsystem
Letter designation and names refer to manufacturer or model
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Complete three-axis redundancy is provided within the gyro unit. Loss
of data on one channel of one axis is unlikely. However, if it does
occur, internal circuitry will switch to the other channel for data
thereafter. The effect of this failure will be loss of redundancy on
one axis. A more predominant failure mode is loss of one gyro. Internal
circuitry will then switch to the two good gyros for three-axis data.
The effect of this failure mode will be loss of redundancy on the two
axes assigned to the failed gyro.
A failure of one of the two IRU power supplies will have no effect on
the system operation, other than to lose redundancy in the power supply.
Isolation and protective devices will prevent any failure in one supply
from influencing the operation of the other supply.
The predominant failure modes in the accelerometer subsystem are low or
intermittent outputs and no output. If either failure mode should occur
in the primary system, the backup or redundant accelerometer system will
provide a thrust-termination signal. Thrust termination by a CC&S signal
is a third backup mode.
Known failure modes in the Canopus-tracker subsystem are performance
degradation, erroneous outputs 9 and a complete loss of output data.
General failure modes in the Sun-sensor subsystem are the same as for
the Canopus-tracker. Complete redundancy is provided on each sensing
axis. Failure can be recognized by comparing the four independent
sources of data (two gyros and two trackers) for each axis, and switching
accomplished either by onboard logic or through ground command.
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6.5.4 Autopilo% Subsystem
6.5.4.1 Summary Data
Table 6-13 presents summary data for the autopilot subsystem.
Table 6-13: AUTOPILOT RELIABILITY SUMMARY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.9763 to 0.999812
0.9996
0.9982 to 0.999812
0.999812
0.999
6.5.4.2 Discussion
Table 6-13 summarizes pertinent reliability values for the autopilot
subsystem. Three basically different redundancy concepts were considered:
single thread, dual redundant, and triple redundant.
The preferred system employs both operating and standby redundancy as
well as forms of triple redundancy. The redundancy concept of the system
interfaced with and the signal form determine the type of redundancy
employed in a given circuit.
Figure 6-9 is a reliability block diagram of the selected d.c. analog
autopilot. The power supply and signal-summing amplifiers are connected
in a TRISAFE arrangement that provides proper output in every case when
two out of three are operating correctly, and when only one is operating
6.-42
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correctly for a significant number of failure modes. The signal elec-
tronics majority voter is a diode quad arrangement that provides internal
redundancy for both open- and short-circuit failure modes. The reaction-
control power switches and jet-vane actuator electronics are connected
in series to both the primary and backup items, which they respectively
drive. This yields overall redundancy and provides for higher reliability
switching (at the signal rather than power level). The secondary injection
electronics is not redundant since there is no redundancy in the thrust-
vector injection system on the main engine. The single-thread electronics
is more reliable than the injection system, and further reliability gains
through redundant electronics are insignificant at the system level.
Mission reliability for each block of hardware at the level determined
to be optimum for redundancy is shown in Figure 6-10. The subsystem
hazard curve for the total autopilot is also shown in Figure 6-10.
Table 6-14 is a reliability summary of the trades considered.
Table 6-14: P_LIABILITY TP_DE SUMMARY--AUTOPILOT SUBSYSTEM
DANCY
CONCEPT
D.C. Analog _
A.C. Analog
Digital
wPreferred Subsystem
SINGLE-
THREAD
SYSTEM
0.99708
0.99664
0.9763 to 0.9964
REDUNDANT
SYSTEM
0.999812
0.99972
0.9982 to 0.99978
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COMPONENT
Power Supply
Pitch Axis Electronics
Yaw Axis Electronics
Roll Axis Electronics
Reaction Jet Power Switches
Jet-Vane Actuator Electronics
Secondary Injection Electronics
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.999919
0.999997
0.999997
0.999997
0.999999
0.999997
0.999905
RELIABI LITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
0.999998
0 999856
MARS
BOOST INTERPLANETARY ORBIT
0.5 HR FLIGHT rNJECTIOb
4968 H R 192 HR
MISSION TIME
0.99985
0.999812
MARS ORBIT
720 HR
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Figure 6-I0: Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary --Autopilot
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6.5.4.3 Failure-Mode and Effects Analysis
Each of the three channels provided in each control axis has two pre-
dominant failure modes: the open-circuit type that results in no output
from that channel_ and one that results in an erroneous channel output.
In either case_ the majority voter will recognize a difference in data
from the failed channel_ and will discard this data as long as the fault
persists.
The majority voter in each axis also has two predominant failure modes:
an open-circuit type that results in no output from the voter_ and one
that prevents the voter from rejecting data from a failed channel in the
control-axis electronics. The probability of both modes is minimized
for highest mission reliability by quad arrangement of the diodes in
the voter.
The two predominant failure modes in the power supply are loss of regu-
lation and loss of power output. The TRISAFE feature ensures success
if any one of the three power supplies fails in either mode_ and if
specific combinations of two failures occur.
The reliability analysis for each control axis is similar. If any one
channel should fail_ the majority voter will discard data from that
channel. Mission success requires that any two of the three channels
be operational in each control axis for the majority voter to have com-
parison data by which to identify the failed channel.
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Reaction-Control Subsystem
0
0
0
0
0
0
6.5.5.1 Summary
Table 6-15 presents summary data for the reaction control subsystems.
Table 6-15: REACTION-CONTROL SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY SUMMARY
MISSION RELIABILITY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
0.956 to (*)
0.956
0,99907 to 0,99974
0.99959
0,999
(e) The feasibility range is represented by a single figure
because a single-thread system was not considered
6.5.5.2 Discussion
Table 6-15 summarizes the preferred system reliability assessment, the
subsystem allocation, and the trade studies performed on competing confi-
gurations.
The reaction-control subsystem owes its rather high reliability to the use
of highly reliable parts and components united into a completely redundant
gas system. Considerable experience with similar systems on the Mariner,
Ranger, OGO, OSH_ OAO, and Syncom vehicles has furnished both design di-
rection for this system and an indication of its reliability. Since nitro-
gen is necessary to the reaction-control subsystem before, during, and
after it is needed for propulsion, the N2 tankage is assessed as part of
the reaction-control subsystem. Figure 6-11 is a reliability block diagram
of the reaction-control subsystem.
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N2 TANK
QUAD
CHECK
VALVE
N2 TANK N2 TANK N TANK2
QUAD
CHECK
VALVE
SOLENOID
LATCHING
VALVE
I
SOLENOID
LATCHING
VALVE
PRESSURE
REGULATOR
PRESSURE
REGULATOR
J l
NOZZLE & CONTROL NOZZLE & CONTROL
BANK BANK
Figure 6-11: Reliability Block Diagram
Reaction Control Subsystem
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Figure 6-12 indicates how each piece of equipment compares with others
in the subsystem and shows how the subsystem reliability varies as a
function of mission phase.
6.5.5.3 Failure-Mode and Effects Summary
This is a completely redundant system comprising two complete and separ-
ate legs from the N2 tanks through the thrusters. Single failures can be
remedied if detected and the standby leg switched in (except in two places).
External leakage of the quad check valve or the solenoid latching valve
(in either leg) allows depletion of the N 2 from all tanks.
6.5.6 Central Computer and Sequencer
6.5.6.1 Summary Data
Table 6-16 presents summary data for the central computer and sequencer.
Table 6-16: CC&S RELIABILITY SUMMARY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.876 to 0.9930
0.9930
0.9927 to 0.9945
0.9941
0.994
6.5.6.2 Discussion
Table 6-16 summarizes the results of the reliability assessment and goal
of the central computer and sequencer (CC&S) subsystem. The feasibility
range is based on an initial analysis of the CC&S considerinag single-
thread and completely redundant arrangements. The initial allocation
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COMPONE NT
N 2 TANKS
SOLENOID LATCHING VALVE
PRESSURE REGULATOR
NOZZLES & CONTROLS
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.999999+
0.99999
0.9859
0.999948
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
1.0
III
>
I.--
<
-- _OOST
._ 3.5 HR
U
f
99999+
_ 0.99970 _
0.99959
TRANS-MARS MARS MARS
4968 HR ORBIT ORBIT
INSER- 720 HR
TION
192 HR
MISSION PHASES
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Figure 6-12: Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary
Reaction Control
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was also based on the results of this analysis.
modified Lunar Orbiter, memory-oriented computer.
configurations were also considered:
i) Timer-oriented, fixed-wire (Mariner C)_
2)
The preferred CC&$ is a
Two alternate subsystem
Timer-oriented, fixed-wire (integrated circuit logic approach).
The subsystem reliability assessment of the fixed-wire configuration us-
ing integrated circuit logic is 0.9927. A cursory analysis of the Mariner
C configuration, which uses core transistor logic (CTL) and relays, revealed
that approximately the same number of logic elements would be used for this
configuration. However, because of the higher failure rate (5 to i) of the
CTL logic element and the greater weight of this subsystem configuration,
it does not appear to be a good candidate. In addition to its higher relia-
bility, the memory-oriented subsystem also provides an advantage in mission
flexibility.
Figure 6-13 is the reliability block diagram for the preferred design
of the CC&S subsystem. This diagram shows the series and redundant ar-
rangements of the major elements considered for the reliability assessment.
The subsystem consists of two major assemblies: control assembly and switch-
ing assembly. The major parts of the control assembly are the redundant-
processor logic elements, and the major parts of the switching assembly
are the squib drivers for the propulsion and solar-panel subsystems.
Figure 6-14 summarizes the results of the detailed reliability assessment
of the CC&S and identifies the cumulative mission reliability by mission
6-51
BaEi, iV_
D2- 82709 - 1
I
>-_
I-uc_
I
I
>.-
U
Z
_0
Z ,--..
_Z
L.U
,-vU
L
"-" -'1 r-
IU ,-,,. U ,"." I
I¢,_ F--,-I
I0 ul
.__1 Lr..,.
IZ
I_u!
IOoi
lug,
_U
,..,_
07-
___.
!
>.-
U
_Z
_o
,vU
IU rv I
|L/_, F,--I
IC ui
' ')0
l')--
r
.J
O
I--
Z
O
U
I
LLJ
F--
0
L.U
cv
_Z
o_
._ I--
uB
s8
I I
5
II
8
-j-
I _ --J
51 2u,,.I0 _ i-
_,_J ou
i
I I
Io
z>,
I-- uJ
I_ _IJ1
.--I
o_ I
Z"'
O,-n
U'<
.--.I
0
rv
I--
Z
0
U
I"-
0
I
Z
o I
I.--. "
u I
UJ
Z
0
U
I
V1
LLI
I
UJ ._1
O_
J
LLI
> >
- _r_
_a6_a
m"',._Zuj >-
_ m
" 0 • •
I
E
,,i,...o
I
E
o_
O
e_
om
J
om
o_
n
¢Y
I
6-52
80,e'JAl'_
D2-82 709-1
COMPONENT
Control Assembly
Input Circuits
Command Logic
Oscillator & Countdown
Register
Redundancy Control
Memory & Arithmetic
Control
Output Matrix Decoder
Power Supply
Connection_
Switching Assembly
Relay Subassembly
Squib Drivers
Solenoid Drivers
Relay Drivers
Connections
RELIABI
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.9988
0.9915
0.9999+
0.9965
0.9867
0.9910
0.9913
0.9915
0.9999+
0.9999+
0.9999+
0.9981
0.9997
0.9999+
LITYOF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
Figure 6-14:
0.9950
-INJECTION i MARS_'_"_ 9941
192 hr ORBIT
720 hr
MISSION PHASE
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary-- CC&S
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phase.
are:
l)
2)
3)
4)
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As shown in Figure 6-14, the low reliability items in the subsystem
Memory and arithmetic unit_
Control logic;
Output matrix decoder;
Command logic;
Power supply.
The CC&S subsystem is basically a redundant configuration. The control-
assembly elements are arranged in redundant strings, and the drivers in
the switching assembly are also redundant. The input circuits to the
control assembly and the driver circuits for the solenoids and relays are
essentially the only in-line elements within the subsystem. These elements
account for approximately 55 percent of the subsystem unreliability.
6.5.6.3 Failure-Mode and Hffects Summary
The primary purpose of the CC&S is to provide signals to the other space-
craft subsystems. Because the CC&S is essentially redundant, few failures
would result directly in mission loss or in loss of a function. Failure
modes, effects, and workaround schemes have been established for the Lunar
Orbiter subsystem (see Boeing Specification D2-I00254, Volume i) that are
also applicable to a more detailed analysis of the Voyager CC&S. A po-
tentially serious failure mode is a shorted output in either redundant
computer. The effect is that the shorted output would appear as a com-
manded function resulting in an erroneous signal. Another failure mode
that could affect mission success is a combination of a squib breakwire
shorting and the squib driver failure to shut itself off. The effect of
6 -54
this failure mode is a power drain. The loss of a command function could
also result in mission loss for such functions as solar-cell deployment
and midcourse maneuvers or orbit insertion. However, the redundant ar-
rangements of squib drivers and squib breakwires reduce the probability
of failure of command for these functions to less than 2.0 x 10-6 .
6.5.7 Electrical Power Subsystem
6.5.7.1 Summary Data
Table 6-17 presents summary data for the electrical power subsystems.
Table 6-17: ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM SUMMARY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment*
Revised Allocation
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.975 to 0.999
0.999
0.992+
0.992
0.992
0 6.5.7.2 Discussion
The assessed reliability of the preferred electrical power subsystem is
0.992. As indicated in Table 6-17, this is slightly below the initial
allocation and the feasible maximum. The feasibility range reflects
*Power conditioning equipment providing power to a particular subsystem
is subject to integration with that subsystem. Subsequent to the assess-
ment of the preferred system shown here, the 400-cps single-phase inverter
(or its equivalent function) was integrated into the telecommunications
system.
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values for the simplest system of series components compared to a system
in which redundancy is provided for each major component. Trades were
performed on subsystem components, revealing some variation in parts
count in the d.c./d.c, regulator, 2400-cps inverter, and a.c. fail-sense
circuit. However, because these components are part of the redundant de-
sign, the effect of failure-rate variations is negligible in the relia-
bility calculations. Also, variations were considered in the battery/
battery charger configuration, which, due to redundancy, does not sig-
nificantly affect reliability calculations. In general, choices between
alternates were based on performance and weight.
Reliability improvement has been achieved by a two-out-of-three battery/
battery charger configuration, standby regulators, and standby 2400-cps
inverter. Also, the solar array is inherently redundant because of the
extra margin of cells. In addition, command system switching is available
for all standby components.
The reliability block diagram of the preferred subsystem is shown in Figure
6-15. The subsystem breakdown in Figure 6-16 shows the power synchronizer,
share sense circuit, and 400-cps inverter to be the least reliable. Fail-
ure of the synchronizer results in reduced performance of the inverters
but does not affect primary mission success. Therefore, the potential
problem areas appear to be the 400-cps inverter and share sense circuit.
6.5.7.3 Failure-Mode and Effects Summary
The following are the prominent failure modes in the electrical power
subsystem:
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COMPONENT
SOLAR PANEL ASSEMBLY,
BATTERY/BATTERY CHARGER-S ENSOR
BOOSTER CONVERTER
SHARE SENSE CIRCUIT
POWER SWITCH & LOGIC
SERIES SWITCHING REGULATOR
SYNCHRONIZER
INVERTER 400 CPS SINGLE PHASE*
INVERTER 2400 CPS SINGLE PHASE
* SEE FOOTNOTE FOR TABLE 6-17
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
MISSION RELIABILITY
0°999319
0.999940
0.999928
0.996589
0.999992
0.999908
0.998175
0.998428
0.999990
1.000
0.998
_ 0.996
_) 0.994
I 0.9935
:E
u.,I
>
<
ii
u
0.992
0.990
BOOST
0.5 HR
I1,,,
0
TRANS-MARS
4968 HRS
MARS
ORBIT
NJECTIOI_
192 HRS
MISSION PHASE
0.9932
MARS
ORBIT
720 HRS
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Figure 6-16: Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary--
Electrical Power
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l)
2)
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Failure of the 400-cps inverter would result in loss of power to
the telecommunications and cause mission failure.
A short in the unregulated d.c. bus would result in mission failure.
Failure of the share sense circuit could result in insufficient
power to reorient the spacecraft when solar panels are inclined
such that their output is lower than the minimum required. This
would result in mission failure.
6.5.8 Propulsion Subsystem
6.5.8.1 Summary Data
Table 6-18 represents summary data for the propulsion subsystem.
Table 6-18: PR_PIL__OH SUBSYSTE_ RELIABILITY S_,_IARY
MISSION RELIABILITY
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
0.946 to 0.989
0.989
0.9458 to 0.99684
0.99684
0.996
6.5.8.2 Discussion
Table 6-18 summarizes the preferred subsystem reliability assessment,
+h= =11hev=+=m _=l_ah_l_+v a11nn_+_on, and ih_ Irad_ sludies performed on
the competing propulsion subsystem configurations. In addition to the
preferred subsystem, trade configurations included a large liquid engine
for orbit insertion, i00- and 200-pound-thrust engines for midcourse
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correction, pulsed engine operation, gimbaled engines, larger numbers
of small engines, and thrust vectoring of the large engine by pulsing
small engines. The preferred system represents the most reliable com-
bination of system elements and functions.
The preferred system reliability is 3.48 times as good as the initial
allocation (an assessed mission failure rate of 0.00316 compared to
the allocated 0.011). Redundant components, isolation of system parts
to reduce them to inactive status while not needed, and choice of highly
reliable parts were the main reasons for the higher reliability than
expected.
Figure 6-17 is a reliability block diagram of the propulsion subsystem.
Figure 6-18 shows the effect of each major grouping of components on
mission reliability. Significant redundancy exists in the propellant
feed system, and the midcourse correction engines are backed by a stand-
by pair. A solid motor was selected for orbit insertion because of its
reliability feature. Historical data on solid motors indicate reliability
achievement in excess of 0.99995. Although increased performance require-
ments may have a degrading effect on reliability, improved design and
inspection techniques are expected to provide adequate compensation to
maintain the reliability levels demonstrated in the past.
Figure 6-18 also shows how the propulsion subsystem reliability changes
as the mission progresses (mission hazard chart). The contrlbution of
major components is shown in the table at the top of Figure 6-18. The
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I N2
PRESSURE
SYSTEM
SOLID
ROCKET
MOTOR
THRUST
VECTOR
PROPELLANT
FEED SYSTEM
i
SMALL LIQUID
ENGINES
(ONE PAIR OPERATING;
ONE STANDING BY)
Figure 6-17: Reliability Block Diagram-Propulsion Subsystem
6-61
D2- 82 709-1
COMPONENT
N 2 PRESSURE SYSTEM
PROPELLANT FEED
SMALL LIQUID ENGINES
LARGE SOLID MOTOR
THRUST VECTOR SYSTEM
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.99942
0.99932
0.99864
0.99995
0.999465
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
0.9999979
_ 0,99742
co
,_J
iii
OL
,_1
u
ORBIT J
INSER- J MARS
TION J ORBIT
192 HR I 720 HRI
m
m
BOOSTI
0.5 HR
(INCLUDES MIDCOURSE
MANEUVERS)
T RA N S-MARS
4968 HR
MISSION PHASE
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Figure 6-18: Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary-
Propulsion Subsystem
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mission hazard chart of the figure shows the mission phases connected by
straight lines for convenience only. The actual change is by a series of
gradual changes interrupted by abrupt steps at points of significant
failure potential.
6.5.8.3 £ailure-Mode and £ffects Summary
There are eleven "major leak" or "burst" failure modes that can cause
mission loss caused by fuel pressure loss. There are seven internal-leak
failure modes that can cause orbit insertion loss. There are four other
failure modes that can cause orbit insertion loss. They are associated
with squib valves not working and the large engine failing to start.
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6.5.9 Structures Subsystem
@
6.5.9.1 Summary Data
Table 6-19 presents summary data for the structures subsystem.
Table 6-19: STRUCTURES RHLIABILITY SUMMARY
Mission Reliability
Feasibility Range
(Combined with Mechanisms)
Initial Allocation
(Combined with Mechanisms)
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
0.991 to 0.999
0.999
O.9999
0.999
6.5.9.2 Discussion
Structural reliability is assumed to be 0.9999. Because of the lack of
statistically significant failure data for comparable structures and
environments, this figure is necessarily a judgment.
The approach to structural reliability included the following:
l)
2
3
4
5
6)
7)
Use of materials having proven mechanical properties
Use of proven stress analysis techniques
Design for simplicity, producibility, and inspectability
Conservative safety factors to account for uncertainties of static
and dynamic loading
Redundant structural arrangements
Extensive environmental testing
A stringent quality control program
6 -64
6.5.10 Mechanisms Subsystem
6.5.10.1 Summary Data
Table 6-20 presents summary data for the mechanisms subsystem.
Table 6-20: MECHANISMS RELIABILITY SUMMARY
Feasibility Range
(Combined with Structures)
Initial Allocation
(Combined with Structures)
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
Mission Reliability
0.991 to 0.999
0.999
O.998±
0.9988
O.999
6.5.10.2 Discussion
Results of the preferred configuration reliability assessment are shown
in Figure 6-19. Figure 6-20 is a reliability block diagram of the
mechanism subsystem.
A conservative approach was used for this assessment. All items having
time-based failure rates were treated as if they were operating at full
load during launch-boost. Because the boom hinges and locking devices
may be expected to absorb the brunt of stresses generated by spacecraft
maneuvers_ an operating cycle is charged against these items each time
an engine is fired after boom deployment.
A number of special design features are being incorporated into this
subsystem to enhance reliability. All pin-pullers will have redundant
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COMPONENT
LOW-GAIN-ANTENNA BOOM ASSEMBLY
VHF-ANTENNA BOOM ASSEMBLY
PLANETARY-SCAN PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
SCIENCE BOOM ASSEMBLY
HIGH-GAIN-ANTENNA BOOM ASSEMBLY
BACTERIOLOGICAL BARRIER (BASE ONLY)
RELEASE MECH.
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.99973
0.99973
0.99996
0.99972
0.99968
.99999+
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
0. 99997
1.000___,_._ 0. 99929
<
-_ 0.999 -
iii
Z
0
_ 0.998 -
>
BOOST0.5 HR
U 0.99_
TRANS-MARS
4968 H R
MARS
ORBIT
INJEC-
TION
192 HR
MISSION PHASE
0.99914
_0.99881
MARS
ORBIT
720 HR
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD CHART
Figure 6-19: Preferred Subsystem Reliability Summary-
Mechanisms Subsystem
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squibs and firing circuits. All sleeve bearings used will be self-aligning
and will incorporate two independent bearing surfaces. Thus, active paral-
lel redundancy is achieved in all bearings. Misalignment of bearing housings
caused by thermal deformation will not cause mechanism failure.
6.5.10.3 Failure-Mode and Effects Summary
The subsystem is actually a collection of mechanism units that functionally
act as parts of other subsystems such as deployment of antennas for the
telecommunications subsystem. Basic failure modes and effects are, there-
fore, related to these subsystems. Critical, single-effect failure modes
and results are:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
VHF antenna boom does not deploy: loss of capsule, Mars entry, and
surface data;
Magnetometer (science) boom does not deploy: loss of magnetometer
data;
Planetary scan platform optics cover sticks closed: loss of Mars
pictures;
Planetary scan platform does not track or tracks improperly:
smeared pictures of Mars surface_
Planetary scan platform does not deploy properly: loss of desired
Mars surface data;
High-gain antenna boom does not deploy: loss of mission through loss
of command, tracking, and data (T = 60 days and on);
High-gain antenna boom does not respond properly to Earth-tracking
signal input: loss of mission through loss of command, tracking
and data (T = 60 days and on);
6-68
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8) Bacteriological barrier release mechanism does not release; loss of
orbit and capsule data through damaged firing orbit insertion motor.
6.5.11 Temperature Control Subsystem
6.5.11.1 Summary Data
Table 6-21 presents summary data for the temperature control subsystem.
Table 6-21: TEMPERATURE CONTROL RELIABILITY SUmmARY
Mission Reliability
Feasibility Range
Initial Allocation
Trade Range
Preferred Subsystem Assessment
Revised Allocation
0.550 to 0.997
0.997
0.996+
m
0.996
0.996
6.5.11.2 Discussion
The assessed reliability of the preferred temperature control subsystem
is 0.996. The wide feasibility range is accounted for by the capability
for extensive redundancy in the louver assemblies. Heaters are provided
for backup in case louvers fail in the open mode. Each heater is con-
trolled by thermal switches in series which provides redundancy for
switches failing in the closed mode. In addiiion_ the capability is
present to command control the heaters through the CC&S. Figure 6-21
shows the preferred subsystem reliability block diagram_ Figure 6-22
summarizes the reliability assessment.
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O
O
COMPONENT
LOUVERS (WITH HEATER BACKUP)
INSULATION
SOLAR SHIELD
ENGINE HEATSHIELD
MISSION RELIABILITY
0. 996069
0. 999976
0. 999982
0.999994
RELIABILITY OF SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS
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0.999
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6.5.11.3 Failure Mode and Effect Summary
The temperature control subsystem is composed of passive elements_
conventional louvers_ and electric heaters. The louvers are individually
actuated and controlled by temperature sensing elements which drive the
louver from fully closed to fully open. Louver control is based upon
a minimum radiation loss from space radiators (with louvers closed) to
a maximum (with louvers open). For periods of Mars orbit_ when space
losses are high, and for close temperature control, the electric heaters
back up the louver control. Electric heaters are activated by series
wired bimetallic switches that can be overriden by commands from Earth.
Maximum temperature excursions expected with either louver control alone
or the majority electric heaters alone are well within design tempera-
ture ranges of most electronic parts and components. The inertial
reference unit is one component identified that will depend upon both
electric heaters and louver control.
The only critical failure mode identifiable at this time is the complete
failure of such a critical heater as the elements protecting temperature
control for the inertial reference unit.
6-72
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6.5.12 Pyrotechnics Subsystem
The arming switch, separation timer, firing and inhibit switches, and
associated wiring have been designated the pyrotechnics subsystem. The
squibs, or actual explosive devices, are included with whatever subsystem
with which they are associated.
@
Even %he switching mentioned above is included in the analysis and con-
siderations of the CC&S subsystem, leaving only the wiring harnesses
unaccounted for. The reliability of these harnesses is conservatively
estimated at 0.999 or greater.
The failure mode analysis of the pyrotechnic subsystem revealed but one
critical failure mode: a short in the inhibit-switch circuitry could
cause mission loss by premature firing of a solid rocket engine during a
midcourse correction maneuver.
@
6.5.13 Science Payload
6.5.13.1 Summary Data
Table 6-22 presents summary data for the science payload.
Table 6-22: SCIENCE PAYLOAD RELIABILITY SUGARY
@ Reliability Range
Initial Allocation
Total Payload Assessment
Primary Objectives
(Planetary Experiments Only)
MISSION RELIABILITY
0.510 TO 0.912
0.650
0.510
0.672
@
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6.5.13.2 Discussion
Reliability of the science payload is estimated at 0.672 (see Table
6-22). This is the reliability of those planetary experiments which
satisfy primary mission objectives. Certain interplanetary experiments
are included as secondary objectives which, added to primary objectives,
brings the total payload reliability down to 0.510. Since all experi-
ments are isolated, failure of any instrument or combination of instru-
ments will not result in failure of the mission. Therefore, success of
any experiment may be regarded as partial success of the payload.
Table 6-23 shows breakdowns of various combinations of instrument re-
liabilities. It should be noted that reliability of the data automation
equipment enters all calculations since no data can be collected without
it. The most desired experiments are the television system and the Mars
scanner; therefore, the reliability limit to satisfy these primary objec-
tires would be 0.775.
6.5.14 Operational Support Equipment (OSE)
6.5.14.1 Summary
The mission success criteria for the Voyager Project dictate that the
reliability of the OSE be established in terms of two operational mis-
sion phases; namely: (i) a reliability requirement which would be
associated with the probability of reaching and maintaining a state of
readiness to launch or a launch-on-time status at the time of launch
commitment, and (2) a reliability requirement associated with that
equipment (located at DSN) used throughout the actual mission flight.
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Table 6-23: Science PayloadReliability Range
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
DATA AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT
MARS SCANNER
TOTAL
DATA AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT
TV SYSTEM
TOTAL
DATA AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT
TV SYSTEM
MARS SCANNER
TOTAL
ALL PLANETARY EXPERIMENTS
DATA AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT
TV SYSTEM
MARS SCANNER
IR SPECTROMETER
UV SPECTROMETER
DUAL-FREQUENCY RADIO BEACON
MARS RF NOISE DETECTOR
TOTAL
ALL EXPERIMENTS
DATA AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT
TV SYSTEM
MARS SCANNER
IR SPECTROMETER
UV SPECTROMETER
DUAL-FREQUENCY RADIO BEACON
MARS RF NOISE DETECTOR
HELIUM VECTOR MAGNETOMETER
PLASMA INSTRUMENT
TRAPPED RADIATION DETECTOR
MICROMETEORITE DETECTOR
I.___,,_^T,_l CH AI_I_I:R
TOTAL
_T
0.0659
0.0266
0.0925
0.0659
0.1616
0.2275
0.0659
0.1616
0.0266
0.2541
0.0659
0.1616
0.0266
0.0415
0.0415
0.0390
0.0209
0.3970
O. 0659
0.1616
0.0266
0.0415
0.0415
O. 0390
O. 0209
0.0842
0.0744
0.0349
0.0122
0.0699
0.6726
RELIABILITY
0.912
0.798
0.775
0.672
.510
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Reliability requirements to be associated with the launch readiness
phase of the mission (Category i) have not been established. Their
values will be greatly influenced by factors such as the philosophy
advanced for maintenance and repair, the workaround capability, time
and equipment availability during the critical prelaunch period, and
the definition of the critical prelaunch period, with its attendant OSE
operational requirements.
A reliability of 0.97 has been allocated to the DSN-OSH (Category 2) re-
quirement during the actual mission flight. This reliability estimate
is believed to be consistent with the reliability experienced with equip-
ment having similar operational environments and functional and electronic
parts complexity.
6.5.14.2 Discussion
Generally, the OSE falls into two basic types: Type i, which includes
those equipments required for the assembly, servicing, checkout, handling,
shipping, and testing of the space vehicle subsystems; and Type 2, which
includes those equipments (software and hardware) required at the DSN to
meet the functional mission requirements of the Voyager project not re-
quired for any other project. This type is commonly referred to as mission
dependent equipment (MDE). Those equipments that are considered critical
to a successful checkout, launch, and mission flight will be subjected to
appropriate reliability and design disciplines comparable to those imposed
on spacecraft equipment.
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The methodology used to determine the level of reliability required by
the two types of OSE to meet mission objectives will depend on such
considerations as the following:
i) Maintainability ground rules for OSH and subsystems in the launch
vehicle
2) Protection from overstress or degradation of the spacecraft system
during test or as a result of OSE malfunction
3) In terms of time and equipment, the availability of workaround
capability during various operational phases of prelaunch and
mission flight.
After determining all the pertinent factors, a mathematical model, based
on such factors as indicated above will be formulated. This model will
provide the means for determination and interpretation of all OSE reli-
ability requirements which will then be allocated to specific equipments
in terms of MTBF's and MTTR's.
6.5.15 Launch Vehicle System
The launch vehicle system--consisting of an S-IB first stage, an S-IVB
second stage, and a Centaur third stage--must inject the overall flight
spacecraft into a prescribed transfer orbit. A probability of success of
0.90 is the assigned objective for this function. Because this configura-
tion is in a developmental state, assessment of the 0.90 objective has been
performed by an analysis of each of the stages. T_e of these have been
based on actual flight data.
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The S-IB stage, composed of the most mature engine derivative in the
United States, has completed nine successive, successful flight tests_
these conservatively indicate a reliability in excess of 0.92. The Centaur
has scored two successes out of four opportunities, with one opportunity
lost by first-stage failure. No flight trials have been conducted on the
S-IVB, necessitating a design analysis to derive an assessment.
Chart A of Figure 6-23 shows 50-percent confidence limits (labeled "low"
and "high") and a midpoint assessment for the S-IB and Centaur stages.
The low and high values for the S-IVB were based on the midpoint value
derived from the design assessment. Chart B of the figure shows current
estimates (based on the latest firing data) for the Atlas-Mercury and
composite Mercury-Gemini shots. These data provide typical booster matu-
rity points. Chart C represents a typical booster reliability growth curve
showing the cumulative reliability for 33 firings of the Titan II booster.
By combining midrange data of Chart A (as a starting point), the typical
growth of Chart C, and the maturity range of Chart B, the Voyager 1971
launch vehicle reliability was forecast as shown in Chart D. This analysis
indicates that an objective of 0.90 for the Voyager launch vehicle is
feasible. This is true in light of the experience of our Saturn I and
manned space shots where, by conservative design, by component screening,
and rigorous control, significant gains in booster reliability were
achieved.
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PREFERRED SYSTEM EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION
6.6.1 Evaluation
The preferred Spacecraft System, comprised of subsystems "preferred" from
the standpoint of most effectively meeting overall design criteria, has
an assessed reliability level of 0.552 for the full Voyager mission. It
reflects those trades occasioned by constraints on weight, cost, and
development time. T_ble 6-24 summarizes the reliability evaluation of
the preferred system.
Table 6-2¢: PREFERRED SYSTEM EVALUATION SUMMARY
SYSTEM ELEMENT
Spacecraft Bus
Science Payload
Spacecraft (Subtotal)
Launch Vehicle
Operational Support
Equipment (MDE)
Other Factors
Contingency
INITIAL
ALLOCATION EVALUATION
0.911 0.820
0.650 0.673
0.592 0.552
0.900 0.900
0.970 0.970
0.954 0.983
0.885
Spacecraft & Launch Vehicle
(Total) 0.450 0.474
Figure 6-24 shows by mission phase a comparison of cumulative mission
success plots of the fully redundant, single-threat, and preferred
systems with the Voyager mission objectives. A breakdown of major sub-
system contributions to the cumulative mission success is shown in
Table 6-25. As indicated in the Table, assessment of the science sub-
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Table 6-25:
SYSTEM ELEMENT
Al'a_"jjllr,_
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Preferred System Reliability Evaluation Summary Chart
ASSESSED RELIABILITY
Spacecraft
Spacecraft Bus
Tel ecommunicat ions
Attitude Reference
Autopilot
Reaction Control
CC &S
Electrical Power
Propulsion
Structure
Mechanisms
Temperature Control
Pyrotechnics
Spacecraft Bus (Subtotal)
Science Payload
Spacecraft (Subtotal)
OSE
Launch Vehicle
Performance Factors
Midcourse
Orbit" Injection
Orbit Trim
No Meteoroid Damage
Contingency
TOTAL
0. 8416
0. 9969
0. 9998
0. 9996
0.9941
0. 9923
0. 9968
0. 9999
0. 9988
0. 9960
0.8201
0.6726
0.5516
0. 970
0. 900
0. 997
0. 997
0. 999
0. 990
0.4735
_ Included for reliability purposes in CC&S
> For all planetary experiments
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system was premised on performance of all planetary experiments. Values
for other levels of success, ranging from complete success of all data
gathering functions to success of a defined minimum number of functions
was shown in Table 6-23 of Section 6.5.13.
6.6.2 Preferred System Reliability Allocation
The initial allocation, described in Section 6.3.3 was used as a guide
in the first round iteration of the preliminary design. It was based
on the feasibility study (Section 6.3.2) which showed that compatibility
with specified design objectives could be achieved by the use of high
reliability component/parts (equivalent to Minuteman) applied in a
design employing redundancy on critical functions.
Subsequent design efforts evolved candidate configurations aimed not
only at meeting allocated reliability objectives, but meeting overall
design criteria and in the most effective manner. As a part of the
latter studies, the reliability of each candidate was assessed to deter-
mine compliance with objectives and to establish relative ranking for
selection criteria. Details of these trade studies were set forth in
Section 6.5. From these studies, the preferred or selected system
(evaluation given in Section 6.6.1) was evolved.
The reliability allocation for the preferred system, shown in Table
6-26, is based on the studies described above and assumes the implemen-
tation plan as described in Section 5.0.
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Table 6-26: Preferred System Reliability Summary Chart
SYSTEM ELEMENT REVISED ALLOCATION
SPAC ECRAFT
SPACECRAFT BUS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ATTITUDE REFERENCE
AUTOPILOT
REACTION CONTROL
CC&S
ELECTRICAL POWER
PROPULSION
STRUC TUR E
MECHANISMS
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
PYROTECHNICS
0. 841
0. 996
0. 999
0. 999
0. 994
0. 992
0. 996
0. 999
0. 999
0. 996
$¢
SPACECRAFT BUS (SUB TOTAL) 0.817
SCIENCE PAYLOAD 0. 650
SPACECRAFT (SUB TOTAL) 0.531
OSE 0. 970
LAUNCH VEHICLE 0. 900
PERFORMA NC E FACTORS
MIDCOURSE
ORBIT INJECTION
ORBIT TRIM
0. 997
0. 997
0. 999
NO METEOROID DAMAGE 0. 990
CONTINGENCY 0. 987
TOTAL 0.450
*INCLUDED FOR RELIABILITY PURPOSES IN CC&S
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The preferred system reliability allocation will serve as the main
numerical control procedure for the follow-on design phase. Demonstration
of compliance to allocated objectives will be required by means of detailed
design analyses supported by agreed upon data standards and analyses
procedures.
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1969 TEST SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION
6.7.1 Evaluation
Reliabilities of alternate and preferred 1969 test spacecraft were
assessed by revising the evaluations of the 1971 preferred system to
account for differences in: (i) equipment configuration, and (2) mission
profiles and objectives. Although it is expected that the test spacecraft
equipment maturity will be less than that for the 1971 system, this factor
has not been included in this analysis. In terms of overall mission
success, the test system compares favorably to the 1971 system in that its
reduced complexity will more than offset equipment maturity degradation.
Summary data for each candidate configuration and mission are presented
below in Table 6-27.
Table 6-27: 1969 TEST SPACECRAFT
RELIABILITY EVALUATION
TEST/MISSION
CONFIGURATION
Atlas/Centaur
Launch
Mars Flyby
Heliocentric
Earth Orbit
Saturn/Centaur
Mars Orbit
DEVIATION FROM 1971
CONFIGURATION
Reduction in Elect-
rical Power, Temp-
erature Control,
Mechanism No.,
Orbit Insertion
Engine, No Science
Payload
MISSION
DURATION
(Days)
Dummy Science
Payload
315
225
270
270
RELIABILITY*
0.761
0.825
0.800
0.792
* For test spacecraft only
6.7.2 Allocation
The reliability allocation for the preferred 1969 test spacecraft will be
the same as that for the preferred 1971 configuration, with minor adjustments
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to account for differences in equipment configuration. The approximate
2-year difference in launch dates between the two systems will affect
achieved reliability. However, because the reliability allocation serves
primarily as a design control and not as demonstration criteria for hard-
ware, no adjustments will be made to account for maturity differences.
Table 6-28 lists reliability allocation for the 1969 test spacecraft.
Deviations are noted by an asterisk.
Table 6-28: ALLOCATION FOR 1969 TEST SPACECRAFT
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT RELIABILITY ALLOCATION
Telecommunications
Attitude Reference
Autopilot
Reaction Control
CC&S
Electrical Power
0.841
0.996
0.999
0.994
0.994
0.979*
Propulsion
Structure
Mechanisms
Temperature Control
TOTAL
0.998 _
0.999
0.999
0.997 _
0.805
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7.0 INTEGRATED TEST PLAN DEVELOPMENT
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The importance of testing to Voyager Mission Success and the extensive
test interface with flight hardware and the Mission Operating System
requires that preliminary planning for Integrated Testing be developed
concurrently with the Spacecraft System Design. This preliminary
planning includes review and analysis of requirements and constraints
and examination of certain alternative approaches. It culminates in
a selected approach and scheduling to support program planning. The
impact of '69 test flights on the test plan will be highlighted.
A preliminary Integrated Test Plan has been prepared based on the
study andplanning described in this section. This plan will be
developed and completed during Phase IB. Salient features of the plan
include:
i) A highly disciplined test operation through automatic programmed
test equipment, detailed test procedures, and a test team train-
ing program.
2) Documented assurance of performance and reliability status
through a Central Data collection and analysis system.
3) Integration of test time from all tests into equivalent mission
to provide a numerical index of reliability assurance.
4 Collection, collation and analysis of trend data.
5 Test flows and scheduling that optimize test effectiveness with
efficiency.
6) Use of a moving test complex including equipment and test team
for STC level testing.
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Burn-in and screening of parts.
Accumulation of sufficient test time on flight articles during
flight acceptance and interface testing to detect potential
infant mortality failures.
Incorporation of life test requirements in Type Approval Test
specifications for components, subsystems and systems.
Environmental testing of non-flight hardware to explore design
margins and degradation rates.
Environmental tests of flight hardware in the Planetary Vehicle
configuration to assure integrity of all interfaces and inter-
actions.
7.2 OBJECTIVE
The overall objective of the Integrated Test Plan is to demonstrate the
ability of the totality of systems to meet the Mission Flight Require-
ments. This objective is achieved by choosing tests and environments
and sequencing them to produce documented assurance at the time of
launch that all significant failure modes have been investigated and
the risk of their occurrence during the mission is at an acceptable
level. The basic concept is to summarize test requirements from all
project elements, i.e., system engineering, design, operations, quality
assurance, reliability and safety and to integrate these into a compo-
site test program which satisfies the test program objectives.
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7.3 REQUIREMENTS AND SCOPE
Table 7-1 depicts the various tests identified by the Preliminary
Voyager '71 Mission Specification, categorizes them into either type
approval tests or flight approval tests and indicates the hardware
involved.
7.3.1 Interface Tests
An important facet of the test program is the impact of the interface
tests on the scope of the test program. The Spacecraft Integrated
Test Program is a part of a larger test program and must be viewed in
the context of the total Voyager Project. Figure 7-1 shows how the
program elements come together to constitute a project. Each junction
represents an interface whose integrity must be verified by test and
formally controlled. Figure 7-2 is a simplified spacecraft integra-
tion diagram which includes the Operational Support Equipment. Figure
7-3 illustrates how geographical factors complicate interface test
and control.
7.3.2 Environmental Test Requirements
The spacecraft test program will be required to demonstrate the capa-
bility of the spacecraft to meet the requirements for normal and back-
up modes of operation in all the ground-handling and mission environ-
ments. Simulated environmental tests will consider the mission phases
of Table 7-2.
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Table 7-2: MISSION PHASES
"_-_ Mission
se
Environment
Temperature
Humidity
Shock
Vibration
Ground
Handling
Electrical Transients
Ethylene Oxide*
Electromagnetic
Radiation
Magnetic Field &
Field Stability
Acceleration
Pressure
Vacuum
Solar Radiation
Corpuscular Radiation
Meteoroid
Electrostatic Charge
Acoustic
EMI
X
X
X
X
X
Pre-launch
X
X
X
X
X
Launch
and
Injection
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Inter-
Planetary
Cruise and
Orbit
Insertion
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Only if sterilization employed.
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7.3.3 Interchangeability Requirements
The probability of being able to launch during a given window is a func-
tion of the interchangeability of systems where problems develop or
failures occur. Figure 7-4 illustrates the interchangeability pattern
required to provide maximum availability of a complete Planetary Vehicle
for launch. The test program must provide adequate integration testing
to assure the interchangeability of systems and subsystems.
7.4 RELIABILITY ASSURANCE
There are several possible approaches to designing a test program to
provide reliability assurance. Three were considered:
i) Statistical demonstration testing; for example, a life test based
on setting the requirement equal to a lower confidence limit. Such
tests are usually impractical for longlife systems as they require
at least 2.3 times the mission length to demonstrate to 90Z prob-
ability that the MTBF of the system is at least as long as the
mission life. The Spacecraft Bus reliability requirement for a
6000 hour mission is 0.88 or equivalently a Bus MTBF of approximately
46,000 hours. To demonstrate this reliability to n_o,_v/o confidence in
a test as described above would require more than i00,000 equipment
hours of testing. This method has the advantage of low risk, but
is not as cost effective as the approaches described under 2) and
3) below.
2) A different approach to reliability assurance testing is to make the
main purpose the exploration and elimination of potential failure
sources. This approach involves identification of the probable
failure causes and the design of tests to explore for susceptibility
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to these causes. For this purpose, we will classify failure causes
into the following general categories:
Random Failures (so called) - These are due to manufacturing
defects or handling damage which reduces the "strength" of the
part significantly below the expected value. They are not truly
random in time but fail st a higher rate during early life
(infant mortality) and are susceptible to detection by part
and equipment burn-in and screening.
Over Stress Failures - These are caused by misapplication or
accidental over stress. Misapplication may be due to inade-
quate application data or designer error plus inadequate appli-
cation review. Type approval and design verification tests
should confirm the adequacy of the strength margin for all
important mission stresses.
Wear Out Failures - These are a special case of the over stress
failure wherein time is an important variable in the failure
mechanism. They result from misapplication or part defect.
Two types of testing are indicated,
a) Life testing to establish wear out characteristics and,
b) Testing to obtain trend data indicating abnormal wear rates.
Degradation Failures - These are another form of time dependent
failures and result from inadequate allowance for part parameter
drift or degradation. Life tests for a substantial fraction of
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the mission operating time should be incorporated in type
approval tests to insure adequacy of the design. Trend measurements
on flight hardware should be used to monitor this source of failures.
This method has the advantages of being a more direct attack on sources
of unreliability, and readily inoorporated into an integrated test pro-
gram, but affords no quantitative measurement of the degree of assurance
achieved.
3) A third method adds to 2) a quantitative dimension by converting test
time and cycles into equivalent missions. Thus, burn-in time on parts
components and subsystems, time from life tests which are a part of
type approval testing, and time used in interface testing can be
modified with appropriate K factors and accumulated into equivalent
missions. This third method has been selected by Boeing as the most
appropriate for Voyager and is described in greater detail below.
The objectives of the selected Test Assurance Plan are:
I) Qualification of hardware for mission (Type Approval and Design
Verification Tests)
a)
b)
c]
2)
Establish adequacy of environmental stress margins.
Establish adequacy of performance.
Establish adequacy of performance degradation rates.
Screening out defective hardware (Flight Acceptance Tests)
a) Parts burn-in and screen.
b) Component burn-in.
c) Subsystem burn-in.
d) System burn-in.
7-12
OI
O
BOIJMMG
D2-82709-1
3) System Integration (Interface Tests)
a) Checkout and debug component - subsystem - system interfaces
interactions, and interaction margins.
b) Checkout spacecraft - OSE - software integration.
c) Crew training - failure and corrective action simulation.
d) Maintainability checkout and training.
4) Detect design, quality or reliability deficiencies, analyze and
initiate corrective action (All tests)
a) Flight readiness demonstration (Flight Acceptance Tests)
b) Reliability Status (All Tests)
The preferred plan has the following major elements which will be dis-
cussed in some detail in subsequent subparagraphs.
i) Identification of test program elements as they relate to failure
causes.
2) Incorporation of reliability requirements into test specifications
and procedures to obtain adequate levels of test assurance against
potential failure modes.
q1 Creation of a data _i_+_ and analysis system to:
a) Collect and collate data.
b) Identify problems.
c) Identify and monitor trends.
d) Convert test hours and cycles to equivalent missions.
e) Provide continuing visibility of the status of system reliability.
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7.4.1 Test Proqram Elements Versus F_ilure Causes
Table 7-3 shows which test program elements provide assurance against
the various general causes of system unreliability, This chart also
serves as a guide for preparing reliability requirements for test
specifications,
7.4.2 Reliability Requirements for Test Specifications
The following are typical of requirements which will be incorporated
into test specifications to provide the necessary assurance against
the major causes of failures:
i) Type Approval Tests - Hardware exposed to these tests does not
fly, so near design limit stresses will be used to explore design
margins.
a) Parts -- Parts will be qualified to environmental levels which
exceed the mission environment, e.g., mission vibration plus
5 db and mission temperature + 40°C and -20°C. Performance
application data will be substantiated by test data.
b) Components -- Components will be qualified to the mission
environment plus the specified factors except those in Space-
craft controlled environments. In addition, components will
be required to pass an accelerated life test equivalent to
one half of the mission operating time with degradation trend
monitoring to verify design limits for performance degradation.
2) Design Verification Tests - These tests qualify the subsystems
and system to the flight environment and include component and
subsystem interfaces not included in the component type approval
tests. Reliability requirements for these tests will include:
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a) Qualification to mission environment plus specified margins.
b) Simulate mission operation and exercise of redundant modes of
operation.
c) Subsystem accelerated life tests for at least 301_ of mission
life requirement.
d) Accelerated system life test of at least one complete
mission with trend degradation measurement to confirm
desi9 n margins for performance degradation.
Flight Acceptance Tests - These tests are designed to assure freedom
from defects, deficiencies, and abnormalities and be specifically
designed to detect potential infant mortality failures prior to
launch. They will include 95 percentile vibration environments and
burn-in times as indicated below.
a) Parts -- Part acceptance tests will typically include 168
hours of burn-in plus other non-destructive environmental
exposure and screening.
b) Components -- Component acceptance tests will include burn-in
and screening for early degradation and/or failure. Burn-in
time will be tailored to the components but 200 hours will be
typical for electronic components. Critical parameters will
be measured before and after to obtain trend data.
c) Subsystems -- Subsystem acceptance tests will include 250
hours of operation of electronics and equivalent number of
cycles and hours for other types of devices. Subsystem
tests will also include trend measurement.
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System -- At least 300 hours of operation will be accumulated
at the system level to assure subsystem interfaces and to de-
tect any abnormal trends.
7.4.3 Data Collection and Analysis System
The documented assurance of flight readiness is supported directly by
the data system which is described below. All test data will be collected
and programmed to provide a numerical measurement of assurance by convert-
ing time to equivalent missions. Tables 7-4 through 7-6 show how time
is derived from the w rious tests and accumulated into equivalent missions.
The Data Collection & <nalysis System is shown on Figure 7-5. The Engineer-
ing requirements and test specifications are incorporated in the Manu-
facturing & Inspection Record (M&IR).
All test data, including both success and failure data is recorded. The
test record will include all critical design parameter measurements,
test conditions, test time and all other pertinent data necessary for
performance, trend analysis and/or failure analysis.
Provisions are made on the Planned Events Form to give all instructions
necessary to provide configuration accountability, and to account for
supplements or revisions to the original planning. Unplanned events,
which include all failures caused by personnel, test equipment, or
procedures to perform according to plan, are recorded.
7-17
Table 7-4:
TYPE APPROVAL TEST TIME
D2-82709- I
TEST ASSURANCE FROM TAT
One Mission Equivalent Operating Time for Each Component
Environmental acceleration
Duty cycle acceleration
Distribution of Time Among Equipment Levels
Component
Subsystem
System
Range of Test Times
Components
Subsystems
System i i
0 1500
Approximate % of
Mission Time
50
30
20
I I I I
3000 4500 6000
HOURS
Table 7-5: TEST ASSURANCE ACCUMULATION
SYSTEM INTERFACE TESTS FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE
Subsystem - 50 Hours
S/C System - i00 Hours
S/C - 0SE - 50 Hours
Part - 168 Hours
Component - 200 Hours
Subsystem - 250 Hours
System - 350 Hours
DESIGN VERIFICATION - (RELIABILITY)
Life Test & Mission
Simulation - 5000 Hours
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Hach failure of flight hardware or OSH which occurs during test is
thoroughly evaluated. The test is stopped immediately and an evalua-
tion is made to determine the direct cause of failure before the testing
is allowed to resume. All test anomalies are completely investigated
by a failure analysis to determine the mode(s) of failure and the
appropriate corrective action.
Planned and unplanned event data are sent to the Voyager Data Central
for processing, storage, and retrieval. If evaluation of the test data
discloses that a hardware problem exists, a Failure Analysis Request
(FAR) is prepared and the discrepant hardware is sent to a laboratory
for a complete failure analysis. If the problem is a result of test
procedure deficiencies_ or human induced failures, a Reliability In-
vestigation Request (RIR) is issued to the responsible organization
for corrective action.
The "critical parameter" test values are also examined using data plots
and statistical techniques. All data are evaluated for drift trends
and potential component incompatibilities. These data_ with conclu-
sions and recommendations, are sent to the responsible design group for
any required corrective action. The Boeing system provides for followup
of such assignments to assure adequate closeout of the problem.
Reliability status reports will include the mission equivalent time and
the failure data for component, subsystem, and system levels. Charts
will be prepared from the data and analyses to highlight reliability
status, trends, problem areas, and action requirements.
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7.5 SPACECRAFT TEST FLOW AND SEQUENCE
Spacecraft Test Flow and Sequence patterns were studied to optimize
a progressive assembly and checkout sequence which could demonstrate
the compatibility of system elements and the capability of the space-
craft to meet the requirements of all phases of mission profile as
well as all flight and ground handling environments, and to establish
confidence that the totality of all systems will meet the mission
flight requirements.
7-7).
Four basic alternatives are considered (Table
Table 7-7: BASIC ALTERNATIVES
Mate Spacecraft
with:
Science Payload
Flight Capsule
Nose Fairing and
Adapter
A
AFETR*
AFETR
AFETR
Assembly Location
B
Seattle
AFETR
AFETR
C
Seattle
Seattle
AFETR
D
Seattle
Seattle
Seattle
Air Force Eastern Test Range
The alternatives consider the range of options from integration of
the Science Payload and Flight Capsule with the Spacecraft at AFETR
to complete integration at Seattle. Integration of flight systems
at locations other than Seattle is considered as a special variation
of integrating the flight systems at AFETR. There are also variables
to be considered within each alternative, such as, test locations
for specific tests; test sequencing and scheduling; OSE requirements;
use of Proof Test Models instead of actual flight hardware.
7-22
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In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the basic options,
the impact on the following factors has been considered:
l)
2)
a)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
Handling Requirements
Test-Flow Requirements
Test Assurance of Mission Success
Test-Redundancy
Delivery Schedules
a) Spacecraft
b) Science Payload
c) Flight Capsule
d) Nose Fairing
AFETR Facility Requirements
AFETR Operations Schedules
Launch Schedule
OSE Requirements
Figures 7-6 through 7-9 show the general test flow sequence for each
of the four alternatives and the relative advantages for each of the
factors listed above are tabulated on Table 7-8.
The selection of the preferred approach is based on incorporating the
major advantages derived from assessment of the several basic test
flow sequences into a composite Spacecraft test-flow sequence which
meets program objectives. Further iteration of the selected sequence
will be required to develop the test-flow sequence in depth as program
elements are defined in more detail.
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ALTERNATIVE A
Integrate Spacecraft, Science Payload, Flight
Capsule, and Nose Fairing at AFFTR
a) Requires minimum handling of flight systems because
all flight hardware is shipped directly to AFETR for
integration.
b) Requires longest test-flow time at AFETR because
flight systems are integrated for First time.
c) Provides least confidence of mission success because
spacecraft flight acceptance test is accomplished
using simulators for Science Payload and Flight
Capsule. Integration of the flight systems at
AFETR may disclose incompatibilities that will re-
quire recycling hardware back to contractor facility.
d) Affords less interface testing of flight hardware
because systems are delivered directly to AFETR.
e) Requires earliest delivery schedule for on-dock of
flight hardware at AFETR.
f) Modification of flight hardware may be required to
integrate planetary vehicle systems at AFETR. Ad-
ditional AFETR facilities such as cleanroom en-
vironments for disassembly, and vibration and space
simulation facilities for confidence testing will
be required to re-establish confidence level°
g) Scheduling of AFETR operations is more difficult
due to contingency for problems that may result
from first-time integration of flight systems.
h) Interface problems between flight hardware systems
are identified too late for effective corrective
action to meet launch commitment.
i) Additional OSE is required at AFETR to support in-
tegration of Spacecraft, Science Payload and
FIight Capsule.
!
ALTERNATIVE B
Integrate Spacecraft with Science Payload at Seattle
and with Flight Capsule and Nose Fairing at AFETR
a) Requires additional handling of Science Payload
because flight hardware is delivered to Seattle and
tested with Spacecraft before delivery to AFETR.
Actual increased handling is small because Science
Payload shipped as part of Flight Spacecraft.
b) Reduces test-flow time at AFETR by that required
to integrate Science Payload into Spacecraft.
c) Provides more confidence of mission success since
Science Payload mechanical, electrical, and thermal
interfaces are exercised with Spacecraft during
Spacecraft fllght acceptance testing.
d) Requires redundant testing of Science Payload
because flight acceptance testing of Spacecraft will
exercise the Science Payload. Additional testing
is considered as an advantage as it represents an
additional screen for defective or marginal
equipment.
e) Requires earller delivery ot: the Science Payload
to Seattle for integration with the Spacecraft.
f) Eliminates possible modifications to Spacecraft
or Science Payload after delivery to AFETR, which
may be necessary to interface the systems. In-
tegration of Flight Capsule at AFETR will require
additional assembly and test capability.
g) Provide more confidence in AFETR test scheduling
because no unknown contingency for integration of
Science Payload and Spacecraft is required.
h) Interaction problems between Spacecraft and
Science Payload are identified early enough to
enable effective corrective action. Integration
of Flight Capsule may disclose other problems too
late for effective action to meet launch
commitment.
i) OSE requirements at AFETR are reduced to that re-
quired to integrate Flight Capsule and mate nose
fairing to verify overall performance and to pre-
pare planetary vehicle for launch.
Table 7-8: Compar
ALTERNATIVE C
Integrated Spacecraft with Science Payload and Flbh t
Capsule at Seattle and with Nose Fairing at AFETR
a) Requires additional handling of Science PayloQd
and FllghtCapsule because systems are delivered to
Seattle and tested with Spacecraft before de-
livery to AFETR.
b) Test-flow time at AFETR is further reduced since
the planetary vehicle is totally integrated before
delivery.
c) Provides more confidence of mission success since
Spacecraft flight acceptance testing is accomp-
lished with other interfacing systems.
d) Provides more testing of Science Payload and
Flight Capsule because these systems are exercised
during Spacecraft flight acceptance testing.
e) Requires earller delivery of Science Payload and
Flight Capsule for integration with Spacecraft at
Seattle.
f) Eliminates possible modifications to flight hard-
ware at AFETR (which may be required to integrate
flight systems) and deletes requirement for special
facilities at AFETR to support integration.
g) Provides greater confidence in schedullng AFETR
operations because contingency for integration prob-
lems can be deleted.
h) Integration problems between flight systems are
identified early to enable effective corrective
action to meet launch commltment.
i) OSE requirements at AFETR consist only of those
necessary to verify overall performance and pre-
pare planetary vehicle for launch.
BOfJA/'G
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;sonof Alternate Spacecraft Test Flow & Sequences
ALTERNATIVE D
Integrate Spacecraft Science Payload Flight
Capsule, and Nose Fairing at Seattle
a) Requires additional handling of Science Payload,
Flight Capsule, and nose fairing since all flight
hardware is del ivered to Seattle for integration
with Spacecraft before delivery to AFETR.
b) Requires least test-flow time at AFETR because all
systems are integrated before delivery. (This
alternate would permit del ivery of complete plane-
tary vehicle encapsulated nose fairing, and would re-
quire only final preparation at ESA for mating
with launch vehicle on launch pad.)
c) Same as Alternate C
d) Same as Alternate C
e) Requires earlier delivery of Science Payload, Flight
Capsule, and nose fairing for integration with
Spacecraft in Seattle.
f) Same as Alternate C
g) Same as Alternate C
h) Same as Alternate C
i) Same as Alternate C
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7.5.1 Preferred Spacecraft Test Flow and Sequence
The preferred test flow and sequence is shown in Figure 7-10 and 7-11
and is a composite approach which incorporates the major advantages
offered by each of the alternatives. The criteria applied in
developing the preferred sequence includes the following:
t)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
Minimum handling of flight hardware.
Latest on-dock dates for flight hardware at AFETR.
Most confidence of mission success.
Minimum test-flow time consistent with maximum test assurance.
Minimum AFETR facilities.
Most confidence in scheduling AFETR operations to meet launch
commitment.
Minimum OSE requirements.
The preferred test flow sequence features the Flight Acceptance Testing
of the Spacecraft in a complete Planetary Vehicle Configuration. The
actual science payload is delivered to Seattle and integrated with the
Spacecraft. The advantages of integrating the actual Flight Capsule
and nose fairing with the spacecraft for Flight Acceptance Testing of
the Spacecraft at Seattle are achieved by using Proof Test Models
which must be identical to the flight systems. This deviation has been
made to meet the objectives of minimum handling of flight hardware and
for the latest on-dock date of flight hardware at AFETR, while at the
same time, providing a high degree of assurance that the Spacecraft
and Flight Capsule can be mated and flown together without problems.
Since the Science Payload has closer form, fit, and function interfaces
with the Spacecraft, and its performance is more sensitive to the
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spacecraft environment, it is considered necessary to integrate the
actual Science Payload early in the spacecraft testing sequence and to
verify the Science Payload performance during the Spacecraft Flight
Acceptance testing. Further analysis of this approach is required to
confirm that all test objectives can be accomplished by use of Proof
Test Models. Environmental acceptance testing of the spacecraft
with science payload and capsule installed provides more realistic
simulation of actual flight conditions, thus improving test assurance
of mission success.
@
O (
@
Salient features of the preferred test flow sequence are discussed
below:
i) Procured items will be source tested to approved procedures under
Boeing Engineering and Quality Control surveillance. Parts Screen-
ing and Burn-In Tests, and Flight Acceptance Testing will be
performed by the subcontractor prior to delivery to Boeing.
2) All flight hardware received at Boeing will be inspected and
tested to verify status and meet reliability assurance requirements
for subsequent assembly into the spacecraft.
3) Flight acceptance tests on all components and subsystems will be
completed prior to assembly into the spacecraft.
4) The Spacecraft System will be first tested with functional simula-
tors for the Science Payload and Flight Capsule systems to verify
subsystem and system performance limits.
5) The actual Science Payload for the flight mission is integrated
with the spacecraft; then a PTM Flight Capsule is integrated with
the Flight Spacecraft.
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7.6 TEST STATION TEAM CONCEPTS
The alternates considered for selection of the Test Station concept
to implement the Test Flow for assembly and testing of the Spacecraft
through final checkout of the Spacecraft are listed below:
Alternate A -- Permanently located Test Stations equipped with all
necessary test equipment and facilities, and operated by qualified per-
sonnel to receive and perform specific tests on each Spacecraft.
Alternate B -- Assign test crew to each Spacecraft and move Spacecraft
and crew to fixed Test Stations equipped with the necessary test equip-
ment and facilities to perform specified tests.
Alternate C -- Assign test crew and Systems Test Complex Equipment to
each Spacecraft and move the Spacecraft, its test equipment, and crew
to each test facility from assembly through launch.
To optimize the Test Station Concept Approach, the following factors
are considered for each of the above Alternatives:
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
Quantity of Test Equipment
Number of Test Personnel
Learning Factors
Test Compatibility
Test Equipment Reliability
Test Responsibility
Test Confidence
Test Flow Time
7-40
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The testing of parts, components, assemblies, subassemblies, and sub-
systems will be accomplished at Fixed Test Stations to assure uniformity
of tests and interchangeability of flight hardware. Therefore, the above
alternatives only consider the Spacecraft system testing from initial
assembly through launch.
Table 7-9 summarizes the number of test sets to support the above
alternatives.
Since the total number of Spacecraft to be assembled is small compared
to the number of fixed Test Stations required for Flight Acceptance
Testing of a Spacecraft, the quantity of STC equipment and the total
number of personnel required to implement and operate the fixed Test
Stations will be greater and the utilization of equipment and per-
sonnel less than for Alternative C where test equipment and personnel
move with the Spacecraft to each test facility.
Learning rate for the Test Team concept will be higher than for the
fixed Test Station concept since the Test Team personnel conduct all
Spacecraft testing instead of being limited to one test phase. Further,
the Test Team concept will provide the best test continuity and develop
greater depth of knowledge of Spacecraft system performance since the
Test Team is intimately associated with each Spacecraft through all
system test phases.
Assignment of STC equipment to each spacecraft to move through all
test phases assures 0SE interface compatibility and provides the best
7-41
Table 7-9: TEST SETS
Movable
Test Facility Test Station
STC I LCE
Engineering Test Model
Proof Test Model
Assembly Tests
Flight Acceptance Tests
Vibration
Space Simulation
Magnetic Mapping
F/4I
Parameter Variation
Simulated Propulsion
Free Mode
Dummy Launch
AFETR Testinq
A&O
Magnetic Mapping
ESA
Launch
TOTAL 6 6
Fixed
Test Station
STC LCE
i
2
3
i
i
i
i
1
i
i
i
3
1
2
2
-I16 6
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basis for performance trend analysis. Processing each Spacecraft
through the same Test Station will better assure interchangeability.
However, in the event of a spares replacement, it will be necessary
to retest the Spacecraft to establish functional compatibility in
either case.
@
@
@
Moving the STC equipment to each test facility will require recalibra-
tion and integrity checkout of the STC after setup at each new location.
The fixed Test Station may require less comprehensive integrity check-
out, since moving the STC can damage and/or degrade performance of
the test equipment. The total number of times that the Spacecraft will
be connected and disconnected to the STC is approximately the same for
each of the Alternatives.
Assignment of a Test Team to perform all test phases on a Spacecraft
will fix responsibility and assure best test confidence. Mating of
Spacecraft and test equipment can result in tailoring the Spacecraft
performance and obscuring system deficiencies; however, close coordina-
tion between Test Teams and correlation of test data will minimize this
problem. Moving the Spacecraft and its test equipment to the various
test facilities will require more time to install, checkout, and
perform the testing than to move only the Spacecraft to a fixed Test
Station which has been prepared in advance to receive the Spacecraft.
@
Table 7-10 summarizes the general evaluations of the several Test
Station concepts. An "X" in the Alternative column indicates the
best choice for each of the factors noted. Based on this brief
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TEST-STATION EVALUATIONS
Factor
Quantity of Test Equipment
Number of Test Personnel
Learning Factors
Test Compatibility
Test Equipment Reliability
Test Responsibility
Test Confidence
Test Flow Time
Alternative
A B C
X
X X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X X
@
@
@
@
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discussion, Alternative C, the assignment of a Test Team and STC
equipment to move with each Spacecraft through ali test phases, is
indicated as the best approach to meet the Spacecraft test program
objective. Further iteration of the selected Test Station concept
is necessary to develop the planning in depth and to minimize the
inherent disadvantages.
7.6.1 Preferred Test Station Team Concept
The preferred Test Station Team concept is based on selection of the
best approach derived from consideration of the alternate concepts
discussed in paragraph 7.6. The concept selected is a hybrid which
utilizes:
i) A fixed test complex and personnel for testing of parts,
components and subsystems before they are installed in the
spacecraft_ and
2) A moving System Test Complex (STC) and test team to accompany
each spacecraft through all system test phases from assembly to
launch.
Figure 7-12 shows the movement of test teams and test equipment through
the test phases.
The basic test team will include at least the following assignments:
Test Director
Science System Engineer
Flight Capsule Engineer
Guidance and Control System Engineer
7-45
80_-JNG
D2-82709-1 O
Z
0
i
m
r- --7---- I
l_Z_ _ I5_. o _ o _I S_ I__°_z_
I W<_-_ u _" <_
, I___ I
7-46
00
Telecommunication System Engineer
Mechanics and Propulsion System Engineer
Power System Engineer
Data Specialists
STC System Engineer
Lead Technician
0
0
Additional specialists will be available at each Test Facility to
support the Test Team as required.
The heavy reliance on testing for reliability assurance and the use of
trend data demand a well trained and disciplined test crew supplemented
by:
i) Machine programmed stimuli measurement and data recording wherever
possible.
2) Control of test variance through a carefully designed calibration/
certification program.
3) Documented test procedures.
4) Formalized data recording for all manual operations.
5) Periodic audit of test operations.
6) Periodic retraining.
0
0
In developing the final Test Station Plan, it is the objective to
meet the following criteria:
i) Require minimum test equipment.
2) Require smallest number of test specialists.
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4)
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7)
8)
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Provide maximum learning opportunity.
Establish and maintain test compatibility through all test phases.
Assure test responsibility and accountability.
Provide required test assurance and confidence of spacecraft
performance.
Provide for continuity of test data.
Provide a highly disciplined test operation.
7.7 OSE CONCEPTS
Fulfillment of test program objectives requires the development of
test equipment concepts and selection of criteria for a preferred
design of OSE which will meet all requirements and remain within the
constraints of cost, schedule r reliability and performance.
7.7.1 Requirements
OSE must:
i) Demonstrate the capability of all systems to meet all mission
requirements.
2) Demonstrate the capability of the Spacecraft to meet the require-
ments of the mission profile, and all flight and ground handling
environments.
3) Support flight acceptance testing at both Spacecraft subsystem
and system levels.
4) Support Spacecraft interface testing with other system elements
to establish and verify design compatibility.
5) Demonstrate compatibility of Spacecraft with the Launch Vehicle,
MOS, Flight Capsule, and DSN.
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7.7.2 Constraints
The major constraint in meeting test program objectives is time. In
order to assure maximum data return and standardization of testing,
OSE design must provide automatic programming and mechanized stimulation
capability. The design must also provide manual override capability
to support detail analysis of failures, design deficiencies, or
interface incompatibilities.
The requirement for transportable OSE design is influenced by the re-
quirements of schedules, test location, test flow, and the selected
test station concept.
7.7.3 Reliability
Since one of the major contributing factors to reliability assurance is
performance trend information, it is mandatory that all data be collected,
and evaluated expeditiously and in a uniform format. This requires an
automated data system having the capability to store, process, and re-
call data. Performance trend analysis is based upon quantitative
performance_ it is therefore essential that all data be in numerical
form rather than simply establishing that a function is within limits.
To obtain trend data it is also necessary to keep test variance an
order of magnitude below the trend level. The required degree of
repeatability would be difficult with manual testing due to human
variance.
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7.7.4 Performance
End-to-end testing of the spacecraft and exercising of its systems in
a manner simulating flight conditions required to establish that all
systems perform properly. Isolation of faults to a flight spares level
requires 0SE capability for inter- and intra-subsystem monitoring
of all dependent and independent functions including supporting
functions. Closed-loop testing provides the best capability for per-
formance measurement and fault analysis. In order to verify integrity
of 0SE interfaces and to isolate subsystems within the spacecraft for
performance testing and fault analysis_ it is necessary to provide
functional simulation of the interfacing subsystems.
7.7.5 Documentation
0SE designs must facilitate test program documentation. Data Sum-
marizing to support reliability and test status must be obtainable
with a minimum of processing.
7.7.6 Alternatives
The 0SE requirements and constraints_ when considered in the light of
the unalterable Voyager launch opportunities_ allows very little
latitude in the choice of 0SE. The alternatives of Table 7-11 have been
evaluated to determine which best satisfies OSE objectives. In each
case_ the concept which is superior and would thus become a preferred
0SE design criteria item is listed first:
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Table 7-11: ALTERNATES EVALUATED
OSE
FUNCTION ALTERNATI VES
Stimuli
Test Control
Configuration
Connection to Test
Item
Data System
Type of Measurements
Test Characteristics
Pro grammed/Au toma tic
Pro grammed/Au tomati c
Transportable OSE
Manual
Manual
Fixed OSE
Combination RF &
Hardline
Automated
Quantitative
Dynamic
Closed Loop
End-to-End
Hardline
Forms/handwrite
Qualitative
Static
Open Loop
Individual items
7.7.7 Preferred Concepts
The Voyager Spacecraft System OSE elements are defined and described
in detail in Volume C and will not be further discussed here. The
preferred concepts will be formalized as OSE design criteria and
will govern the development of hardware items. These design
criteria are summarized as follows:
i) Automation - The OSE at all test levels will be designed to be
automatically sequenced. Manual override and single step control
will permit troubleshooting and fault isolation to the part level
level in the System Test Complex.
2) Data Measurement - The OSE will be designed to display and record
quantitative data at all levels of testing.
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Transportability - The OSE design will permit transportation with
the Spacecraft Systems of all OSE having critical interfaces
with the Spacecraft Systems. The design will provide for movement
and reassembly of OSE so as to minimize the time required for
re-calibration_ realignment and recertification.
Design Commonality - The OSE design will be such that identical
functions are implemented by common designs for all levels of test.
Testability - The OSE design will include self check capability
which in general will be accomplished by simulation.
Maintainability - The design commonality and self-check capability
of the OSE will facilitate maintenance and reduce spares require-
ments.
Safety - The principles of equipment and personnel protection will
be emphasized in OSE preliminary design. The major safety
criterion is that the design must be such that an OSE malfunction
or operator error will impose no performance degradation of a
test article and no hazard to personnel.
7.8 TEST SCHEDULE DEVELOPMENT
Testing plays a major role in the Voyager Program. The scope of the
test program_ in terms of time_ facilities_ geographical factors and
cost_ creates critical interfaces with almost every program activity.
As a result_ the test schedule is central to the program schedule and
demands attention early in the planning phase to assure first_ feasi-
bility of the program_ and then availability of the necessary facilities_
manpower9 equipment and technology. This section will discuss schedule
7-52
OBQIJN_
D2-82709-|
constraints, the application of Proof Test Models, the '71 mission
schedule and test flows, and the impact of the '69 test launches on
the '71 test schedule.
O
O
O
7.8.1 'V1 Mission Schedule Constraints (W/O '69 Test)
The test schedule to support the '71 mission is constrained on the right
by a fixed launch window and on the left by equipment availability for
testing. The equipment availability constraint is eased by using proto-
type hardware for debugging and checking out subsystem, system, 0SE,
and M0S interfaces. A preliminary review of PTM usage indicates the
need for two PTMs in order to support all the requirements for inter-
fact tests, design verification_ mission simulation and system life
tests. The schedule is also sensitive but not critical with respect
to STC setup and calibration time for the moving test complex mode of
operation.
O
7.8.2 'Vl Proof Test Models
The primary purpose of the two proof test models is to verify the
adequacy of the spacecraft design; secondary benefits will include
training and verification of procedures and testing which will be used
on flight spacecraft.
O
O
The proof test flow is planned to be as much like the acceptance cycle
as possible. The test approach considers the need for testing a space-
craft identical to the flight article, the priority of the data (design
verification comes first), and the ease of obtaining the data. As an
example, although space simulation has historically disclosed more
7-53
defects than vibration testing, space simulation is time consuming
and has been planned following vibration. Miscellaneous tests, judged
less likely to produce requirements for significant changes have been
deferred until the latter part of the flow. A significant portion of
the tests of the proof test models will be directed to measuring the
environments seen by the subsystems when installed in the spacecraft.
A comparison can then be made with the design and subsystem qualifica-
tion environment to provide confidence in the results. In some cases,
it may be necessary to change the design of the subsystem or its
installation to achieve the required confidence.
7.8.2.1 1971PTM #i Test Flow
Table 7-12 details the test flow for PTM #i. This model will undergo
testing intended to verify the capability of the hardware to perform
its mission under both nominal and extreme environments. At the com-
pletion of this testing, this model will be used to demonstrate
compatibility with the DSIF at Goldstone, and later to prove
compatibility with the facilities, equipment, and launch vehicles at
ETR.
7.8.2.2 1971PTM #2 Test Flow
Tables 7-13 and 7-14 detail the flow of PTM #2. The second proof test
model will be subjected to a total of 5000 hours of testing composed of
a FAT identical to the FAT for flight spacecraft, three 30-day space
chamber tests, and approximately nine months of accelerated mission
simulations and system reference tests. Each space chamber test will
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1971 PTM #i TEST FLOW
Subsystem Assy & Power Off Test
STC - Spacecraft Ground Integrity Test
Power Applications
Subsystem Tests
Inter-Subsystem Tests
T61ecommunication Calibration
Science Subsystem Calibration
Systems Test
Parameter Variations Tests
System Reference Tests
S/C Capsule Compatibility Tests
Magnetic Mapping
Midcourse Interaction Tests
Retro Interaction Tests
Pyrotechnic Shock Test
Vibration Tests (FAT & TAT)
Magnetic Mapping (After Vibration)
Space Simulation
Free Mode Test
S/C - Centaur Compatibility
EMI
Weight & Balance
S/C - LCE
Simulated Countdown
Special Tests
System Reference Tests
Cleanup, Buy-off, Prepare to Ship
TOTAL
Weeks
6
2
1
2
2
1
1
3
2
1
3
2
3
3
2
4
1
12
1
1
3
1/2
2
1
3
2
2
66-½ Wks.
Schedule Contingency
Arrive Goldstone, Inspect, Set-up STC, System
Reference Test
S/C - DSN Compatibility Test
System Reference Test
Pack & Ship (Air Ship)
4
3
4
1
Goldstone 12-½ Wks.
........................
Arrive ETR, Inspect, Set-up STC, System
Reference Test
Pad #i Compatibility Tests
Pad #2 Compatibility Tests
3
3
5
5
ETR 16 INks.
7-55
Table 7-13: 1971 PTM#2 TESTFLOW
SubsystemAssy. & PowerOff Test
STC- S/C Ground Integrity Test
PowerApplications
SubsystemTests
Inter-Subsystem Tests
Science SubsystemCalibration
Telecommunication Calibration
System Test
Parameter Variation Tests
System Reference Test
S/C Capsule Compatibility Tests
Magnetic Mapping (2 modes)
Vibration Test (FAT only)
Magnetic Map & Deperm. after Vibration
Space Simulation
Free Mode Test
EMI
S/C - Centaur Compatibility
S/C - LCE
Simulated Countdown
Weight & Balance
System Reference Test
Clean-up, Buy-off, prepare for Mission Sym.
TOTAL
Weeks
6
2
i
2
2
i
I
3
2
1
i
2
2
i
4
i
2
1/2
1
1
1/2
1
2
40 Weeks
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1971 PTM #2 DESIGN VERIFICATION & MISSION SIMULATION
Test
(1)
(2)
Space Simulation Tests
30 day space vacuum and solar simulation test (720 hrs.)
5 day pretest setup and checkout
7 day system reference test
TOTAL 6 Weeks
Earth Ambient Mission Simulation
Partl - Prelaunch through midcourse correction
Part 2 - Midcourse correction, cruise, capsule
separation, flight S/C cruise, Mars orbit insertion
da%aa_isition and transmittal
Part 3 - Repeat Part 2 using alternate operational
modes
Part 4 - Repeat Part 2 - Free Mode except batteries
replenished from external power
Part 5 - Systems Reference Test
TOTAL 12 days
(i day)
(2 days)
(2 days)
(2 days)
(5 days)
Approximately 20 cycles of test (2) with test (i) repeated
three times will be performed as a life demonstration of the
Voyager design.
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require continuous, 24-hour per day, operation throughout the test
period. The mission simulation and system reference tests are scheduled
for a three-shift, seven day week operation with actual testing normally
being confined to the "first shift" period of each day and the other
two shifts being used for operating time maintenance and contingencies.
7.8.3 '71 Mission Schedule (W/O '69 Test)
Table 7-15 is a test flow for the '71 flight spacecraft. The schedule
for the test and flight vehicles is shown on Figure 7-13, "Integrated
Test Program Schedule." This testing is scheduled to include some
slack time to assure meeting the launch window in the event of contin-
gencies.
7.8.4 '71 Test Schedule With '69 Test Flight
The integration of '69 test flights into the total '71 mission test
program requires some compression of the development testing period.
This is offset by the early availability of full scale flight test
data.
The '69 test flights provide real mission environment for qualifying
'71 mission hardware, OSE, and MOS on a time scale that is competitive
with ground testing in terms of supporting the '71 mission. On the other
hand, they create additional schedule constraints. Our review of
schedule factors shows that the STC setup and calibration time will
become a critical factor. This problem will be solved by designing
for transportability or mobility so that the integrity of the test
system may be quickly re-established after each move.
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Table 7-15: Figure 7.4.5.3-4:
'71 FLIGHT SPACECRAFT TEST FLOW
System Assy. & Power off Test
STC - S/C Ground Integrity Test
Power Applications
Subsystem Tests
Inter-Subsystem Tests
Science Subsystem Calibrations
Telecommunication Calibrations
System Test
Parameter Variation Tests
System Reference Test
SIC Capsule Compatibility Tests
Magnetic Mapping (2 modes)
Vibration Tests
Magnetic Mapping & Deperm. After Vib.
Space Simulations
Free Mode Test
EMI
S/C - Centaur Compatability
S/C - LCE
Simulated Countdown
System Reference Test
Clean-up, Buy-off, prepare for shipping
TOTAL = 40 weeks = 9-1/2 too.
Weeks
6
2
i
2
2
i
i
3
i
i
i
2
2
i
4
i
2
1 1/2
i
i
_/_
1
2
4O
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1971 SI
III.
DEVELOPMENT TESTS
SUBSYSTEMS DESIGN CRITERIA
DEVELOPME NT & VERIFICATION
STRUCTURAL TEST MODEL GT-I
THERMAL TEST MODEL GT-2
DYNAMIC TEST MODEL GT-3
ENGINEERING MODEL GT-4
TYPE APPROVAL TESTS (TAT
SUBSYSTEMS
PROOF TEST MODEL 1971 NO. I
PROOF TEST MODEL 1971 NO. 2
* JPL TEST SPACECRAFT
FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS (FAT)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT (SPARE) (1971)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO. I (1971)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO. 2 (1971)
1966
DEVELOPME NT FREEZE
I
BREADBOARD
TESTS
1967
I
ENGINEERING
MODEL TESTS
J FAB
J FAB
J TE_
J FAB
J FAB
ASSY & TES1
I TAT
*Per Specimen Statement of Work -- Phase
I
/
Bgi'JA/'_
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kTURN/CENTAUR MISSION
1968
I
rEST J
I
I'ABI
J FAB
1969
ASSY/FAT/TAT
J ASSY & FAT
1970
I 1971
1971 LAUNCH WINDOW OPEN
J GOLD- J ETR
STONE J
DESIGN VER LIFE TESTS
FAB ASSY & FAT TO JPL
J FAB J
J FAB
FAB
ASSY & FAT J_/_
J ASSY & FAT
J ASSY & FAT
Figure 7-13:
ETR SUSTAINING iETRETR
1
Integrated Test Program Schedule
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It is essential to sustaining the validity of the '69 launches as qual-
ification tests for '71, that the configuration of the '69 S/C be sub-
stantially identical to the '71 $/C. This means either bringing the
S/C design to a firm configuration earlier than would be required by the
'71 launches, shortening the test cycle, or some of both. The integrated
'69 test - '71 mission schedule was developed using the latter approach.
Inasmuch as the '69 launches are test shots, it is logical to require a
lesser degree of test assurance before launch than is required for the
mission. It is, however, necessary to complete sufficient testing to
assure an adequate probability of success as well as a degree of design
maturity that will minimize the probability of significant changes be-
tween '69 flight hardware and '71 flight hardware.
This assurance will be obtained through comprehensive testing on the
1969 Proof Test and Compatibility Test Models in addition to flight
acceptance testing (FAT) of the flight spacecraft. The Proof Test Model
will be the first 1969 flight configuration system to be tested and will
undergo a combined FAT/TAT program of sufficient scope to demonstrate
adequacy of the system design for its test flight. Levels of testing
on the PTM will be limited, however, such that its capability to serve
as a spare flight spacecraft will not be compromised. The Compatibility
Test Model will undergo ambient system level FAT including EMI, launch
countdown simulations and other special tests pertinent to both the
Goldstone and ETR compatibility tests. Space simulation, vibration and
other tests not critical to the compatibility tests will not be con-
ducted due to schedule restrictions. The Flight Spacecraft will undergo
complete FAT, both ambient and environmental, prior to delivery to ETR.
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7.8.4.1 '71 Test Schedule with Saturn/Centaur '69 Test Flight
Figure 7-14 shows a representative integrated test schedule for a 1971
mission with a 1969 Saturn/Centaur Test Flight and Tables 7-16, 7-17_
and 7-18 outline the specific tests to be accomplished on the 1969 PTM,
Compatibility Model and Flight Spacecraft, respectively. Salient fea-
tures of this integrated test schedule are:
l) Early initiation of subsystem level engineering model testing such
that an engineering model spacecraft is available for test seven
months prior to start of the '69 PTM testing. This will allow
initial design compatibility tests between subsystems to precede
the PTM assembly and testing.
2) While type approval tests at the subsystem level will not be com-
pleted prior to start of PTM testing_ any mandatory changes
identified during subsystem TAT can be incorporated during
system level testing.
3) Time is available in the 1971PTM #2 test program to incorporate
design changes brought about as a result of the 1969 test flight.
4) A capability exists to upgrade the 1969 compatibility model to
the 1971 Proof Test Model 6_2 assuming no major configuration
changes between models.
5) A potential reassignment of 1971PTM #2 to a 1971 Flight Spacecraft
exists if a successful 1969 test flight satisfies the design
verification life test requirement.
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III.
DEVELOPMENT TESTS
SUBSYSTEMS DESIGN CRITERIA
DEVELOPMENT & VERIFICATION
STRUCTURAL TEST MODEL GT-I
THERMAL TEST MODEL GT-2
DYNAMIC TEST MODEL GT-8
ENGINEERING MODEL GT-4
TYPE APPROVAL TESTS (TAT)
SUBSYSTEMS
PROOF TEST MODEL 1969
COMPATIBILITY TEST MODEL 1969
PROOF TEST MODEL 1971 NO. 1
PROOF TEST MODEL 1971 NO. 2
* JPL TEST SPACECRAFT
FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS (FAT)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT 1969 SPARE
(SAME AS PIM 1969)
TEST FLIGHT S/C NO. I (1969)
TEST FLIGHT S/C ND. 2 (1969)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT (SPARE)(i97i)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO. I (1971)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO. 2 (1971)
1966
DEVE LOPME NT
FREEZE
BREADBOARD
TESTS
1969 SATURN/(]
1971 SATURN/C
1967
T
ENGINEERING
MODEL TESTS
FAB
FAB
UPDATE
UPDATE
TES1
ASSY &
*Per Specimen .Statement of Work Phase II
/
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":NTAUR TEST
"NTAUR MISSION
?
rEST
1968
I
ASSY & EXTENDED FAT
& TESI
1969
_! 1969 TEST I I/,,,I
SATUR N/CE NTAUR[,//I
AUNCH ARRIVAL
PERIOD PERIOD
(ORBIT
INSERTION)
1970
FAB
I ASSY &TEST i--_-,_-TOJPL
ASSY/I=AT/TAT
ASSY & FAT
GOLD-I
STONEI ETR
DESIGN VER LIFE TESTS
ETR SUSTAINING
1969 TEST
FLIGHT
\
1971
• I
71 LAUNCH
WINDOW OPEN
ASSY & FAT
J ASSY & FAT
I
FAB J ASSY & FAT
I FAB l ASSY & FAT
Figure 7-14:
, il
,_ ETR I MISSION
ASSY & FAT ETR I _
Integrated TestProgram Schedule
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1969 PTM/SPARE TEST FLOW
Subsystem Assy. & Power Off Test
STC - S/C Ground Integrity Test
Power Applications
Subsystems Tests
Inter-Subsystem Tests
Telecommunications Calibrations
Systems Test
Parameter Variations Tests
System Reference Test
SUB-TOTAL
Weeks
4
2
i/2
1-1/2
1
1
3
1
i
15 weeks
Simulated Midcourse Interaction Tests
Vibration Tests
Space Simulation
Free Mode Test
S/C - Centaur Compatibility
EMI
Dummy Capsule Interface Test
Weight and Balance
S/C - LCE
Simulated Countdown
Special Tests
Spares Burn In
System Reference Test
Clean-up, Buy-off, prepare to ship
SUB-TOTAL
2
3
7
l/2
1
2
1
1/2
1
1/2
2
4
1
2
27-1/2 Weeks
TOTAL = 43-1/2 weeks
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Table 7-17:
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1969 COMPATABILITY MODEL
Subsystem Assy. & Power Off Test
STC-S/C Ground Integrity Test
Power Applications
Subsystem Tests
Inter-subsystem Tests
Telecommunications Calibrations
Subsystem Test
EMI Tests
Dummy Capsule Interface Test
Simulated Countdown
System Reference Test
Clean-up, Buy-off, Ship (Air ship)
Seattle
Arrive Goldstone, Inspect, Set-up STC,
System Reference Test
S/C - DSN Compatibility Test
System Reference Test
Pack & Ship (Sir ship)
Goldstone
Arrive ETR, Inspect, Set-up STC, System
Reference Test
Pad _i Compatibility Tests
Pad #2 Compatibility Tests
ETR
TOTAL 41 weeks
Weeks
4
2
i/2
1
1
1
3
2
1
1/2
1
2
9-1/2 Weeks
3
4
1
1/2
8-1/2 Weeks
3
5
5
13 Weeks
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1969 FLIGHT SPACECRAFT TEST FLOW
Subsystem Assy. & Power Off Test
STC - S/C Ground Integrity Test
Power Applications
Subsystem Tests
Inter-Subsystem Tests
Parameter Variations Tests
Subsystems Reference Tests
SUB TOTAL
Weeks
4
2
i/2
1-1/2
1
1
1
15
Vibration Tests
Space Simulation
Free Mode Test
Weight & Balance
Simulated Countdown
Special Tests
Systems Reference Test
Clean-up, Buy-off, Ship (Air ship)
Total Seattle - 27-1/2 weeks
SUB TOTAL
2
4
1/2
i/2
i/2
2
1
2
12 1/2
Arrive ETR, Inspect, Set-up STC, System
Reference Test
Shroud & Booster Mate
Simulated Countdown
Weight & Balance
Fuel and Arm
Final Pad Assy & Prelaunch checks
3
3
1
i/2
1
4
TOTAL ETR 12-1/2 Weeks
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7.8°4.2 '71 Test Schedule With Atlas/Centaur '69 Test Flight
Figure 7-15 shows the test schedule if Atlas/Centaur is used for the
'69 flight. The later launch window provides approximately 2-1/2 months
more test time. The absence of a dummy capsule and associated interface
tests provides additional schedule relief. This additional time is
sufficient to allow a full FAT on the compatibility test model, thereby
making it usable as a flight spare. This in turn will permit the proof
test model to be tested to full TAT levels and will provide added
assurance for the flight articles.
The test schedule is otherwise essentially the same as the schedule for
the '69 test with the Saturn/Centaur.
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DEVELO PME NT TESTS
SUBSYSTEMS DESIGN CRITERIA
DEVELOPMENT & VERIFICATION
STRUCTURAL TEST MODEL GT-1
THERMAL TEST MODEL GT-2
DYNAMIC TEST MODEL GT-3
ENGINEERING MODEL GT-4
TYPE APPROVAL TESTS (TAT)
SUBSYSTEMS
PROOF TEST MODEL 1969
COMPATIBILITY TEST MODEL 1969
PROOF TEST MODEL 1971 NO. I
PROOF TEST MODEL 1971 NO. 2
*JPL TEST SPACECRAFT
III. FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS (FAT)
1966
DEVELOPMENT FREEZE
BREADBOARD
TESTS
1967
I
i
ENGINEERING 1
MODEL TESTS
, FAB
TEST UPDATEFAB
FAB TEST ' UPDATA TES_
FAB ASSY &
J FAB
J FAB
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT 1969 SPARE (SAME AS COMPAT TEST MODEL 1969)
TEST FLIGHT S/C NO. I (1969)
TEST FLIGHT S/C NO. 2 (1969)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT (SPARE) (1971)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO I 11n71_
* _171 I/
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO. 2 (1971)
*Per Specimen Statement of Work Phase II
I
/
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1969 ATLAS/CENTAUR TEST
1971 SATURN/CENTAUR MISSION
1968 _1969LAUNCH
PERIOD 1969 TEST
ATLAS/CE NTAUR
ASSY & TEST L
I"
ASSY & FAT
FAB I ASSY & FAT
ASSY/FAT/TAT
ASSY & FAT
ETR SUSTAINING
1969 TEST
FLIGHTS
1970
ENCOUNTER
PERIOD
(FLYBY)
1971
71 LAUNCH
ASSY & FAT J_
_'t & FAT
ASSY & FAT _
F I
WINDOW OPEN
ETR SUSTAINING ._ETR 1 MISSION
Figure 7-15: Integrated Test Program Schedule
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Revise figure per following data:
Facilities line:
Cka.t_e "BOD-Dynamic Test Facitity" from 5/1/69 to
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1971 SATURh
1966 1967
DEVELOPMENT TESTS
S _ ,_ vc, c q,.,.,S, _T_.M_ DESIGN CRITERIA
DEV-LGPMENT & VERIF_CAT!ON
c-_" ,"-.-" _CCT MODEL GT.I,.,. x,_ ._. L,."kAL _,_,.,
T.X---._MAL TEST MODEL GT-2
2'/.X.-'..L'.:C TEST MODEL GT-8
--.'<O:.XZ-R]NG MODEL GT-4
:!. TYPE. APP._OVAL TESTS (TAT)
SUSSYSTF_MS
-_--,,-,:- --:c': MOD:-L 1969
COM?ATLS_L!T\. z TEST MO_T--L 1969
.._.- ,_ MODEL ]971 .NO. 1
,:,,Jwr T:_ST MODEL 1971 NO 2
'_ .,-__ TEST b, A_.:CRAFT
_:Jl. _" "_- CEr,' _,,: ACCEPTAN TESTS (FAT)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT 1969 SPARE
;'FS_ FL!GHT S/C NO, 1 (1969)
TEST FLIGHT S/C NO, 2 (1969)
FL!GHT SPACECRAFT (SPARE) (1971)
r,!Gmi .,, _,,r_,,.m,_rl NO. 1 (1971)
FL'GHT SPACECRAFT NO. 2 (I97I)
DEVELOPMENT
FREEZE
V
BREADBOARD
TESTS
ENGINEERING
MODEL TESTS
969
1
I
[k 'FAB j
1
l
TEST
_971
I
u
I
l
r
i
1
(SAME AS PTM 1969)
_Pe: S_acimen ,Statement of Work Phase !1
D2- 82 709 - 1
" '_:--NT-XL2 T_ST
'D/ x,_, _
•, ::=./,..:_x _,_u,_, :V,ISS!ON
t
: TZST !
::AS TEST i
FA3 _TEST;
i 1
1968 ij 1969
i
/ / /,,
?F.RIO D
ASSE,_3L¥ & "-:c_,._,
ARRIVAL
PERIOD
(ORBIT
INSERTION)
1970 ]971
|
1971 LAUNCH WINDOW
OPEN
V
_,-t-
i ASSY &
EXTENDED FAT
i ASS¥ & {
i TZST ;.;/ i
%
GOLD, STONE J
. ASSY &
FAS i _.,...:.
i im
i ASSY & FAT i
i .
'1
]
ET,_
; i
GOLDSTONE
r/--
i [_ ,r-A3 j A._SY & FAT DES. VER. LIFE TEST ]"
SH:P TO '_
ASSY & FAT
PR_LAUNCH
TESTING
71
' I
I _as
I FAB
p.LI" SHIP TO ETRI
Integrated Test Program ScheduleFigure 7-14:
7-65
D:\/=I mr_ NT TESTS
_..,S, ..,. ,._..4..,DESIGN CRITERIA
DZVELQPMF_.NT & VE,RIF!CATIQN
c,-_r trT.'_A, T_ST MODEL GT-1
T'-":-_n_ ,,' "r=c'r MODEL GT-2
-...'-;.-..v..,., ._,_.._.,'.,,-,-,:L GT-3
Z.\C ;>,;---..,I>,;G MODF_L GT-4
1966 i 1967
!
V
DEVELOPMENT iFREEZE
i i,e . . ° _
5READ-
BOARD
TESTS
APP.%DVAL TESTS (TAT)
$U3SYSTEMS
?£OOF TEST MODEL 1969
C3MPAT!£!L£TY TEST MODEL 1969
?ROOF TSST MODEL 1971 NO. !
D_ z'-,_ -'r" c:.\O_,. ir-,,T MODEL 1971 NO. 2
"-"JPL TEST SPACECRAFT
:il. =" :GH_ ACCEPTANC = TESTS (FAT)
ENGINEERING
MODEL TESTS
/
-1 -H ", _ G T SPACECRAFT 1969 SPARE (SAME AS COMPAT TEST MODEL I%'-:
TEST FLIGHT S/C NO. I (1969)
TEST FLIGHT SIC NO. 2 (1969)
_I I ,_ I.,.1 Tr_.,_, ,. SPACECRAFT (SPARE)(1971)
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT NO. I (1971)
FL!GHT SPACECRAFT NO. 2 (1971)
* Per Specimen Statemen: of
D2-82709-1
i_ C,_ ; _'i ,q,/f" \! TI_ "i-_ ;ZST
197] c,',':."_ , _" r"
.... L,.',N ,__/,,.ENTAUR MISS._ON
i T_'= i
..... -i
i
1969 } I970
...... ENCOU,_E_
,c<:..rv & TEST \
TA'_
'":' T25T i ---"FAS _'_:'_-'- I :.b.:x s
FA,3
C ,DLD3 • _Nr. i FAS
i I ASSY/FAWrAT
i FA__,ASSV/FA_
: .>,- c._o TO J?L
,,,, ,,
i
J FAB j ASSY _- FAT ]
' "/ii ASS",' & ;:AT iFA_,
"Nd_.,, ETR
, PRELAUNCH
TESTING
j GOLD.Is.roNE1 ET_ 'X
DES. VER. LIFE TE.ST
FAi_
ASS¥ & FAT
FA_
I I
I
I
Figure 7-15:
ASSY & FAT
ASSY & FAT
\
1971
x7
1971 LAUNCH WINDOW
OPEN
_SHIP TO ETR? I
& PAD TFSTING l
j "_1 ET,_
'?.}_ ?R ELAUNCH
Integrated Test Program Schedule
7-7]
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
MAJOR PROGRAM INTERFACES
BOEING
MISSION ENGINEERING
SYSTEM ENGINEERING
PLANETARY QUARANTINE
PRODUCT ASSURANCE (P/A)
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION & DESIGN
SUBSYSTEM DESIGN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ATTITUDE REFERENCE
AUTOPILOT
REACTION CONTROL
CENTRAL COMPUTER & SEQUENCER (_
1965
JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
PH. IB PH.
PROP. EVI
NOV
IB PROPOSA
,LUATION
DEC
SELECT
CONTR.
REL FII_
MISSIO
/
START
MODIFICA
PHASE
PLAN
ST
RE
ISSI
REC
DIRE
JAN
PHASE IB
aCTORS
AL 71
N SPECS
rlON
IB
REL. FUNCT.
AN ALYSI S
RIL. OR DEO
_MT - PROPU
T
P/A UPD;
ATS & PART
:TIVES LIST
F
FEB
IL
ESTAB.
PROJECT
CONTROL
CENTER
)NTAM.
_SION
_TE APPVD
S &M&P
MAR
PHASE IB
APR
IN °PR( _CESS
REVlEV & TECH
DIRECl iON
p,
h,
DEV! LOPMENT
STAT US
REVl !W
UPDAT S/C MOS r
r
PREL M - DEFINII
STER L. & DECOF
AVA L
RELP/A
DATA ASSIGN COG
I_,.AN EhlGRS
AN
COR
M.A_,
DEV STATUS
REV
r
OMPL. PHA
READBOARD
DEV STATUS
REV _Jv
_LAnI
BREADBC
c______
COMPL, PHASE IB
BREADB DARD TEST
DEV ST, _,TUS
REV
COMPL.
BREADB(
DEV STATUS
REV •
DEV
1966
MAY
N INTERFAC
L
DN
AM
APPRq
DSGI'
SPEC_
LYSIS &
!CTIVE ACTI(
COMPLETE
T
AUG SEPJUN
ANAL
IN PRO
REVIEW
JUL
"ESS
& TECH
DIR. _r
JILOPDE_
FREI ZE
FINAL REL
PHASE IB
DOCUMEI_
)VE
i AWARD PI
CONTRA(
AI
II_
TI
I
SUB_ UTI FUNCT. _
DESI 3N SPECS.
!
I
ST
TATION AI'
IMPL
PHASE
R&S I_
COMPL S JBSYS
FUNCT. PEC
REL
4ASE II
IT
_PROVE
ITEGRATED
ST PLAN
ASSIGN h
ENGR PAt
PERSONN
_T SYST.
IAL '69 & '71
bl SSION
IEL
"L
UPD_ TE
REL 4 SAF
ANAl YSI$
r
COMI ..
PDR
I'
69-71 :UNCT.
SPEC I_EL &
COMP_ PDR
_r
I
69 FUNCT
SPEC REL
COMPL
PDR
,I
"71 LO
•'1 tULUe
HASE IB FUNCT SPEC REL.
_RD TEST COMPL
PDR
_r
REL INTERFACE
CN1RL DWG 71 & 69
j' COMPL FUNCT. SPE
f PDR REL.
' T t Tt
'HASE IB I l
• D TEST I 7_& 6T
/ FUNCI"
COMPLJ PDR SPEC I_EL.
II
ANS
OCT
ES1AI
P/, DATA
CE _ITRAL
PROVIDE F
69 TEST FL
REQMTS &
S/C - L/V
r
_r
BREAD BOARD
DSGN DEV
& TES1 COMPL.
g
COMPL. PHASE IB
BREADB( _ARD TEST
ST,
M(
T
,RT ENGR
_DELTEST
F
NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR API
INTEG _ATED
TEST PIAN
APPRO/E
'69 /V
DECISION
PHASE II
SUBMIT '69
L/"V RECOMA A.
1969 TES
FLIG HT
APPROV
1969 DE
REVIEW
RELIM
MISSION
RESTR.
MOS - DSN
_r
d
IPDATE S/C
r'ST FUNCT.
NAL
PROVIDE UI_DATED
INTERFACE DATA 71
Ul DATE 19
Ft NCT SPI
f
U _DATE PLANq "ARY
C UARANTINE IEQMTS
REL P/A
TEST
REQMTS
'I'
tEL P/A
_FG
IEQMTS
V
UPDATE
REL '69
ANALYSIS
¥
P/A ST_TUS
AT CDR
S/C ETM
DWG REL
g
STAR ENGR
MOC _L TEST
_F
STAI T ENGR
MO IEL TEST
( DMPL ENGI;
t ODEL TEST
START ENC_R
MODEL 'EST
s/s cc _M.
DSIF C )MPAT
ESTAB
S/C ETM
DWG REL
COMPL
CDR
• • 'V
ENGR
HDW A
¥
START !NGR
MODE TEST
S/C ETM
DWG REL
1967
MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
ISIGI
UPDATE S/C
71 S, C SYST. FUNCT
CS ANAL (EVERY 6 MONTHS)
IPL S )BSYS
:TM )WG
CO/_ ,PL ENGR
MOI _. TEST
REL QU.4 L
STATUS
DOCUME NT
Ir
Ul DATED PART',
M_LS & PROCE'.;S TEST
LI:iT
UPDI
REL
ANA
COMP. SI
ENGR. M
69 T.F. DWC
_EL EFM HDW
COMPL ' _VAIL
COR
r •
ETM HDW
AVAI L
I'
COMPL. ENGR
MODEL EST
t ?
COMPL
CDR
ETM HDW
AVAI L
1'
COMPL. Et4GR
MODEL TE_T
COMPL
CDR
COMPL
CDR
T
Iq_69 DWG REL
ETM HDW
AVAI L
T
START
TAT
¥
OCT NOV DEC JAN
1971 S/,Z CDR
APPR()VAL
REL MI!_SION
OPER,_ FION
PLAN
FEB MAR
S/C 1971
CDR
rE '71
SAF
YSIS
r
_,SYS
_D
CDR
COMPL.
UPDATE
O _.E '71
FU NCT.
SP !CS
PR )VIDE FIN.
VC YAGER '71 JPDATE S/C
MI ;SION REQM S IYSTEMS
& ESTR. S/C - _OS DSN :UNCT. ANA
'f L/ - CAP I
VERIFY r ECONTAMIIx _,TION
OF '69 F.T ARTICLE
P/A
STATUS
CDR _
T q
COMPL. UBSYS
DWG. RE ..
_ONITOR TA TESTING -_
START
TAT
r
START
TAT
l
1969 1 LT
HD'_ AVAIL
1969 FL1
HDW ,_ /AlL
T
START
TAT
969 FLT
H DW AVAI L
969 FLT
HDW AVAIL
T
I _69 FLT
HDW AVAIL
T
1968
_PR
START
OSE
CDR
MAY
ASSIGN
SPAT & F
TEAMS
JUN
OSE
SAFE
A.PPRC
_AT
Y
_VAL
JUL AUG
SU_-,
1_69 MISSION
A2CEPTANCE
v
START E _'R DEI
INTEGR _TION S/C
TESTINq
ORT TO JPL
REL.
INTER
DWG
PAYL(
SEP
LEV
k
IV TEST
TO JPL
N THE REFIN
NAL
;ACE CONTR
/C SCIENCE
AD
SUMMAR
STATUS '
r P/A
_9s/c
-- MONITOR '69 FA & PRE.AUNC H TES
COMPL
TAT
T
7
rOCT
TURN IB
NTAUR AVA
_ENT OF Tl'i
NOV
i
69 FINAL
.L CONFIG
r T
E VOYAGER
UPDATE VO"
)71 MISSION
& RESTR. S/(
csr
DEC
19
REV OI
,d
SUBMIT
LAUNC
RECO_
iP71MISSION
AGER
REQMTS
- L/V
JAN
,9 LAUNCH
PORTUNITY
r
A L
2ND I!
_ VEHICLE D
ENDATION
DEFINITION
FEB
il
e_UNCH
,IJECTION
EPLOYMENT
AND MISSIO
I
MAF
FINAL I
CORREC
,,I DESIG
UPD
SUM
;._..._P/'A
,TE
v_ARY
ITATUS
r
P/A QUICK
LOOK REPC
ON LAUNC
RT
r
. MONITOR '69 FLIGt"
( OMPL. SUBS'
TAT
T
CO_ _PL.
TAT
r
COMPL.
TAT
T
'S
971 PTM #1
SUBSYS AV/
I'
1971 PTM #_
SUBSYS A_
I'
i97i PTM N1
SUBSYS A_
T
971 PTM #1
SUBSYS AVA L
t
IL
iP71 PTM 11
SUBSYS AVAIL
,i 1'
'AlL
klL
1969
APR
COURSE
)N
EST
UP )ATED
DWG COMPL.
I
MAY
19
JUN
rl STER.
REQMTS DEF.
INTERIM
P/A REPOR
_. '69 TEST
11'
JUL
r
AUG
MONITf
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB
CAPSULE ORBIT SUBA IT FINAL
SEPARATI( IN TRIM ENC_)UNTER
1969 FLT REPO :_T
" UPDATE :UNCTION,_L ANALYSIS, :UNCTIONlrL SPECS.,,DE"AII
I( '69 FLIGHT TEST
FINAL
P/A REPORI
• '69 TEST _._
P
_'71 FLT SPAR
t SUBSYS AV,_r
971 FLT SPAR
SUBSYS AVA
l
971 FLT SPAR
SUBSYS AVA
t'
1971 FLT SPARE
SUISYSI' AVAIL
/O 1971 :LT SPARESUE ]YS AVAIL
MONITI,_R
1970
_AR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG
MISSIDN ACCEPT _,NCE
REVIEN '71 SPARE
STAI_T I
INTEC
TESTIt
SPECSt _ SYSTEM DOi UMENTATION
I S/C FA TESTING
SUMMA!
PA STAT
'7_s/c
lY
II
SEP
'R
_TION
ONITOR '71
OCT
MISSION AC
REV. 1971 FLI
S/C NO. I
s/c FA &PC
NOV
CEPT
GHT
LAUNC H TE_
DEC
TING
JAN
SATURN
AVAI LA
VERIFY DEI
STATUS
FEB
IB/CENTAL
3LE
i
IONTAM.
UPDATE
SUMMA
P/A ST,a
ira,-
1971
MAR
1971 FINAL
CONFIG.
rT
'1 STERIL.
ERTIF.
r
APR
1971
:EVIEW OPP
T
P/A QUK
LOOK RE
ON LAUI'
,q
MAY
LAUNCH
)RTUNITY
K
ORT
CH
r
JUN JUL
AUG SEP OCT NOV
1971 MARS
MISSION
DEC
ENCOUNT.
T
JAN
SUBMIT '71
PRELIM ENC(
REPORT
1972
FEB
THE
MAR
SUBMIT '
FINAL El'
REPORT
APR
'I
ICOUNT
MAY JUN JUL
COMPANY
ELECTRICAL POWER
STRUCTURES & SPACECRAFT ADAPTER
MECHANISMS
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
PYROTECHNICS
CABLING
PROPULSION MIDCOURSE
PROPULSION ORBITAL INSERTION
SCIENCE PAYLOAD INTEGRATION
MANUFACTURING & TEST PROGRAM
MOCKUPS
PARTIAL SPACECRAFT
STATIC TEST MODEL
THERMAL TEST MODEL
DYNAMIC TEST
COMPLETE SPACECRAFT
, ENGINEERING&
MODEL
MODEL-PROTOTYPE
DEV
REV
DEV STATUS REV
COMPL.
BREADBO
DE'/STATUS REV
DE' STATUS REV
COMPL.
BREADBC
DEV
REV
DEV STATUS
LONG LEAD SUPP!
PROCUR. SPEC CON'
RELEASED SELECT SU)PLIER AW_
r T '
LONG LEAD
PROCUR. SPEC
RELEASED
!
SELECT SUFPLIER
T
SUPP
CON
AWA
RELEA_jE CLASS Ii
M/U D_'GS
11'
cc_lM/
REL.IN
CNTRL
1
kSE IB REL,
) TEST CNI
COMPL.
BREADBC
iASE IB
_D TEST
_TUS CC
1
COMPL
COMPL
BREADB,
V.
- COMPL
I PDR
IERFACE
WGS C
INTERFACE
_L DWGS
COMPL PDR
)HASE IB
_D TESTS
MPL. PDR
:'DR
PHASE IB
)ARD TEST
REL. NTERFACE
CNTR L DWGS
R
_CT REL.
CNT
)L CLASS II
INTERFACE
_,L DWGS
1'
STAT
THER
DYN
ENG
r ?NCr SPEC REL
• COMPL '6' & '71 FUNC
PDR SP:C REL
I'
COW
BREADBC
'69 & '71 FUNC1 SPEC REL.
_r
COMPL
PDR
' 1
REL INTERFA
ENTRL DWG.q
r
COMPL
PDR
r
'69 & '71 FUr
SPEC. REL.
'69 & '71 FUI
SPEC REL
:E '69 & '71
SPEC REL
I'
'69 & '71FUI
SPEC REL.
I'
CT.
ICT
FUNCT
hlCT HDWE :ONTRACT
AWARE
_r
:OM_.
PDR
C TES
MAL TI
_MIC 1
INEER
'69 & '71 FUt
SPEC REL
MOD
ST M(
EST M
I ',,IG M(
_CT
L
)DEL
DDEL
DDEL
HDWE CON
AWARD
_r
i
L
1. PHASE IB
S,RD TEST
r
REL. STRUCT
TEST DWGS
I'
STAF I" ENGR
MOI:,EL TEST
'qr
STAR
MOI:
,q
ENGR
EL TEST
V
S/C ETM
DWG REL
1'
S/C ETM
DWq REL
f
COMPL. REI IAB.
THERMAL TEST
DWGS
T
STAR' ENGR
MOD L TEST
,q
START
MODE
START
tACT MODE
T
NASA DEF
SCIENTIFIC
INVESTI GA1
START El
MODEL
ENGR
L TEST
ENGR
L TEST
IONS
INIT. CLAS
M/U STRU(
IGR
EST
V
START E1
MODEL
S III
• DWG REL
Ir
1_9 FAB & S_ASSY
1969 FAB & SUBASSY
I
J TOOl
S/C ETM
DWG REL
T
,IGR
EST
INIT. CL,
SYSTEM
DWG REI
ING
s/c ETM
DWG REL
T
,SS III M/IJ
WIRING
STA
MO
,q
S/C ETM
DWG REL.
THER
iTENGR
EL TEST
I
cO
MC
_L. ENGR
TEST
ENGR
TEST
r
S/C ETM
DWGS REL.
T
S/C ETM
DWGS REL
T
ASS III
'U COMPL
_L TEST
_PL ENGR
DEL TEST
T
COMPL. E
MODEL TE
ETM HDW
COMPL
CDR
COMPL
CDR
I
SATURN IB
CENTAUR
VlB TESTS IF
SUBASSY- EI'IGINEERING
ETM HDW
AV AI L
COMPL ETMI
C DR AVA_
' T
ETM HD!
NGR AVAIL
ST
COMPL
MODEL
AVAI L
¥
ETM
HDWE
AVAIL
HDW
L
COMPL
CDR
t
ENGR
TEST COt
CDR
' 1
1969 T.F.
DWG REL
1'
1969 T.F.
1971 FAB & SL
COMPL
CDR
T
'69
D_A
REt
1
COMPL Er
MOD TES'
C(
DWG REL M
1'
BASSY
START
: TAT
¥ ,
'69 T.F.
DWG
REL
t
T_F.
G STAi_T
TAT
' T
'69 T.F.
DWG REL
START
TA1
69 T.F.
DWG REL
P
IGR COMP_
CDR
r T
ENG
HOW
)MPL. ENGIq
2)DEL TEST
T
197'
I
i
ENGR. MC
FLT
HDW
START
TAT
I
196p,
FLT
HD ' _'E
AV, _IL
START
TAT
, ?
START
TAT
START
TAT ENGI_. MOD
HDW AVAIL
'TT
_AOD
_VAI L
STARTCOMPL
CDR TAT
r t •
S/C SCIENC
INTERFACE
DWGS
1'
INSTR.
IPECS & ASSC C.
'69 FLT
HDW AVAI L
T
1969 FLT HDW
AVAI L
I'
AHSE - S/C ICOMPAT EST AB
STATIC TEST IIT II
I FAB & SUBA' SY J
J 1971 FABI& SUBASSY
)EL ASSY & lEST _ SUB
j DYN,_,ciJTEST
YSTEMS & 0 E COMPATII
II
ILITY TESTS
iL
rI CO
TA'I
COl APL
TAT
g
C_)MPL
TJ_T
,p
CqbMPL
T,__T
,g
¢
I
_.u_rL PTM r I
TAT SUBSYS ANI
COMPL
TAT
T
1971 PT
SUBS_'
_A//I
S AVAIL
g
971 PTM //I
SUBSYS AVA
971 PTM 11
SUBSYS AV,
¥
COMPL.
TAT
I'
971 PTM #1
SUBSYS AV,_
1971 PT_ ll
SUBSYS AVAIL
f
in_liv RIle,
COMPI TAT
r
SUBSYSTEMS
COMPAT
COMPL
r
1971 PTM I 1
SUI SYS AVAIL
r
REI Ul
EN ._lt
REI'_
JP! T
971PT/v#l
SUBSYS !AVAI L
I
flISH
rEST
TO
ONFIG
EST
FLTSPARI
SUBSYSAVA
1971 FLT
SUBSYS
T
;PARE
A_YAIL
1971 FL1
SUBSY',
Y
SPARE
AVAI L
)71 FLT SPAR:
SUBSYS AV,_ "L
r
1971 FI
SUI
I'
1 P71 FLT SPAR
SUBSYS AVAIL
F
1971 FL_ SPARE
SUBSY AVAIL
I'
JP_L - BOEIN
1971 FLT ;PARE
SUBSYS AVAIL
SPARE
AVAI L
ORG
SPACECR,_
PROGRAM
AUTONETI
DIVISIO_
ELECTRO (
,,s_er bcneaule 1vii NIIsslon wi_
Saturn IB/Centaur Mars Orbit
ABBREVIATIONS
C/O C H ECKO UT
ETM ENGINEERING TEST MODEL
CDR CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW
PDR PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW
M/U MOC KUP
FAT FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TEST
TAT TYPE APPROVAL TEST
ASSY ASSEMBLY
FAB FABRICATION
SUBASSY SUBASSEMBLY
REV REVIEW
REL. RELEASE
MDS MISSION OPERATION SYSTEM
DEV DEVELOPMENT
COMPAT COMPATIBILITY
INSTR INSTRUMENTATION
HDWE HARDWARE
FLT FLIGHT
ANAL ANALYSIS
IMPL IMPLEMENT
COG COGNIZANT
S/C SPACECRAFT
L/V LAUNCH VEHICLE
CAP CAPSULE
ETR AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE
BOD BENEFICIAL OCCUPANCY DATE
DSN DEEP SPACE NETWORK
DSIF DEEP SPACE INSTRUMENTATION FACILITY
DWG DRAWING
OSE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
SPEC SPEC IFICATION
MTLS MATERIALS
M&P MATERIALS & PROCESSES
APPROVALS
,ANIZAT ION NAME DATE APPROVAL
i |
11:1"SYSTEM ,"
JPL TEST SPACECRAFT
1969 PROOF TEST MODEL
1969 COMPATIBILITY TEST MODEL
SUBSYSTEM FLIGHT SPARES
1969 FLIGHT I
1969 FLIGHT 2
1971 PROOF TEST MODEL tl
1971 PROOF TEST MODEL _2

IR
cur_
ul
_J
LL i
0
©
r_
a_
o_
o_
m
r_
©
0_
_0
0_
|
LL
J_
LAJ
Iml
0_
m
LL
LLI
In
O_
m
AFT
TES
#I
3HT S/C #2
MO[ EL
I
1969 PTM :AB
1969 COMPJ TEST MODE
1969 FL1
FAB & SUBASSY _ JPL rEST S/C
L FAB
_9 FLT 2 FAB
I S/C ASSY a EXTENDED F
S/C ASSY
S/C ASSY &
J s/c AS_
1971 P
1971P
A.T
TEST
'69 SPARES
"AT
,Y & FAT
_OOF
_OOF
UBSYSTEMS
s/c
ASSIGN
SPAT & FPAI
TEAMS
COMPONE
,SSY & TEST
GOLDSTq
COMPAT
NTS AVAI LA
_)NE
TEST
_LE FOR FLIG -IT S/C
& S/S TO JPL
_V
ETI_ COMPAT TEST
I ETRPRELAI
II ETR
PREL,
TEST
TEST
ODEL
ODEL
P1
P2
TEST DATA REVIEW
NG
I ETR AVAILFOR SPARE
SATURI
AVAI L
DEPL(
SATURN IB
CENTAUR
AVAI L
& SUBASSY
LAUNCH
OPPOR -
TUNITY
MIDCOURS|
CORRECTIOI
TEST DATA VIEW
:INAL
20RRE
MI DCOURSE
CTION
S/C ASSY & _AT
35"
_ATA RI
;ULE
RATION
ORBIT
ECTRICAL &
MECH
COMPAT
ESTABL
VIEW
"r
ORBIT
TRIM
I ,ISERTION
 A  ' -VLEW
_r
1971 FAr SPARES SUB!YSTEM & C_)MPONENT!
I
PT/V DESIGN
VER F. TESTS CC MPL
F
S/C ASSY _FAT
AVAILFOR
TO
)STONE
DESIGN VER
FLI GH T S/C
F. TEST 5000
I
JrL - D_)rlN
rEST DATA
P
/C - DSN
_ESIGN
_ERIF. TESTS
IOMPL.
1'
-IRS MISSIOI
EVI EW
SHIP TO
ETR
SIM.
S/
L/
C,
'C - SYSTEM
V SYSTEM
DMPAT
T
1
s/c - MOS
COMPAT
ESTABL.
T
JPL - BOEIN JPL -
TEST DATA R !VIEW TEST DATA
COMPAT
ESTAB.
Jt'L - BUEIN
TEST DATA R ]VIEW
PH ILCOWE
DEVELOPMI
BUSINESS
ENGINEERII
FACILITIES
i
MANUFACTI
MATERIEL
i
QUALITY C
RELIABILIT
ASSURANC!
i
SYSTEMST
10711_, AD _
I.i,.I
m
0
l,m
£,0
_z
1971 FLIGHT SPARE
1971 FLIGHT I
1971 FLIGHT 2
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
ASSEMBLY, HANDLING & SHIPPING
EQUIPMENT
SYSTEM TEST COMPLEX
LAUNCH COMPLEX EQUIPMENT
FACILITIES
MISSION DEPENDENT EQUIPMENT
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

AHSE INTEI FACE
CO NTROL
DRAWINGS
STq" INTERFACECC_NTROL DWG
T
LCE INTERFACE
CONTF,OL DWGS
'I
MDE INTE FACE
CONTROL DWGS
T
PHASE II :ACIL
PLAN RF_
CO_PL. PHASE II
PROJG. PLANS, S:HED. & CO! IS
ESTAB CO xlFIG
CONTROL CENTER
'I
ESTAB PROJECT C_NTROLCEIx
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